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UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

TRADE ASSOCIATION STRATEGIES TO INFLUENCE PUBLIC POLICY

BY

© JUDY WAHN

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE

OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

IN

ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS

FACULTY OF BUSINESS

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THE UNDERSIGNED CERTIFY THEY HAVE READ, AND RECOMMEND TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH FOR ACCEPTANCE, A THESIS ENTITLED TRADE ASSOCIATION STRATEGIES TO INFLUENCE PUBLIC POLICY SUBMITTED BY JUDY WAHN IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN BUSINESS MANAGEMENT.

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Date:

ABSTRACT

The study was designed to examine the approaches used by trade associations to influence government policy relevant to their members. Data was obtained through interviews and questionnaires conducted with managers of twenty-nine Alberta trade associations and fourteen government officials. Both qualitative and quantitative analysis was conducted.

It was concluded that the likelihood of trade association representatives participating in the formation of public policy is influenced by the following factors: the extent of government dependence on the industry for information, the extent of government dependence on the association for policy implementation, the extent to which the association's goals coincide with those of government, and the extent to which the issue is specifi to the local industry.

Furthermore, it was concluded that direct contact with the government is the most common 'non-participative' influence tactic, followed by joint action with other organized interests, followed by the use of the media to influence public attitudes.

Long term strategies utilized to improve associations' relationships with government were placed in four categories: managing dependencies, managing legitimacy, facilitating communication and/or access and the general approach to government relations. Implications of the findings to resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) are discussed.

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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

Over the past thirty years, the study of organizations has recognized that organizations adapt to, as well as adapt, their environments in order to facilitate organizational success. However, the former approach has received a greater portion of the interest. In other words, more attention has been paid to how environments influence organizations than how organizations influence their environments (Astley and Van de Ven, 1983).

The present study contributes to the research which explores the proactive role of organizations. More specifically, the present study focuses on one particularly important sector of an organization's environment that has received little attention within Organizational Theory -- that of government policy. Furthermore, the present study focuses on industry trade associations as instruments of collective action. The purpose of the present study, then, is to examine and seek to understand the conditions under which trade associations undertake particular actions in order to influence government policy relevant to their members.

Two literatures will be shown to be useful in the present study. First, the resource dependence perspective from the field of Organizational Theory deals with the relationship between organizations generally. Second, the pressure group literature from the field of Political Science provides insight into the relationships between organizations and governments. Concepts and ideas from the resource dependence perspective will be combined with the empirical, largely case-study evidence from the pressure group literature to develop propositions for the study.

The present study utilizes a blend of quantitative and qualitative data collection methods. Interviews were conducted with twenty-nine industry association managers and with fourteen officials of the Alberta provincial government. The interviewees also completed one or more questionnaires. Quantitative analysis of the data has been undertaken to provide relatively large sample evaluation of the research questions that are beyond an initial exploratory phase.

Qualitative analysis of the interview data has been used to examine some of the previously unexplored research issues and to supplement the quantitative analyses.

The next chapter will provide an overview of the Organizational Theory literature, and attempt to place the present study within this field. Chapter Three consists of a general background discussion of trade associations (also called industry associations, or industry trade associations) in Canada. Chapter Four will present a conceptual framework and outline three specific research questions which will direct the remainder of the study. Chapter Five includes the literature review, including a general discussion of resource dependence theory and the pressure group literature. Also within this chapter, specific propositions are developed based on these two literatures. The methodology of the study is presented in Chapter Six. Chapters Seven through Nine present and discuss the findings related to the three research questions. Chapter Ten concludes with a discussion of the contribution that the study makes to the field of Organizational Theory, as well as to the field of Political Science.

CHAPTER TWO: ORGANIZATIONAL THEORY BACKGROUND

In this chapter an attempt is made to make three arguments. The first is that the field of Organizational Theory underemphasizes the potential for organizations to influence their environments. Second, such proactive organizational strategies are made possible even for small organizations through collective action via industry trade associations. Finally, the argument is made that an important sector of the environment that has traditionally been underemphasized in the Organizational Theory literature is government regulation.

The chapter will begin with a consideration of three dominant perspectives within the field of Organizational Theory, emphasizing the role of environment in each.

CONTINGENCY THEORY

Drazin and Van de Ven (1985) suggest that the dominant strand of Organizational Theory in the 1960s and early 1970s was contingency theory. Its proponents argue that managers of organizations attempt to attain a "fit" between contextual factors and organizational structure. That is, given a particular contextual factor, specific aspects of structure are seen as facilitating organizational success. Some of the contextual factors that have been studied are size (Blau, 1970; Pugh, et al, 1969; Kimberly, 1976), technology (Perrow, 1967; Fry and Slocum, 1984; Schoonhoven, 1981; Woodward, 1965), and environment (Burns and Stalker, 1961; Khandwalla, 1970; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). Thus, the role of the environment in contingency theory is as one of a number of contextual factors which serve as constraints on organizational structure.

Contingency theory has been criticized on many grounds (cf. Child, 1972; Schoonhoven, 1981; Schreyogg, 1980). Particularly relevant to the present study is that contingency theory is deterministic. For example, Zey-Ferrell (1981: 10-11) argues that it

> implicitly view[s] humans as nonvolitional, sponge-like, malleable organisms that absorb and adapt to their environments rather than as volitional actors pursuing

their own self-interests.

John Child (1972) argues that organizational decision makers are able to choose the environments within which they operate and are also able to influence their chosen environments. In other words, contingency theory is deceptive and incomplete in regarding managerial action as determined by various contextual factors.

Donaldson (1982) stresses that contingency theory's critics misrepresent its causal process. It is the fit between context and structure that leads to effectiveness, but this fit can come about either:

> by altering the structure to the contingency, . . or by modifying the contingencies to fit the structure (Donaldson, 1982: 67-68).

Contingency theory, he argues, does not preclude organizations acting upon their environments.

Whether or not the contingency perspective acknowledges that organizations affect their environments, the point being made here is that "most contingency theorists study only the deterministic type of hypothesis" (Schreyogg, 1982: 73-4). Contingency theory is perhaps best regarded as a theory of organizational structure rather than a theory of organizations more generally. A broader theory of organizations requires a more developed analysis of organization-environment relations.

Donaldson, in his <u>In Defense of Organization Theory</u> (1985) defends contingency theory's emphasis on organizational structure, suggesting that organizational actions to manipulate their environments should not be studied within the realm of Organizational Theory. He prefers a much narrower focus for the field:

> Organization Theory seems to be distinguishable as a body of thought by a concern for internal characteristics such as differentiation, specialization, standardization, integration, coordination, centralization and the like. These are not only traditional aspects of attention, they are recognizably organizational phenomena. Theories of organizations are frameworks for explaining the interrelation of such variables (Donaldson, 1985: 119).

Later in the same work he states:

> Similar remarks apply to the study of the manipulation of the environment. . . Much of this work is conducted outside of the boundaries of organizational sociology. While there is much to commend in scholars drawing upon the work of colleagues from other disciplines there would seem little merit in organization theorists attempting to duplicate the work of others who have distinctive competence. A sounder approach would be for organizational students to pursue enquiries based upon their special expertise and which draw upon their particular frameworks (Donaldson, 1985: 121).

The weakness of Donaldson's argument arises due to his bias towards normative research, as indicated by his interest in "the analysis of different designs, and their contingencies and <u>their outcomes</u>" (Donaldson, 1985: 120; emphasis added). However, in any field of study a basic understanding of the phenomena necessarily precedes normative statements. If we incorrectly view organizations as adapting to environmental conditions, or incorrectly view organizational success as unrelated to the ability to control the environment, then it is unlikely that useful prescriptive statements will result. It is necessary to <u>understand</u> the causal relationships between environment, structure and the actions of organizational actors before theorists can attempt to provide normative models.

In summary, contingency theory restricts its concern with environment to studying it as a factor influencing organizational structure. This restriction results in an incomplete view of the interrelationships between an organization and elements of its environment. Specifically, it emphasizes the environment as a cause; and neglects to consider it as a consequence.

INSTITUTIONAL THEORY

Although the institutional perspective (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Zucker, 1977; Zucker, 1988) is diverse:

> [t]he common feature . . . is that institutionalization is viewed as the social <u>process</u> by which individuals come to accept a shared definition of social reality (Scott, 1987: 496).

This shared definition of reality, or the "myths and rules" (Meyer and Rowan, 1977) about how organizations should be structured are held by society generally. Organizations adopt

> the form, if not the substance, of these rules and incorporate them in their structures, rules, and reporting requirements (Pfeffer, 1982: 245).

Structure, according to the institutional writers, is dependent on society's shared view of how organizations should be structured.

Institutional theory does provide some role for organizations to influence society. For example, Tolbert and Zucker's (1983) study of civil service reform implies that innovators of reform alter the societal view of appropriate civil service structure, thus leading to the diffusion of this innovation to other cities. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) argue that bureaucracy was initially adopted for reasons of efficiency. Subsequent adoption of this form, however, arose due to the institutionalization of bureaucracy as the desired mode of organization.

These studies suggest that organizations and their actions influence the development of the shared definition of society about how organizations should function. Thus, while organizations are subject to institutional pressures, these pressures are created, at least in part, by other organizations. Institutional theory goes further than contingency theory in viewing the broader environment, or society, as at least partly a function of the actions and structures of organizations. Still, though, the focus of the research is on how institutional environments influence organizations (eg. DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Greenwood and Hinings, 1988) rather than the reverse. Furthermore, the process of institutionalization is not treated as a conscious attempt by organizations to alter their <u>own</u> environments.

POPULATION ECOLOGY

The theoretical perspective that typically provides the smallest role for organizations to control their environments is <u>population ecology</u> (Carroll, 1984; Hannan and Freeman, 1977).

While Donaldson argues that organizational strategies to manipulate the environment are outside the realm of Organizational Theory, the population ecologists maintain that there are severe limits to such action. In other words, the population ecology perspective explicitly adheres to an environmental determinist position. This perspective utilizes an ecological analogy to explain the change in organizational forms over time. Like contingency theory it too suggests the need for a "fit" between the environment and organization. Those organizations that do not fit with their environment will fail. Thus, via a process of natural selection, populations of organizations of a particular form will occupy a particular niche of the environment. Organizations are assumed to be both passive and inert. They are unable to change in response to changing environmental conditions and are unable to influence their environments.

Population ecology was gaining in popularity in the late 1970s, at the same time as many writers were criticizing the deterministic assumption of contingency theory. Thus, those adhering to an ecological perspective were forced to defend their deterministic position more than were the early contingency theorists. Aldrich (1979), for example, points out that just over three percent of businesses in the U.S. employ more than fifty people, and in 1972 a majority had revenues of less than $25,000. He argues that it is unlikely for small firms to have enough power to influence their environment, although he acknowledges that large firms are often powerful enough to do so. However, he states that:

> the issue we must address . . . is whether it is fruitful to build a sociology of organizations on exceptional organizations (Aldrich, 1979: 154).

It does seem reasonable to assume that small organizations are relatively powerless, and are therefore required to adapt to their environment rather than able to manipulate it. This assumption appears to have been made by a number of authors. Even Child in his classic statement of 'strategic choice' emphasizes size as a determinant of the organization's ability to influence its environment:

> the directors of at least large organizations may command sufficient power to influence the conditions prevailing within environments where they are already operating . . . . Some degree of environmental selection is open to most organizations, and some degree of environmental manipulation is open to most larger organizations (Child, 1972: 4; emphasis added).

The implication is that small organizations are unable to influence their environments. Zeitz (1980) makes a similar statement suggesting that small organizations do not control critical resources that would provide them with power over other organizations with which they have exchange relationships.

COLLECTIVE ACTION

While viewing small organizations as powerless to influence their environment is intuitively acceptable, an alternative theoretical argument has been made which suggests that this may not be the case. Ironically, the argument utilizes an ecological analogy, although it denies the deterministic view of population ecologists such as Hannan and Freeman (1977) and Aldrich (1979). Astley and Fombrun (1983) discuss the work of Amos Hawley (1950) and his notions of how communities of organisms adapt. Adaptation to the environment can occur through communal action of like species (commensalism); or communal action of unlike species (symbiosis). Astley and Fombrun also point out that the nature of the relationship between species can be either direct or indirect.

The authors then apply this analogy to organizations by developing a classification of organizational collectives based on the form of interdependence (commensalistic or symbiotic) and type of association (direct or indirect):

> The agglomerate collective consists of organizations from the same species that form a single category because of their dependence on common resources, but that do not directly associate in order to cohere their respective actions. The confederate collective is comprised of organizations from the same species that directly associate with each other for the purpose of concerting their actions toward joint ends (Astley and Fombrun, 1983: 580).

The authors argue that the members of the agglomerate collective operate under conditions resembling the economists' notions of perfect competition. There are many small firms, each with little power to individually alter their environment. These firms, they argue, are the ones that population ecologists typically focus on. However, they argue that these organizations,

> being similar in kind, are equally vulnerable to the environment, . . . and thus share a common fate. . . what population ecologists fail to recognize is that, although such considerations diminish the importance of strategic action at the level of the single organization, they do not diminish the importance of strategic action at a collective level. Indeed, the very impotence of organizations' acting in isolation merely elevates the importance of collective action. Organizations in agglomerate collectives can and must formulate proactive strategies precisely because they occupy the same niche and share a common fate (p. 582).

Organizational size, according to this argument, does not preclude proactive strategies; rather, it makes collective action the strategy of choice for these firms. Astley and Fombrum argue that because of the large number of firms in these collectives, formal coordination mechanisms, such as cartels, trade associations and professional associations are required. Informal coordination is difficult when the number of firms is high.

The reverse is true, however, for confederate collectives. These occur in highly concentrated industries with few enough members to allow direct interaction between them. Informal collusion is a likely collective strategy under these conditions.

Whether framed within an ecological perspective or not, the argument that small organizations avoid the deterministic trap by acting collectively is an appealing one, and deserves theoretical and empirical attention. Fortunately, there appears to be an increasing interest in collective strategies in the Organizational Theory and Business Strategy literature. Such strategies include creating joint ventures (Harrigan, 1988), creating a consortia of organizations (Provan, 1984), forming ad hoc coalitions and other temporary political groupings (Baysinger, 1984), and creating cartels, interlocking directorates and trade associations (Hirsch, 1975; Pfeffer and

Salancik, 1978; Bresser and Harl, 1986). Astley regards this positively:

> many of today's organizational interactions cannot be explained adequately in terms of competitive warfare. Interdependence in modern society has grown to such an extent that organizations have become fused into collective units whose very nature does not permit independent action. Here collaboration becomes genuine as organizations develop orientations that gradually eliminate competitive antagonism (Astley, 1984: 533).

Hirsch's (1975) comparison of the pharmaceutical and phonographic record industries is one of the few studies in the organizational literature which examines the collective actions of organizations to influence their environments. He explains the significantly lower profitability of the phonograph industry relative to the pharmaceutical industry as due to its lesser success in manipulating various aspects of its environment in its favour. He summarizes his findings as follows:

> Three significant aspects of the record industry's external environment help to explain its organizational ineffectiveness as measured by its characteristically low rate of return . . . (1) the loss of control over price and the channels through which records are distributed, (2) the decrease in the predictability of decisions taken by programmers of radio stations, and (3) the failure to effect legislation granting full copyright protection to recordings. Each instance highlights elements in the institutional environment which provided the context in which major firms lost a significant share of the market and experienced declining rates of profit, in contrast to pharmaceutical manufacturers, whose efforts to control analogous aspects of their environment were far more successful (Hirsch, 1975: 340).

Hirsch's study demonstrates the utility of examining the strategic action of whole industries, as such action can substantially influence the industry's institutional environment, which can in turn affect the profitability of individual firms within the industry.

As discussed in the introductory chapter, we have chosen to study one type of collective strategy -- that of forming trade associations to undertake collective action. Unlike more informal collective methods, the formation of trade associations is feasible for firms in competitive or oligopolistic industries (Astley and Fombrun, 1983), and thus has wide application. Thus, by studying actions of trade associations, we avoid Aldrich's (1979) criticism of dealing with

strategies only available to 'exceptional' organizations.

ASPECTS OF ENVIRONMENT

To this point in the discussion, the conceptualization of 'environment' has been vague. The final portion of this section will elaborate on the concept of the environment, and narrow the focus of our investigation to one component of it -- that of government policy.

An organization's environment can be defined as including all phenomena external to the organization that influence or have the potential to influence the organization (Hall, 1987: 212). However, this definition presents environment as a rather amorphous entity. For the purpose of theory development and research, most authors attempt either to classify the environment into subsectors, or to dimensionalize the environment.

Within the former group, Hall (1987) argues that the organization's environment can be classified into seven components: technological conditions, legal conditions, political conditions, economic conditions, demographic conditions, ecological conditions and cultural conditions. Dill (1958) classifies the environment into four major sectors: customers, suppliers, competitors and regulatory groups. Daft (1986) divides the environment into nine sectors -- industry, raw materials, human resources, financial resources, market, technology, economic conditions, government and sociocultural sector.

Other researchers have attempted to dimensionalize organizational environments. Some of the dimensions that have been suggested include uncertainty (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967), stability (Burns and Stalker, 1961), complexity (Duncan, 1972), turbulence (Emery and Trist, 1965) and capacity (Aldrich, 1979).

This latter approach is useful for developing fairly abstract theories which incorporate the concept of environment, since the dimensions apply regardless of the sector of the

environment. Our approach, however, is to move away from the relatively 'grand' theory to 'middle range' theory (Merton, 1957) by focusing on just one sector of the environment -- that of government policy.

This focus has been chosen for a number of reasons. First, regardless of how the term 'environment' is defined, government legislation and regulation are clearly important components. While Daft (1986) discusses the government as only one of nine sectors of the organization's environment, the government's role is more ubiquitous than this implies. Government action affects the nature of the industry sector, through competition policy, trade policy, and patent legislation. Macro-economic policy affects interest rates, unemployment rates, and investment rates, all of which are aspects of the economic conditions sector. Education and labour policy affects the human resources sector, while government involvement in research influences the technology sector. Thus, it is inaccurate to regard the government sector of an organization's environment in isolation, as it influences virtually all of the other sectors of the organization's environment.

A second reason for focusing research on government policy is the recent increase in government regulation of business. In the U.S., the last few decades have witnessed an increase in "social legislation" as developed by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration and the Environmental Protection Agency. Canada has followed a similar trend (EEC, 1985; Priest and Wohl, 1980; Schultz, 1984). The total number of pages of Canadian federal regulations increased from 1849 in 1949 to 7722 in 1978 (Priest and Wohl, 1980). Historically, government regulation served to police or prohibit particular forms of activity; however, more recent regulation has been developed to direct private activities in order to attain various social and economic objectives of society at large (Schultz, 1984).

A third reason for focusing on the legislation and regulation component of an

organization's environment is that, until recently, it has received little attention in the organizational literature. This has started to change over the last few years as the Organizational Theory and Business Policy journals have begun to discuss the attempts of firms to influence government legislation (Baysinger, 1984; Aplin and Hegarty, 1980; Fischer, 1983; Miles, 1982; Weidenbaum, 1981). However, the articles tend to be normative, recommending the incorporation of political strategies into the planning process (Mahon and Murray, 1981) or outlining an array of political strategies available to business (Keim, 1981; Weidenbaum, 1981). Some descriptive work includes studies of government relations and/or public affairs departments within organizations (Baysinger and Woodman, 1982; Dickie, 1984). There is a paucity of work within Organizational Theory and Business Policy which attempts to explain the conditions under which various strategies are used to influence government legislation (see Keim and Zeithaml, 1986 for a rare example).

CONCLUSION

It has been the purpose of this section to make three arguments. The first is that organizations must be viewed as capable of influencing their environments as well as being constrained by them. The discipline of Organizational Theory could therefore benefit from research into how organizations attempt to influence their environments. The second argument is that while large organizations tend to have a greater capability of influencing their environment than do small ones, all organizations have that capability by taking collective action through membership in industry associations. The third argument is that government policy is a deserving component of the organization's environment for academic study.

These arguments lead to the purpose of the present study, which is to examine the ways in which trade associations, representing firms within a specific industry, attempt to influence

those aspects of government policy that are relevant to industry members. In other words, the focus of study will be on the industry association, and the actions it undertakes in order to influence the outcome of public policy formation.

CHAPTER THREE: THE CANADIAN TRADE ASSOCIATION SYSTEM

Since the organizations that are examined in the present study are trade associations, it may be useful to provide the reader with some background information about these organizations and their activities. This chapter will summarize the information that is available about trade associations operating in Canada.

An 'industry association' or a 'trade association' is a voluntary association representing firms operating within a particular industry. In Canada, an estimated 648 trade associations of national significance have been created since Confederation, of which there were an estimated 482 as of 1980 (Coleman and Jacek, 1983). In addition to the national associations, there are also many local, provincial and regional associations. The development of Canadian trade associations was slower than that in the U.S. because of slower economic growth, greater distance between population centres and because many firms were members of the American associations; however, there was a large growth in Canadian associations following the rise of Canadian nationalism after the second World War (Colgate, 1981).

Canadian trade associations range in size, either measured in terms of membership, budget or number of staff. Litvak's (1982) survey of national associations included a range from seven members (the Canadian Brewers Association) to some with over one thousand members (eg. the Canadian Retail Hardware Association; the Canadian Construction Association). Over one quarter of respondents to his survey had less than fifty members, and over half had less than 150 members. In terms of budget, sixty-four percent spent less than $600,000 annually, 26% spent more than $1 million annually, and 2% spent more than $10 million annually. There is a wide range in the number of paid staff, as well. Litvak's survey revealed that one out of six associations had one full-time manager. Just under half had full-time staff of two or three people. One third had a staff of greater than four, while nine had a staff of fifteen or more.

The domain of an association refers to the organizations which, by virtue of formal rules

or informal practice, are potential members. It can be defined on the basis of the sector (eg. the Canadian Manufacturing Association), the industry (eg. the Grocery Products Manufacturers of Canada), the product (eg. the Canadian Carpet Institute), the activity (the Canadian Exporters Association), size (the Canadian Organization of Small Business), ownership (often there is a separate association for domestic and foreign-owned firms) or region. Many are hybrids (Litvak, 1982).

Associations can be categorized as either horizontal or vertical. A horizontal association includes firms across industries that operate at the same point in the production process (i.e. all who manufacture something, but not those that distribute it). An example is the Canadian Federation of Independent Grocers, representing grocery retailers, but not distributors. An example of a vertical association is the Canadian Frozen Food Association representing producers, brokers, transporters and retailers of any frozen food.

The above examples are primarily of 'nationally relevant' trade associations; in addition there are numerous associations with a local or regional domain. The nature of their relationship to the national associations varies. In some cases, a firm joins an autonomous regional/provincial association and automatically becomes a member of the national association. In other cases, the national association has provincial or regional divisions, which are not autonomous units in their own right.

William Coleman (1986b) has conducted research into the associational system in Canada. That is, he examines the system of what he calls 'business interest associations' and discusses the implications of this system for involvement of these associations in public policy formation. He identifies three types of systems. The first is a competitive system. In this case more than one association openly competes for members; that is, different associations have overlapping domains. There is no peak association (i.e. an association whose members are other associations) to aggregate the interests of the members of the associations within the sector. The

second type of system is a divided system. In this case the sector has numerous associations, but each with mutually exclusive domains. Again, there is no peak association to aggregate the interests of industry firms. The third type of system he labels an organized system. In this case the sector either has a peak association or there is one association for the whole sector.

Coleman (1986b) suggests that in Europe the associational system is highly organized, with each sector having a peak association, and each of these belonging to a national business association which serves to aggregate the interests of business as a whole. He argues that the Canadian associational system is much weaker, although there is variety across industries. He found that the manufacturing sector has the weakest associational system, with construction and agriculture having a fairly strong associational system.

Furthermore, there is no single association that aggregates the interests of all business in Canadian society. There are cross-sector associations in Canada, but these are in competition with each other. The Canadian Organization of Small Business (COSB) and the Canadian Federation of Independent Business (CFIB) are in competition for small business members. The Business Council on National Issues (BCNI) represents only large firms, and is in competition with the Canadian Chamber of Commerce. There are no formal links between most of these intersectoral associations and the industry trade associations, as their members are firms, not associations. In other words, they are not peak associations. There are some trade associations that are affiliated with the Canadian Chamber of Commerce, but this appears to be primarily for the purposes of exchanging information (Coleman, 1986b). According to Litvak (1982), the permanent heads of 21 major national trade associations meet every six weeks in Ottawa to discuss public policy issues. This informal group is called the Business Association Exchange.

There is some information available about the internal operations of Canadian trade associations. They are democratic in principle, with member firms electing the Board of Directors. Association officers are elected either by the membership generally, or by the Board

of Directors (Litvak, 1982). However, nominations for board membership are done in a behind-the-scenes manner with ratification by members at the annual meeting. Often the largest firms in the industry are informally guaranteed a position on the board (Coleman, 1986b). Thus, Coleman (1986b) argues that it is difficult to discern whose interests the trade association represents.

While final policy-making authority lies with the Board of Directors, the work of the trade association is often conducted by association staff and permanent and ad-hoc committees. The latter tend to be responsible for developing association policy on specific issues (Litvak, 1982).

The above discussion provides some background into the nature of trade associations in Canada, and the interrelationships between them. Of specific relevance to the present study, however, is their involvement in attempting to influence government policy. Some general survey information is available to provide some insight into the extent of this type of activity relative to other trade association activities.

Industry associations undertake a wide range of activities in order to serve their members. The previously cited survey of national industry associations conducted by Litvak (1982) asked its respondents to rank a number of activities according to overall importance. The top-ranking activity was government relations. In descending order of importance after government relations was collecting and distributing industry/market information, public relations, product/service standards, inter-industry relations, industry promotion, interest group relations, education, and employment standards.

Some of the non-government related activities of the provincial associations in the present study's sample include bulk purchasing of supplies, development and marketing of industry-relevant computer packages, reduced rates for insurance and credit card reimbursements, general industry promotion and public relations, educational activities, publications of directories

and industry conventions.

In Litvak's survey, government relations was given top ranking by over half of the responding associations; ninety percent rated it as one of the four most important activities of the association. The survey results indicated that most associations direct their attention to both provincial and federal levels of government, but with somewhat greater attention to the federal level. Over forty-five percent of the associations that reported being active in government relations have an "Ottawa office", presumably to facilitate interaction with federal politicians and bureaucrats. In terms of budget, over half of the respondents reported that they spend less than $200,000 annually on government relations. The proportion of total association budget devoted to this purpose ranged from 0.5% to 90%. Litvak (1982) reports that forty percent of respondents have a permanent government relations committee; in other cases the Board of Directors and/or an ad-hoc committee is responsible for this task. Over half of the respondents utilize outside expertise, including legal firms and public relations consultants, to help with government relations.

The Litvak (1982) survey provides some information about trade-association-government interaction. One-third of the respondents indicated that their association was in 'almost daily' contact with government officials; another one-third indicated that they had 'frequent' contact with officials. Furthermore, the majority of respondents indicated that they were either 'moderately' or 'very effective' in monitoring government, communicating government views to members and representing members' views to government. In terms of influencing government, 68% reported that they were 'moderately effective', while 16% reported being 'not effective'.

The results of this survey suggest that trade association activity in business-government relations is far from trivial. The vast majority of the nationally relevant industry associations appear to be active in business-government relations, and view this role as a significant one for their association. This view of trade associations as vehicles for influencing the environment of

its members is reinforced by the case studies that will presented in the next two chapters.

CHAPTER FOUR: CLASSIFYING STRATEGIES AND DEVELOPING RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Trade associations can utilize a variety of strategies in order to influence an existing or proposed government policy. In this chapter, an attempt will be made to develop a tentative classification scheme based on available literature. Furthermore, three research questions which will guide the present study will be identified.

Figure 4.1 presents a classification of trade association actions to influence public policy. Existing empirical and conceptual work suggests that influence strategies can be placed into two broad categories -- a participative approach and an advocacy approach. Furthermore, three types of advocacy 'tactics' can be discerned. Definitions and examples from the literature will clarify these labels.

PARTICIPATIVE VERSUS ADVOCACY STRATEGIES

The distinction between association participation in government policy formation and an association advocacy strategy is based on the general discussions of authors such as Coleman (1985), Litvak (1982) and Pross (1986). Each of these authors will be briefly discussed.

Coleman (1985) differentiates between what he calls 'policy advocacy' and 'policy participation'. He defines 'policy advocacy' as:

> the attempt to influence what will or will not be a matter of public policy, the content of policies as they are being made, and the way in which they are implemented once agreed to by the government and the legislature. The key word in this definition is that of influence because it emphasizes that the group is outside of the policy process (Coleman, 1985: 415).

He defines 'policy participation' as follows:

> the active participation of associations in the formulation of policy, in the implementation of policy or in both. . . Participation in policy formulation may involve one or more of the following tasks:



Figure 4.1. A classification of trade association actions

1. Formulation of the guiding principles or general rules of the policy.

2. The formulation of the actual text of a law or directive.

3. The formulation of the operationalization of the general rules and legal text including the writing of regulations attached to the policy (Coleman, 1985: 419).

Litvak (1982), in a similar vein, distinguishes between 'cooperative' and 'adversarial' trade association - government relations which are conceived of as the endpoints of a continuum. While the author fails to define these terms, they are clearly related to 'policy advocacy' and 'policy participation', as defined by Coleman. If a trade association is involved in policy participation, presumably it has a cooperative relationship with government. Furthermore, if a group has an 'adversarial' relationship with government, it is likely to be outside of the policy-formation process. However, the reverse of these cases may not be true; a group may be outside the policy process, making recommendations to government (perhaps at the request of the government), yet not perceive itself as involved in an adversarial relationship. The two sets of concepts set forth by Coleman (1985) and Litvak (1982) are similar but not synonymous.

In his recent book, Group Politics and Public Policy, Pross (1986) indirectly makes a similar distinction. His depiction of the policy community, (see Figure 4.2) places some pressure groups within the 'sub-government' inner circle of policy formation while others fall within or towards the outside edge of 'the attentive public' outer circle. Those groups within the sub-government receive the following:

> automatic group inclusion on advisory committees and panels of experts; invitations to comment on draft policy; participation on committees or commissions charged with long-range policy review; and continual formal and informal access to agency officials (Pross, 1986: 98)

Those groups that are within the 'attentive public' outer circle of Figure 4.2:

> are affected by, or interested in, the policies of specific agencies, and who follow, and attempt to influence, those policies, but do not participate in policy-making on a regular basis (Pross, 1986: 99).



Figure 4.2 The policy community, adapted from Pross (1986:100)

Trade associations which constitute interest groups falling within the inner circle correspond approximately with Coleman's (1985) policy participation groups, while those falling within the outer circle bear similarities with his policy advocacy groups.

In summary, a number of authors make the distinction between groups that are closely involved in the policy formation process and those that act to influence policy from the outside.

We have chosen the labels 'participative strategy' and 'advocacy strategy' to represent this distinction and will adapt Coleman's (1985) definitions as presented above. Thus, an 'advocacy strategy' will be defined as:

> the attempt to influence what will or will not be a matter of public policy, and the content of policies as they are being made, from outside of the informal policy-formation process.

A 'participative strategy' will be defined as: "the active participation of associations in the formulation of policy".

The distinction between a participative strategy and an advocacy strategy is not completely nonproblematic; there are clearly cases which would be difficult to categorize. However, some examples will be presented to illustrate the distinction.

Taylor's (1960) study of the Canadian medical profession's role in the formulation and implementation of public policy reveals an example of what we would label a participative strategy. He reports that the Advisory Committee to the Department of National Health and Welfare was also a standing committee of the Canadian Medical Association. This committee formulated policy regarding health insurance, which the government would subsequently implement.

Another example of a participative strategy is presented in Coleman's (1984c) discussion of the development of standards for drugs in Canada. Initially Canada borrowed its drug standards from Britain. After the Second World War, however, a Canadian Committee on Pharmacoepial Standards was created to develop Canadian standards. This committee consisted

of individuals from the Department of Health, the Canadian Medical Association, the Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons, the Canadian Pharmaceutical Association and the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of Canada. In other words, various interested organizations were formally included in the standards-development process.

In these two examples, the trade or professional associations were clearly inside the policy formation process. They are within the inner circle of the sub-government (Pross, 1986). Examples of advocacy strategies will be presented below as part of the discussion of three different advocacy tactics.

ADVOCACY TACTICS

There are a number of advocacy tactics, any combination of which comprise an advocacy strategy. Three such tactics -- direct contact, third party endorsement and the public route -- appear in the literature and will be considered below.

Direct contact consists of "behind-the-scenes lobbying" (Litvak, 1983) and refers to direct, unpublicized contacts between trade association officials and politicians and/or bureaucrats. This includes letters to and phone calls and meetings with government officials, submissions of briefs to task forces and policy-formation committees, and appearances before commissions of inquiry.

'Third party endorsement' (Toner and Doern, 1986) refers to the case in which the trade association appeals to a third party to obtain support for its policy preferences.

Two case studies reveal that one level of government can serve as third parties to enhance the influence of pressure groups on the policy of another level of government. Toner and Doern (1986) show that the oil industry responded to the implementation of the National Energy Program partly by obtaining support of the Alberta government. Bucovetsky (1975) describes how

the Mining Association of Canada garnered the support of the premiers of the mining provinces in opposing proposed federal tax reform which would be costly to the mining industry.

Litvak and Maule (1974) describe the actions of Time and Reader's Digest Magazine in obtaining 'third party endorsement' from the American government in gaining an exemption from a tax on foreign magazines in Canada. In this case, the fact that the firms were foreign-owned provided them with the potential for support from a foreign government.

The phrase 'the public route' is taken from Litvak (1983) and refers to indirect attempts used by trade associations to influence government by attempting to gain the support of the public for their policy preferences. An example is the advocacy advertising campaign undertaken by the Canadian Petroleum Association in an effort to mobilize opposition to the National Energy Program (Toner and Doern, 1986; Sethi, 1987).

A description of the strategies and tactics was a necessary prerequisite to presenting the research questions of the study. There are three such questions; each will be discussed briefly.

> (1) What are the factors that lead to adoption of a participative strategy rather than an advocacy strategy?

Assuming that the distinction between a participative strategy and an advocacy strategy is found to be meaningful, the study will attempt to determine the factors that influence the likelihood that each of these strategies will be utilized.

> (2) What are the conditions under which the tactics of direct contact, third party endorsement and the public route are taken?

Again, assuming that the classification of advocacy strategies into the three tactics of direct contact, third party endorsement and the public route are found to be meaningful, an attempt will be made to understand when each will be used.

> (3) How do industry associations manage their relationships with government over time?

The first two research questions have been chosen in order to develop an understanding

of the conditions under which various trade association actions are adopted. A logical next step is to take a more dynamic approach and examine how these associations manage their relationships with government over the longer term.

In summary, this chapter has developed a tentative classification scheme of trade association strategies to influence public policy and posed three questions to guide the research. In the next chapter, the resource dependence and pressure group literatures will be reviewed, with a specifrc concern with their relevance to the research questions.

CHAPTER FIVE: LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH PROPOSITIONS

The previous chapter clarified the types of strategies and tactics identified with trade association activities. The purpose of the present chapter is to examine the factors which may be helpful in explaining the circumstances under which these activities are undertaken. Two literatures are especially relevant. First, there is the literature of interorganizational theory; second, there is the pressure group literature of political science. In the next section the interorganizational perspective is examined in broad terms, followed by an introduction to the pressure group literature of political science. Subsequent sections address the three research questions, drawing in more detail from the interorganizational perspective and the pressure group literature. These sections develop propositions for the research questions.

THE INTERORGANIZATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

It can be argued that a trade association's attempt to influence public policy is fruitfully considered as a relationship between the trade association and the government (or specific departments or agencies of government). Thus, the literature which deals with interorganizational relations may provide insight into our research questions. The dominant theory that is used to explain interorganizational relations is exchange theory (Blau, 1964; Cook, 1977; Jacobs, 1974; Levine and White, 1961). Resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) is a related perspective based on exchange theory (Provan, 1984).

Exchange theory within interorganizational analysis can be traced to Homans' (1961) 'social exchange theory', and to Blau's (1964) Exchange and Power in Social Life. While the former primarily attempts to explain small group behaviour, Blau tends to emphasize exchange within social institutions. More recently, various writers have applied exchange theory to interorganizational relations (Cook, 1977; Jacobs, 1974; Zeitz, 1980).

Exchange has been defined as a voluntary transaction that involves the transfer of

resources (i.e. any valued activity, service or commodity) between two or more actors (i.e. individuals or corporate groups or organizations) for mutual benefit (Cook, 1977: 64). Exchange theorists argue that as open systems, organizations do not have all the resources needed to survive; interorganizational exchanges are necessary for goal attainment and survival (Levine and White, 1961). Thus, an examination of exchange relationships is necessary to understand a wide range of organizational behaviours.

Exchange theorists assume that organizational decision makers are motivated both to reduce uncertainty and to reduce their dependence on others (Thompson, 1967; Cook, 1977). According to Thompson (1967: 30),

> an organization is dependent on some element of its task environment (1) in proportion to the organization's need for resources or performances which that element can provide and (2) in inverse proportion to the ability of other elements to provide the same resource or performance.

The greater the dependence of an organization on that element in the environment, the greater is that element's latent power over the organization. Furthermore, the greater the power of an organization over its exchange partner, the greater its ability to determine the nature of the exchange and the ratio of benefits that will accrue to each side of the exchange (Cook, 1977).

Clearly the concepts of power, dependence and exchange are related (Clegg and Dunkerley, 1980). In order to understand the nature of the exchange relationship it is necessary to understand the relative power of the two parties, which can be explained by the degree to which each is dependent on the other. This notion of dependence is elaborated within the resource dependence approach (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Aldrich, 1976; Aldrich, 1979) which builds extensively on exchange theory.

The resource dependence perspective regards organizations as dependent on other organizations in their environment for resources required for survival. These resources can include land, labour, capital, information, raw material and legitimacy. The extent of the focal

organization's dependence on any other organization depends on the importance of that resource, the availability of alternative providers of that resource and the cost of switching providers (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).

This concept of dependence is the key one in resource dependence theory. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) utilize it in two ways. First, they discuss the effect of interdependence on the extent to which an organization complies to the demands of external pressures. Second, they discuss the attempts made by organizational managers to reduce the organization's dependence on other organizations and/or to increase others' dependence on it.

Research related to the former issue attempts to determine if there is a positive relationship between the dependence of organization A on organization B and the extent of A's compliance to B's demands. For example, Pfeffer (1972a) found that Israeli firms' willingness to pursue policies favoured by the government was positively related to the firms' dependence on the government for defence contracts. Similarly, Salancik (1979) found a positive relationship between American firms' dependence on government contracts and their seriousness about the government's affirmative action policy, at least for the large visible firm subsample.

The second aspect of resource dependence theory as outlined above deals with the strategies used by organizations to manage their dependencies. This aspect is the contribution of Aldrich (1979) and Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) over the work of the exchange theorists discussed earlier (Blau, 1964; Cook, 1977; Homans, 1961; Jacobs, 1974). Thus, resource dependence incorporates exchange theory, but also includes this additional component.

Aldrich (1979) and Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) assume that organizational decision-makers value autonomy and organizational goal attainment, both of which may be threatened by their external dependencies. Thus, they attempt to 'manage' these dependencies. Aldrich (1979) discusses three categories of strategies that organizations can use to manage interdependence. The first group includes 'proprietary strategies', or those that "[maintain] possession and control

over resources and [protect] organizational boundaries" (Aldrich, 1979: 293). Some examples of proprietary strategies are expansion through vertical integration, thus reducing the organization's dependence on suppliers or distributors; product differentiation, thus reducing the organization's dependence on a specific group of consumers; and predatory pricing which can weaken or eliminate new entrants into the market. These are the preferred strategies of decision-makers because they do not compromise the autonomy of the organization.

The second category of strategies include 'dyadic strategies'. These "require cooperation or negotiation with another organization on a dyadic basis" (Aldrich, 1979: 293). Some of these strategies include joint ventures, co-optation of executives of other organizations through interlocking directorates, and mergers. This category of strategies is less desirable to organizational managers than the proprietary strategies because of the loss of autonomy that they entail; however, they increase the organization's ability to attract resources.

The third type of strategy, an 'action set' is defined as "a group of organizations formed into a temporary alliance for a limited purpose" (Aldrich, 1979: 280). Such strategies include forming cartels and temporary alliances for political purposes. These are utilized when managing interdependencies is critical for all of the organizations within a group. This category of strategy is seen as least preferable, because of the significant loss of autonomy for the member organizations that it entails.

Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) do not utilize this classification scheme, although they, too, discuss how organizations can manage their interdependencies through various strategies. The strategies that they tend to emphasize are mergers, acquisitions, diversification, growth, interlocking directorates, joint ventures, cartels and trade associations. The empirical research is directed at explaining the conditions under which these various strategies will be adopted (Pfeffer, 1972b; Pfeffer and Nowak, 1976).

It is evident that the interorganizational perspective is relevant to the present study of

trade associations. The exchange theorists' concern with power and dependence can be directly applied to a study of the relationship between a trade association and government. However, to this point, no empirical attempt has been made to do this. Furthermore, both Aldrich (1979) and Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) discuss the creation of formal alliances of organizations as a strategy to manage dependencies, and consider the conditions under which such a strategy would be adopted. However, neither provides an empirical test of their hypotheses.

In summary, resource dependence theory provides a theoretical perspective from which propositions about trade association strategies to influence public policy can be deduced (which will be done below). However, it provides little empirical work which directly examines these hypotheses. Before constructing a set of hypotheses, however, there is a second pertinent literature that requires discussion.

THE PRESSURE GROUP LITERATURE

Political scientists have extensively explored the activities of interest groups, including trade associations, and their effect on the public policy formation process. Therefore it is necessary to review this literature to examine the insight that it provides for the research questions posed in the present study. Pross defines a pressure group as an organization "whose members act together to influence public policy in order to promote their common interest" (Pross, 1986: 3). Clearly, trade associations are but one type of pressure group. The political science literature examines a range of types of pressure groups, including professional associations (Eckstein, 1960; Taylor, 1960: Torres, 1988), environmental protection groups (Chant, 1975), labour groups (Finer, 1973; Kwavnick, 1975), issue-oriented groups (Barry, 1975), corporations (Litvak and Maule, 1974), farm groups (Dawson, 1960; Self and Storing, 1962), consumer groups (Dawson, 1963) and student groups (Kwavnick, 1975).

For our purposes, the pressure group literature can be divided into two broad types. The first involves a discussion of the role of pressure groups in the political process, with attention to a range of issues. For example, Pross (1985) discusses the relative power of pressure groups and political parties, and whether this has been changing over time. Some authors discuss the relative power of business, consumer, and labour groups, and whether this has changed over time (eg. Schlozman and Tierney, 1983). Other authors provide a cross-national comparative discussion of the role of interest groups in the political process (Ball and Millard, 1986).

The dominant issue, however, is whether the increasing activity of pressure groups signifies a trend towards increasing or decreasing democracy in the liberal democratic states. Olson (1965) and Lowi (1964) regard pressure group politics as a threat to democracy, since some groups are able to gain a disproportionate amount of influence. Those adhering to a pluralist view of the state (eg. Jordan and Richardson, 1987; Pross, 1986) argue that pressure groups provide a meaningful opportunity for individuals, via their membership in groups, to participate in the political process.

While these issues are relevant to political theorists, they do not directly pertain to the research questions under consideration. However, the second type of work is more relevant. As Jordan and Richardson (1987) suggest, a political scientist's interest in pressure groups arises because of the interest in the process of policy formation. As a result, a wide range of case studies have been undertaken to document and analyze this process. Such studies may illuminate the issues discussed in the previous paragraph. Fortunately, these case studies often shed light on the research questions posed in the present study as well. It is these case studies, and the general discussions of the process of pressure group - government relations, that will be our primary focus within this literature.

As discussed earlier, the exchange perspective has not been used to explain the nature of the relationship between government and other organizations in society. The exchange

literature, then, provides us with theory, but is void of empirical support for that theory. The pressure group literature, on the other hand, provides significant empirical work relevant to our research questions, but suggests little in the way of theory.

This is not to suggest that the pressure group literature is atheoretical. Rather, pressure groups are examined in the context of explaining the nature of the state. The theories that are discussed are thus theories of the state, and are not applicable to the present research questions.

In the next two subsections we will draw upon the theory from the interorganizational literature of Organizational Theory, and the empirical pressure group literature of Political Science in examining the study's research questions. As will be seen, the empirical literature does provide significant support for an exchange perspective.

THE FIRST RESEARCH QUESTION: PARTICIPATION VERSUS ADVOCACY

Applying Resource Dependence Theory

It is commonly argued in the literature on trade associations, and pressure groups more generally, that they would prefer to have a participative rather than an advocacy relationship with government (Van Loon and Whittington, 1987). Thus, it would be expected that the more powerful the trade association vis-a-vis government, the greater the likelihood that the association would have a participative relationship with government. Factors that influence the nature of association-government relations, then, are those that influence the relative power of the two groups. These, as suggested above, are a function of the interdependencies of the two groups.

There are three general types of dependencies that government has on a trade association and which can be seen as influencing the nature of association-government relations. First, the government may be dependent on the industry for two elements necessary for the formulation of government policy. Both of these elements are informational. Thus, the

government may desire information about the policy preferences of association members. This may be difficult to obtain without the coordinating capacity of the trade association. And, the government may require technical expertise which is held by industry members. The trade association may serve as a convenient organization through which to obtain such expertise.

There are various factors which are expected to influence the extent to which government is dependent on the trade association to formulate government policy. First, if the industry is highly concentrated, and thus consists of few firms, it may be feasible for the government to obtain the information it requires by communicating directly with industry members. However, if the industry consists of a large number of firms, the government may be dependent on the trade association to aggregate the information required to formulate policy. Dependence on the trade association is also a function of the resources available to the government department. If the department employs in-house experts, it will be less reliant on industry expertise, and thus more able to develop policy autonomously. The specific proposition, then, is as follows:

> Proposition 1a. The greater the extent to which the government is dependent on the trade association staff and/or its members for information, the greater the likelihood that there will be a participative strategy.

The second dependency that government has on industry is for their cooperation in the implementation of policy. Again, there are a number of factors which can be expected to influence the extent to which government is dependent on the trade association for the implementation of policy. In the case of regulation, implementation of policy may require that firms be monitored for compliance and disciplined in the case of noncompliance. If the government has the resources to monitor and enforce regulation itself, its dependence on the trade association will be low. However, if the government has insufficient resources to enforce compliance, it may be dependent on the trade association to perform this function. Also, if the number of firms in the industry is high, the government may be unable to enforce regulation itself, and thus turn to the trade association for this purpose.

In the case of non-regulatory policy, implementation may require the administration of government programs (eg. subsidy programs). Again, if the costs of implementation are more than the government can afford, it may rely on the trade association to administer such programs. Such factors as the resources of the government department, cost of implementation, and number of firms in the industry will influence the dependence of the government on the trade association for the administration of the program. The specific proposition, then, is as follows:

> Proposition 1b. The greater the extent to which the government is dependent on the trade association staff and/or its members for help implementing the policy, the greater the likelihood that there will be a participative strategy.

The third type of dependency of government on industry is for the general economic well-being of the region. As Ball and Millard (1986: 66) argue:

> Although the state itself has increased its direct economic role, private enterprise is the major source of economic activity. Production and investment decisions rest in the hands of capitalist entrepreneurs, although they are taken within the overall framework required by government. As governments appear to be judged increasingly on the basis of economic conditions, and as government revenue also depends on economic performance, there is a relationship of close mutual interdependence which does not apply to other groups.

This dependency suggests that government will tend to collaborate with all industrial groups. Some argue that this is in fact the dominant tendency (Jordan and Richardson, 1987). However, this form of dependence may vary by industry, and thus it would be useful to predict those trade associations with which government will be most willing to collaborate. Some industries may have fewer barriers to relocation, and thus can threaten to pull out of the region if they are not involved in the formation of the policy with which they will be obligated to comply. Alternatively the government may offer to involve industries in the formation of policy in order to attract them to the country (or region) in the first place. Industries generating significant employment and/or tax revenues may have more power in influencing government than less significant industries.

> Proposition 1c. The greater the extent to which the government is dependent on the industry represented by the trade association for the economic well-being of the region, the greater the likelihood that there will be a participative strategy.

In summary, the interorganizational perspective suggests that a trade association will be more likely to have a participative relationship with government to the extent that the government is dependent on the trade association, either for formulation of policy, implementation of policy, or the general economic well-being of the region. It is not being suggested that strategy is exclusively a function of government dependence. Rather, this factor has been drawn from the perspective of resource dependence theory as of potential importance. Other factors will be discussed later.

The Pressure Group Literature and the Concept of Dependence

The writing of numerous authors within the pressure group literature supports a general exchange perspective. A common theme in this literature is that industrial pressure groups generally have a collaborative relationship with government because of the interdependency between industry and government. The following quote is typical:

> Government and industry need each other, and enter into more or less formal arrangements to sustain co-operation and minimize conflicts of interest. There is an implicit bargain: influence in return for cooperation (Madgwick, 1984: 321).

A quote from the Assistant Deputy Minister of the Health Protection Branch of the Canadian Department of National Health and Welfare supports this view:

> We have found through long experience that in order to assure that proposed regulatory changes are theoretically sound and capable of practical application, we have very closely and deeply to involve the private sector (quoted in Brown-John, 1985: 93).

Pross argues that "to justify their prominence pressure groups must perform some functions that render them useful in the system at large" (Pross, 1986: 88). These functions include the

communication of the demands of group members to government, the communication of demands and decisions of government to group members, the development of group member support for legislation, the regulation of group members and the administration of government policies. This can be seen as

> what some scholars call a benefit-exchange relationship. To survive as effective political institutions they must offer services needed by their host political systems, receiving in return specific benefits for themselves and their members (Pross, 1986: 88).

These functions all relate to the group's role in policy formulation or policy implementation -- two of the three dependencies discussed earlier.

Case studies can also be presented in support of the exchange perspective. Two studies of farmers' associations, one in Britain and one in Canada, suggest that the dependence of the government on an association has led to an involvement of the association in the formation of policy. In their study of British agricultural politics, Self and Storing (1962: 9) describe the "close and pervasive pattern of co-operation" between the government and the principal agricultural organizations. The authors argue that the National Farmers Union (NFU) was able to involve itself in this collaborative relationship because of the extent to which the government was dependent on it for information and advice. Furthermore, the NFU was seen as an instrument through which the government might influence the farmer. Without such a group willing to serve as a mechanism of communication, implementation of government policy would be difficult. This study, then, supports the general thrust of the proposition derived from the exchange perspective. The large number of members made direct communication with them expensive; thus the government was dependent on the NFU to facilitate that communication. The expertise and knowledge of the farming community was seen as necessary in order to develop government policy, and thus the NFU was able to obtain power vis-a-vis government.

Dawson (1960) suggests in her study of the Canadian Federation of Agriculture that

Federation officials were included on advisory committees, although her interviews suggest that not all Federation officials felt that this gave them significant say in government policy. She does argue, however, that

> the Federation has improved its reception in various departments by its willingness not only to provide information and data from its own files but its encouragement to farmers to cooperate with government officials seeking information (p. 145).

The government's dependence on the Federation to facilitate the collecting of information appears to have increased the power of the Federation vis-a-vis government.

A significant portion of the pressure group literature deals with professional groups as special interest groups attempting to influence public policy. Generally, they hope to ensure autonomy in the operation of their profession. In a normative discussion of self-regulation of the professions, Tuohy and Wolfson (1978) suggest that the state should allow the profession to regulate itself when the costs of obtaining information required for making decisions, costs of enforcing these decisions and probable costs of error in making decisions without sufficient knowledge are high. In our terminology, they are suggesting that when government is dependent on the profession for formulating and/or implementing regulation, the profession should be extensively involved in the formulation of that regulation.

Case studies of professions also support the exchange perspective. Eckstein (1960) argues that the British Medical Association (BMA) "has become indispensable to the government as a source of technical knowledge" (p. 46). Furthermore, the Ministry of Health assumes "that persuading the BMA usually is tantamount to persuading the medical profession" (p. 46). Furthermore, Eckstein makes the following observation:

> The BMA is often thought of as the chief enemy of the Ministry, a victim of the policies which the latter carries out. Not so. In its present form as a vast, highly bureaucratized and wealthy organization it is the creature rather than the victim of public medical policies; and far from being involved in constant warfare with the Ministry it is engaged in constant co-operation with it--a highly useful adjunct to the Ministry's machinery of administration which, had it not

already existed, the Ministry would have had to invent (Eckstein, 1960:48).

In this classic pressure group study, then, the existence of dependencies on the pressure group coincide with extensive collaboration between the pressure group and the government.

In a study of the development of national health insurance and hospital insurance in Canada, Taylor (1960) argued that the medical profession was successful in obtaining legislation highly consistent with its interests (although not its first choice of a fee-for-service system). They were successful in this regard because of the high collaboration between the medical profession and the government. For example, advisory committees to each provincial health department consisted exclusively of physicians, and the advisory committee to the Department of National Health and Welfare was a standing committee of the Canadian Medical Association.

Taylor (1960) offers a number of explanations for the success of the medical profession, some of which will be discussed later. A key one, however, was the government's dependence on the medical profession for expert advice, technical knowledge, liaison with medical or lay groups, help in the drafting of blueprints for planning hospitals to reduce the pressure on health departments to unnecessarily construct hospitals, determining the eligibility of people for various government programs (eg. disability pensions, Workmen's Compensation), administering medical care programs for recipients of social assistance, and monitoring and controlling physicians' 'accounts for services'. In this case, the government was dependent on the medical profession for information necessary to develop policy, help in the administration of that policy, and also for help in administering policies (eg. Workmen's Compensation) other than the one that affects the profession directly.

While farmers and the professions have received significant attention in the pressure group literature, the pressure of industry is not omitted. This literature sometimes discusses a particular industry generally, or focuses on the activities of trade associations that represent members of industry. In an early study of the Canadian Manufacturing Association (CMA: a

group representing a fairly broad segment of industry), Clark (1938) found that the CMA's expertise in specific fields provided them with a strong position to have their views taken seriously by the government.

Moran's (1981) case study of the financial industry in England showed how that industry and the Bank of England (which served as its regulator and voice in government) deliberately cultivated a mystique about financial matters, which was sufficient to give them significant power in shaping and implementing monetary policy. This power declined, however, with the rise of the view that monetary policy was no different from other types of policy, and thus could and should be developed by elected governments. Here, dependence on the industry arose due to a perception of their monopoly on information required to formulate policy but declined when that perception changed. Moran argued that in the earlier era,

> as policy makers became convinced that the financial institutions had a key effect on valued economic objectives so they endeavoured to draw them more directly into forming and implementing policy (p. 398).

This supports the general hypothesis based on the dependency of government on industry for the economic well-being of the nation.

Perhaps the most extensive empirical and theoretical work on trade association involvement in Canadian policy formulation has been undertaken by William Coleman (1984a; 1984b; 1984c; 1985; 1986a; 1986b; 1987) as part of a cross-national research programme on "The Organization of Business Interests". Within his conceptual framework Coleman discusses two variables that are consistent with the exchange perspective: the government's need for information and need for compliance. He hypothesizes that:

> the high need for information and for compliance from the industry . . . will lead to the incorporation of the respective interest association into the policy-making and implementation process (Coleman, 1984c: 22).

Coleman (1984c) found that the information and compliance needs of government for regulating advertising of over-the-counter drugs was much lower than for prescription drugs. This difference

corresponds with a much greater involvement in policy formation by the Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Association of Canada (PMAC, representing prescription drug firms) compared with that of the Proprietary Association of Canada (representing non-prescription drug firms).

The participative relationship of the PMAC can also be explained by the high information needs of government regarding the testing of drugs. The Health Protection Branch (HPB) does not have the resources to conduct its own tests of drugs, nor does it have the methodological expertise to judge what constitutes a valid test, or what guidelines to use to approve a drug. Thus, it relies on the research conducted by the industry as the basis of regulation. As Coleman (1984c: 14) says:

> Doubly dependent, then, on firms for the testing of drugs and on the association for assistance in methodological matters, the HPB has worked to involve the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of Canada in the policy formulation and implementation process in this area.

He contrasts this situation with that of the pesticides industry, which is regulated by the Department of Agriculture. Unlike the HPB, this department has its own research capacity and thus performs its own product testing. As a result, it is less dependent on the Canadian Agricultural Chemical Association for information needed to develop policy, and thus does not actively include that association in the policy formulation process.

In an analysis of the Canadian construction industry, Coleman (1984a) discusses the policy issue of ensuring that the end products of construction are safe. This involves devising standards, a task that is undertaken by four organizations: the Canadian Standards Association, the Canadian Gas Association, the Underwriters Laboratories of Canada and the Canadian General Standards Board. Coleman argues that since the government is moderately dependent upon industry for information (because it has some expertise 'in house'), but highly dependent on industry for compliance, trade associations have significant representation on all four of these standards boards. Again, this supports a general dependence hypothesis.

Regarding building procedures, Coleman suggests that the government does not have high information needs, since the National Research Council conducts more research than does the industry. It also has low compliance needs since municipalities have building inspectors to ensure compliance. However, he still reports that industry is highly represented on the Associate Committee of the National Research Council that is responsible for any revisions to the National Building Code. This case of the construction industry suggests that the dependency argument does not completely explain the likelihood of industrial collaboration. Clearly, factors other than those discussed within the interorganizational perspective are apt to help explain the extent to which a trade association collaborates in the formation of public policy. These will be discussed shortly.

In summary, the studies cited above provide evidence for the importance of government dependence generally in affecting the likelihood of association collaboration with government in forming policy. It also provides evidence for the importance of the role of various types of dependencies, specifically information dependence and implementation dependence. We will now turn to additional factors that can be discerned from the pressure group literature to explain industry association participation in public policymaking.

The Pressure Group Literature and the Concept of Legitimacy

Numerous studies suggest that the concept of legitimacy may be important in explaining the ability of an organization to adopt a participative strategy. That is, the government may vary in the extent to which it regards a specific association as having a legitimate role in the formation of a particular policy. The pressure group literature provides some suggestions for the factors that might be expected to influence the legitimacy of a particular association. These will be discussed in turn and associated propositions will be presented.

Association density. 'Association density' refers to "the proportion of production in the domain that is represented by an association's members" (Coleman 1986b: 271). Coleman (1986b) argues that the government will be more willing to involve an association in both policy development and policy implementation if the association represents most, if not all, of the activity of that industry. Thus, he refers to those industries with high association density as having high 'policy capacity'.

It can be argued that the government will not view an association without high density as representative of the industry, and thus collaborating with this group on the development of policy that will affect many non-group members would be seen as an illegitimate process. In another paper, Coleman (1984c) reports that low density associations in the food-processing industry tended to play a 'common pressure-group role' (i.e. tended to use an advocacy approach) while those with high density tended to be involved in policy formation and implementation.

Jordan and Richardson (1987) suggest that lack of density hampers the legitimacy of some social service groups which claim to speak for nonmembers. For example, one British civil servant tended not to heed the view of a particular single-parent group. He stated:

> We are not happy that the one-parent groups are speaking for their clients. The membership is more likely to contain middle class vocal lone parents not the working class (quoted in Whitely and Winyard, 1983: 19).

Jordan and Richardson (1987) cite another example in which Grant (1977) compared the success of the Committee of Directors of Polytechnics at gaining access to government with that of the National Union of Ratepayers who were unsuccessful in this regard. Grant suggested that the Ratepayers were not seen as representing the point of view of all ratepayers, and thus lacked legitimacy.

Jordan and Richardson (1987) also discuss the difficulty of the Farmers' Union of Wales in gaining recognition by government. They state that the Wales Agriculture Department conducted a special audit of the group's membership books specifically to determine how well

the organization represented the Welsh farmers. The proposition, then, is as follows:

Proposition 2a. The greater the density of the association, the greater the likelihood that there will be a participative strategy.

Autonomy. Another factor that has been suggested as influencing the legitimacy of involving a pressure group in policy formation is the autonomy of the association. Coleman (1985) argues that the government will tend to accept a trade association around the policy table if it is able to transcend the short-term and possibly conflicting interests of its members. It must be able to define the long-term interests of its members and even possibly assume the responsibility for controlling their behaviour. In order for the trade association to do this, it must be autonomous from its membership. Autonomy, he argues, depends on the basis of resources. A trade association that relies on its membership dues for all of its funding will be unable to play this role. One that has a other sources of funding (for example from the provision of services for a fee) will be in a sufficiently autonomous position to assume this role.[1]

Useem (1982) presents some empirical support for this view. His interviews with executives revealed that a desirable characteristic of those who were active in business associations was the ability to transcend parochial concerns so as to represent the broader concerns of a wider range of businesses. The chairman of a British company stated that:

> You cannot go [to a meeting] with a narrow point of view . . . . Some tend to push their own company's interests . . . [but] you're much less likely to be sought after for advice if you do that (quoted in Useem, 1982: 216).

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[1] Although the association typically provides such services to members only, the members have an incentive to maintain membership and purchase those services because they are provided at a discount. Thus, an association which obtains revenues from services rather than membership fees faces a more favourable balance of dependencies than one completely relying on membership dues. The result, it can be argued, is less membership influence on the association, or more autonomy for the association management.

Legitimacy of a trade association, then, may depend partially on its autonomy from the membership. The second proposition regarding an aspect of legitimacy is as follows:

> Proposition 2b: The greater the autonomy of the association, the greater the likelihood that there will be a participative strategy.

Goal divergence. A number of studies suggest that if the goals of a particular pressure group are regarded by government officials as consistent with the public interest, they may be perceived by government officials as more legitimate, or morally acceptable [2] and thus have greater opportunity to be included in policy making. Ryan (1978) contrasted two penal interest groups -- the Howard League for Penal Reform and the Radical Alternatives to Prison. The latter's view of prisons as 'symbols of social control and oppression in our class-divided society' hindered their legitimacy, while the former group, with a more liberal ideology was viewed as more legitimate. As a result, the Howard League was given access to the Home Office, while the latter were not. This example suggests that a group's views and goals need to be consistent with those of the public in order for the group to maintain credibility and legitimacy.

In a case study of the Consumers Association of Canada, Dawson (1963) describes its fairly collaborative relationship with government. She argues that the government was open to collaboration because of the high legitimacy of the association arising from the view of it as concerned with the public interest. . . . In his study of the Canadian medical profession discussed above, Taylor (1960) argued that the success of the profession in collaboration with government was partly due to the legitimacy of the profession. He argued that its legitimacy was

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[2] The term 'legitimacy' is frequently used as a descriptor of power. Lawful power refers to "command supported by appropriate sanctions, [but] the moral content of law is secondary" (Abercrombie, Hill and Turner, 1984: 119). However, legitimacy has a moral component. A government may have lawful power without having legitimacy, that is, without being just. In this study, a trade association will be considered as having legitimacy to the extent that its influence in the political process is regarded as *morally justified*.

due, in part, to

> the prestige of the members of the profession and the deference accorded their pronouncements even outside the scope of medicine [and] previous (and continuing) identification of the profession with other matters in the public interest (Taylor, 1960: 254; emphasis added).

A much later study compared the British Columbia Medical Association (BCMA) with the British Columbia Health Association (BCHA, primarily representing hospitals), describing the physician group as having a more adversarial relationship with the provincial government than did the BCHA (Fulton and Stanbury, 1985).

For the first time in 1981 the BCMA hired an advertising agency to promote the benefits of extra billing. They also undertook a public relations campaign in 1984 to promote the view that physicians were the best qualified to make medical and health-care decisions. The provincial government's decision to restrict billing numbers within the province, and the BCMA's attempt to eliminate this policy afterwards, is consistent with the view that the collaborative relationship between physicians and governments in Canada described by Taylor (1960) was deteriorating by the early 1980's. The BCHA, on the other hand, tends to collaborate with government. Fulton and Stanbury (1985) discuss the case in which the attorney general requested the BCHA to assist in the process of developing amendments to the Motor Vehicle Act to empower police to request hospital personnel to take blood samples from an injured drunk driving suspect. The authors also state that the BCHA avoid the use of such adversarial tactics as encouraging public participation in debates with government.

The authors suggest that the legitimacy of the physicians was lower than that of the BCHA because the former group's lobbying was related directly to enhancing their own interests, while the latter group was seen as concerned about the public good. In their terminology, the BCMA is a 'private interest group' while the latter is a 'public interest group'. Presumably, then, the government may regard an interest group that appears to be concerned about the public good

to be more legitimately involved in policy formation than a group that is viewed as primarily concerned about enhancing its own interests.

These studies suggest that one aspect of an association's legitimacy is the extent to which its goals are perceived as in the public interest. This proposition is as follows:

> Proposition 2c. The greater the extent to which the goals of the association are consistent with the public interest, the greater the likelihood that there will be a participative strategy.

Specificity of issue. A related point is the breadth of the issue. If the policy issue of concern to an industry association is highly specific such that it impacts only that specific industry, the government can be expected to view industry participation in developing the nature of the policy as more legitimate than if the issue has impacts on a broader range of groups. The final proposition related to association legitimacy is as follows:

> Proposition 2d. The greater the specificity of the issue, the greater the likelihood that there will be a participative strategy.

In summary, the legitimacy of the pressure group is expected to influence the likelihood that it will be able to collaborate with government. Four 'components of legitimacy' -- density, autonomy, goal divergence, and issue specificity -- have been gleaned from the pressure group literature.

To this point, two factors have been suggested that can be expected to influence the likelihood of a trade association participating with government in policy-formation -- dependence and legitimacy. The review of the literature has suggested numerous factors which influence the extent to which government is dependent on the association, and which influence the legitimacy of the association or the legitimacy of government-association collaboration.

A number of authors suggest a further determinant of a collaborative relationship with government -- ties to or access to decisionmakers (Dawson, 1963; Eckstein, 1960; Hunter, 1980;

Self and Storing, 1962). However, as Madgwick (1984: 311) has pointed out, "access is not so much a resource in the competition as a reward for having won". He argues that access will depend on popular approval of the group's goals (or legitimacy) and control of scarce resources or skills (dependence of government). Access, then, may not be a highly useful explanatory concept, although there may be cases of either fortuitous, or planned links between industry and government which facilitate access. Thus, the present framework will be limited to the two key concepts of dependence and legitimacy.

Dependence, Power and Legitimacy: a Theoretical Linkage

The argument put forth in this section has been that the pressure group literature provides significant support for the framework deduced from the interorganizational perspective. In other words, there is substantial empirical support for the importance of the dependence and power concepts in explaining the ability of trade associations to adopt a participative strategy in influencing legislation and regulation. However, the pressure group literature suggests that these concepts are insufficient. Legitimacy is seen as an additional key concept, especially of relevance within an exchange relationship between government and an organization.

At this point an attempt will be made to theoretically link these two concepts. First, it is necessary to make a distinction between the concepts of power and control. In his frequently cited article, Emerson (1962) argues that power is not an attribute of a person or group; rather, it is a characteristic of a social relationship. "Power", he argues, "resides implicitly in the other's dependency" (p. 32). He conceptualizes power, then, as follows:

> The power of actor A over actor B is the amount of resistance on the part of B which can be potentially overcome by A (p. 32).

Jacobs (1974: 48) criticizes this definition of power as being too stringent in demanding that the

> actor must overcome the resistance of another before the existence of power can be said to have been demonstrated . . . For one thing, it excludes

> asymmetrical relationships based on legitimacy. If actor B willingly lets A command his every action because he is convinced that A has the moral right to do so or because he feels that following A's commands is in his best interest, it can be said that A controls B even though the situation does not meet Emerson's criteria.

He uses this concept of legitimacy to differentiate between power and control. Power requires resistance on the part of one party, while control need not. This differentiation between power and control is useful in considering trade association-government relations. In a given case in which the government is not dependent on the association, it may allow the association to be involved in the formation of policy because either (a) it believes the trade association has the moral right to do so, or (b) it believes that it will enhance its own legitimacy by allowing the trade association to be involved. In cases in which trade associations are allowed to collaborate, they can be seen as having significant control over government and government policy, which is granted by government. However, it does not have sufficient power over government to ensure that its interests are met if the government chooses, for whatever reason, to resist.

In other words, the greater the extent to which government is dependent on the association, the greater the power of the association vis-a-vis government, and therefore the greater the likelihood that the association can include itself in policy formation. Furthermore, the greater the legitimacy of the association, the greater the likelihood that the government will relinquish some of its own control, by including the association in formulating policy.

THE SECOND RESEARCH QUESTION: CHOOSING ADVOCACY TACTICS

Earlier in this chapter, two aspects of resource dependence theory were discussed. The first was the effect of dependence on the likelihood that an organization would comply with the demands of another organization. This aspect of the resource dependence perspective was found to be useful in considering the likelihood that a trade association would have a participative

relationship with government.

The second aspect of resource dependence theory is that organizations attempt to manage their dependencies. Such techniques as mergers, acquisitions and interlocking directorates have been discussed by Aldrich (1979) and Pfeffer and Salancik (1978). It is this second aspect of the theory that may be useful in examining the three advocacy tactics of direct contact, third party endorsement and the public route.

Take, for example, the tactic of third party endorsement. This can be seen as a 'dyadic strategy', using Aldrich's (1979) classification scheme as discussed earlier, since it requires co-operation with another entity. The public route tactic is often taken by organizations in an attempt to "manage their dependencies", as they often emphasize the job creation provided by the industry. The public route tactic also often involves attempts to influence the legitimacy of the organization, or to adapt a Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) phrase, to "manage their legitimacy".

This subsection will argue that trade associations may attempt to manage their dependencies and manage their legitimacy in an attempt to influence their legislative environment. The three advocacy tactics will be considered in this light, and some tentative propositions will be developed regarding when each is likely to be adopted. Relevant empirical work will be examined, resulting in a refinement of propositions.

Direct Contact

Given that the trade association is faced with utilizing an advocacy tactic to influence a particular policy, it is tentatively hypothesized that direct contact will be the tactic of first choice. There are three reasons for this. First, such a tactic requires no loss of autonomy, as an alliance with another group might entail. If the resource dependence assumption that organizational managers value autonomy is accepted, then it is expected that such a tactic would at least be attempted.

Second, such a tactic requires relatively few resources. Third, the direct contact route could be regarded as the least adversarial and least publicly visible of the three advocacy tactics. A trade association may attempt to avoid conflict and thereby maintain good relations with the government, as well as minimize negative publicity. In summary, the proposition is as follows:

> Proposition 3. Direct contact will be the most popular advocacy tactic. It will tend to be used prior to other tactics being used.

If direct contact fails, however, the trade association may then attempt to adopt one of the more adversarial and costly tactics of third party endorsement or the public route. These more dramatic tactics will tend to be chosen if there is a threat of legislation that severely threatens industry profitability.

Third Party Endorsement

It is tentatively hypothesized that this tactic will be less popular than direct contact. That is, it will be used less frequently. By joining forces with another party, the trade association may be able to increase its power vis-a-vis government sufficiently to alter legislation in its favour. This tactic would be less desirable than direct contact for two reasons. First, it would require more resources than direct contact, due to the necessary coordination with the third party. It would also require some loss of autonomy as a result of this coordination. Third party endorsement may also be preferred to the public route because it may have a tendency to anger government less than a public declaration by the industry opposing government policy. Thus the trade association would be able to maintain more cordial relations with government by gaining third party endorsement than by mounting a visible public campaign. The proposition, then, is as follows:

> Proposition 4. Third party endorsement will be the second most popular advocacy strategy. It will be more popular than the public route, but less popular than direct action. It will tend to be utilized after direct action has failed.

The Public Route

The tactic of last resort is tentatively hypothesized to be a public campaign. It is unlikely to be adopted unless direct contact fails, and if third party endorsement either fails, or is infeasible (ie. if there is no powerful third party with comparable policy preferences).

The resistance to the adoption of this tactic is its expense (especially if an advertising campaign is used), the potential for it leading to a deterioration of further relations between industry and government, and an even greater loss of autonomy than third party endorsement because of the multitude of outside individuals who become involved. The proposition is:

> Proposition 5. The public route tactic will be the least popular of the three advocacy tactic. It will be used less frequently than direct contact or third party endorsement. It will tend to be used after the other tactics have failed.

In summary, a hierarchy of tactics is being proposed. These are based loosely on Aldrich's (1979) hierarchy of strategies to manage an organization's dependence. Direct contact is seen as the tactic of first choice, followed by third party endorsement, followed by the public route.

Empirical Evidence

The empirical evidence provides some support for the tentative propositions presented above. However, it also suggests that some adjustments may be warranted.

Bucovetsky (1975) reports the case of the mining industry's response to recommendations made by the 1962 Royal Commission on Taxation (the Carter Report) that would have eliminated the favourable tax treatment received by mining companies. He refers to this response as "an orchestrated campaign of alarm" (p. 94) which included elements of both third party endorsement and a public route tactic.

Various mining companies made public statements that they would suspend construction on certain projects because of the proposed tax reform, which would lead to significant job loss

in some communities. This being a newsworthy statement, the media provided a public forum for criticism of the Carter Report. This is an example of a public route tactic. It can also be seen as a strategy of managing an industry's dependencies, as it emphasizes to the public and the federal government their dependency on the mining industry for economic benefits.

This threatened "capital strike" induced the three western premiers to oppose the tax reform proposals. Bucovetsky attributes the success of the mining industry in ultimately preventing the adoption of most of the Carter Report's recommendations as due to 'inexorable pressure' from a third party -- the provincial premiers.

In response to the hostile reaction from industry and the provincial premiers, the federal government put forth a toned down White Paper for public discussion. The industry responded with a large number of briefs, still critical of the proposals. In summary, this case describes how a severe threat from government led to the adoption of a vocal, aggressive campaign that included a multitude of tactics.

Litvak and Maule (1974) report the response of two American firms -- Time and Reader's Digest -- to a change in legislation exempting firms from deducting expenses for advertising in foreign magazines. These publishers undertook a sophisticated campaign which succeeded in exempting them from this legislation. The campaign included a range of tactics:

> Besides soliciting aid from the U.S. government, Time and Reader's Digest presented oral and written submissions to the Royal Commission on Publications, attempted to influence the support of employee associations dependent on their operations, mailed written presentations to each member of Parliament and personnally contacted a number of members of Parliament and cabinet ministers, and eventually inspired the creation of a trade organization that gave Canada's major publishers an interest in the status quo (Litvak and Maule, 1974: 620).

While these actions did not succeed in eliminating the legislation, it did influence the manner in which a 'foreign periodical' was defined, thus exempting the two firms from this legislation. In this case the threat to the firms was significant, leading to the adoption of a range

of tactics, including third party endorsement and the public route.

In the final case to be discussed, again the creation of a major public policy initiative which threatened the profitability of the industry was responded to with a campaign using numerous tactics. Toner and Doern (1986) describe the response of the oil industry (including the actions of the Canadian Petroleum Association - the CPA - and the Independent Petroleum Association of Canada - IPAC) to the implementation of the National Energy Program (NEP).

The CPA developed a $3 million advocacy advertising campaign directed at (a) improving the public image of the oil industry, and (b) turning public opinion against the NEP. The response of IPAC was to make vicious attacks against the NEP through the press. A number of small Canadian firms formed the Petroleum Research Communications Foundation to disseminate 'facts' to the public. These firms felt that a 'research foundation' would be viewed by the public as more objective and credible than an industry association.

Officials of the CPA and IPAC gave dozens of speeches to other business interest groups and the financial press. The business press was decidedly anti-NEP. However, since the general media were initially seen as sympathetic to the NEP, the CPA and IPAC put on courses for journalists and increased their discussions with newspaper editors. Furthermore, the oil industry gained support from the Alberta government who presented industry views in discussions with the federal government.

In each of the cases utilizing either third party endorsement or the public route, the strategy was not used in isolation. Rather, a number of tactics were used simultaneously. Furthermore, in each case there was a major legislative threat that preceded the multifaceted campaigns.

It is necessary to be wary of generalizing from these cases. There may be a tendency for academics to write about the more visible and more interesting situations. These will tend to be cases of groups undertaking a major, visible, and multifaceted campaign. Those cases

using third party endorsement or the public route alone may be underreported in the literature.

A final research proposition will be based on these empirical case studies:

> Proposition 6. Trade associations will be more likely to undertake multiple advocacy tactics simultaneously under conditions of severe threat than under less threatening conditions.

In this chapter both resource dependence theory and empirical studies from the field of Political Science have been examined to develop a conceptual framework. This framework attempts to outline factors influencing the strategies that trade associations will adopt in an attempt to shape the legislation affecting their members. In the next section, we will change the focus from policy specific influence strategies to longer term strategies to manage the association's overall relationship with government.

THE THIRD RESEARCH QUESTION: MANAGING GOVERNMENT RELATIONS

To this point in the development of a conceptual framework, conditions under which particular strategies would be undertaken have been set out. The present study proposes to advance this discussion one step further and examine longer term strategies that industry associations utilize in order to influence the success with which they are able to influence public policy.

The necessity of viewing organizations as proactive entities was discussed in Chapter Two. In fact, the interest in trade association strategies to influence the legislative environment arose out of the criticisms of those theorists who view organizations as passively adapting to environmental constraints. However, many pages have been spent arguing that various factors will essentially 'determine' the approaches that trade associations will take to influence the legislative environment of its members. It is not necessary, however, that the emphasis on these contingencies be regarded in a deterministic light, since the trade associations can take actions

to influence the contingencies. Some studies were presented earlier suggesting that associations can influence their legitimacy and their dependencies by undertaking public relations campaigns, and that they can influence their dependencies by gaining the support of a third party. In other words, two of the advocacy tactics can be regarded as attempts to manage the association's dependencies and legitimacy.

However, other actions can be taken to increase an association's legitimacy or increase the government's dependence on the association, thus serving to facilitate a change to a potentially more effective strategy in the future. For example, an association may face conditions of low government dependence and low legitimacy, resulting in the adoption of a series of advocacy tactics. The association may feel that this is not sufficiently effective and attempt to alter conditions so that a participative strategy would be feasible.

There are a number of actions which may be feasible in order to increase a trade association's legitimacy. Some of these include attracting new members (thus increasing association density), modifying its stated policy preferences to be more consistent with the public interest, and finding new sources of association funding (thereby increasing its autonomy from its members).

In order to increase government's dependence on the trade association or the industry, it may stress the job and tax benefits provided by the industry, and/or increase the amount of research undertaken by the industry which the government would find useful for policy formation.

In summary, it may be possible for a trade association to move from an advocacy strategy to a participative strategy by undertaking actions which are successful in either increasing its legitimacy and/or increasing government dependence. The study will explore some of the strategies not specific to an issue that trade associations undertake to improve their relationships with governments.

SUMMARY OF PROPOSITIONS

In conclusion, the propositions that have been developed in this chapter are repeated below. The first three relate to three types of government dependences.

Proposition 1a. The greater the extent to which the government is dependent on the trade association staff and/or its members for information, the greater the likelihood that there will be a participative strategy.

Proposition 1b. The greater the extent to which the government is dependent on the trade association staff and/or its members for help implementing the policy, the greater the likelihood that there will be a participative strategy.

Proposition 1c. The greater the extent to which the government is dependent on the industry represented by the trade association for the economic well-being of the region, the greater the likelihood that there will be a participative strategy.

The next four propositions relate participation in policy formation to the four aspects of legitimacy.

Proposition 2a. The greater the density of the association, the greater the likelihood that there will be a participative strategy.

Proposition 2b. The greater the autonomy of the association, the greater the likelihood that there will be a participative strategy.

Proposition 2c. The greater the extent to which the goals of the association are consistent with the public interest, the greater the likelihood that there will be a participative strategy.

Proposition 2d. The greater the specificity of the issue, the greater the likelihood that there will be a participative strategy.

Four propositions relate to the use of various advocacy tactics.

Proposition 3. Direct contact will be the most popular advocacy tactic. It will tend to be used prior to other tactics being used.

Proposition 4. Third party endorsement will be the second most popular

advocacy strategy. It will be more popular than the public route, but less popular than direct action. It will tend to be utilized after direct action has failed.

Proposition 5. The public route tactic will be the least popular of the three advocacy tactic. It will be used less frequently than direct contact or third party endorsement. It will tend to be used after the other tactics have failed.

Proposition 6. Trade associations will be more likely to undertake multiple advocacy tactics simultaneously under conditions of severe threat than under less threatening conditions.

Since the issue of changing strategies over time is exploratory, precise hypotheses have not been developed. The goal of the present research is to gain a better understanding of this process in order to present more precise hypotheses for subsequent research.

CHAPTER SIX: METHODOLOGY

The basic methodological approach of the present study was a blend of qualitative and quantitative research methods. The qualitative data consists of transcripts of semi-structured interviews conducted with trade association managers and government officials. Quantitative data was obtained from questionnaires completed by these same individuals. Further quantitative data was obtained from researcher coding of the interview transcripts.

There are three reasons for the necessity of obtaining the qualitative interview data. First, the study involves describing and explaining a process -- that of how and why trade associations undertake various approaches to influence a policy decision. This process may twist, turn, pause and restart, covering a potentially long period of time. A survey instrument is incapable of capturing the complexities of such a process. Interviews are required.

Second, the distinction between categories of strategies that was identified a priori are not immediately distinguishable from the point of view of the informants. This is especially true of the participative/advocacy distinction. Respondents were asked to classify their influence approach into one of two categories (see question 1, Appendix E), but only 67% of cases found agreement with the researcher coding. Since the distinction between advocacy and participation is difficult to communicate to the informants, a more valid technique for classifying influence attempts was to have the informants describe the process, and have a researcher perform the classification. Interviews were necessary to provide the researcher with sufficient information to do this.

Third, two of the study's research questions were somewhat exploratory. Qualitative research methods are often prescribed for exploratory social research (Babbie, 1979; Eisenhardt, 1989). By conducting semi-structured interviews, it was possible to obtain information regarding variables included in the hypotheses, but also allowed other potentially relevant variables to emerge.

The necessity of obtaining qualitative data for this study needs little further justification. Virtually all of the empirical work cited in Chapter Five is qualitative, case study research. The present study is unique in this area in its attempt to use a relatively large sample and to quantify many of the variables. It is this quantitative aspect that requires more justification, given the dominant research approach in the area.

As discussed earlier, the first research question posed in this study -- that of when trade associations participate in government policy formation -- is the least exploratory of the three questions. In Chapter Five, many case studies were cited in which the author made a conclusion about a relationship between a particular variable (or variables) and association participation in policy formation. In the case studies, the researcher observes participation in policy-formation simultaneously with one or more other variables and then makes a conclusion about the causal process. However, only with a large number of case studies consisting of different combinations of levels of potentially relevant variables can any relationships adequately be established. Furthermore, even if, hypothetically, high government dependence always corresponded with policy participation, there might be a confounding between government dependence and association legitimacy. Large samples are required to establish patterns of relationships between variables and to evaluate the independent effects of each of multiple hypothesized causal variables.

Previous research that attempts to obtain the benefits of in-depth case studies and larger samples is that of Coleman (1984a; 1984b; 1984c) who utilizes a multiple case study approach. The present research differs from his by taking the influence attempt as the unit of analysis, as opposed to taking the industry association as the unit of analysis. By adopting the former approach, the present study allows for policy-specific factors to explain the likelihood of association participation. The latter approach attempts to explain which associations will tend to participate in policy-formation more generally.

The chosen methodological approach is not without shortcomings. While the combination of qualitative and quantitative data attempts to obtain the benefits of both approaches, it can also be argued that the compromises required fails to obtain the advantages of either. Moving from a case study approach to a larger sample approach reduces the intensiveness with which each case can practically be examined, yielding sparser data than is obtainable from a study consisting of a single case. On the other hand, the endeavour to obtain a certain depth from each influence attempt precludes the possibility of a sample of hundreds. However, given the problems of utilizing survey data for a topic of this nature, and the prevalence of single case studies in the area, it is argued that this compromise methodological strategy is the optimal choice.

In summary, the present study will attempt to quantify many previously unquantified variables across a relatively large sample of policy influence attempts in order to search for patterns of relationships between these variables. The focus on the influence attempt as the unit of analysis allows us to search for both policy-specific variables and association-specific variables.

SAMPLE

In the present study, the unit of analysis is the 'influence attempt', or the specific government policy that a trade association attempted to influence. The selection of the sample was performed in a two step process. First, a set of twenty-nine trade associations was chosen. Then, an informant from each association selected up to three specific policies that his or her association had made an attempt to influence. The final sample consisted of sixty-seven such attempts. Further detail on the two-step process follows.

Selection of the Trade Association Sample

The target group of actors for this study consists of trade associations with offices in Alberta. This group includes provincial or regional associations, national associations that have their headquarters in Alberta, and regional offices of national associations. To be considered suitable for the study, a trade association was to meet several criteria.

First, they were required to have at least one full-time paid staff member. Many associations operate on a purely voluntary basis, with the work conducted by committees of the board of directors. These associations were excluded as it was felt that they would have insufficient resources to conduct major political influence campaigns.

Second, the association was to be at least somewhat active in attempting to influence government policy, as reported by a representative of the organization. Third, the association was to be reasonably narrow in domain, and thus represent a specific industry, rather than broad segments of business. This third criterion excluded such groups such as the Canadian Federation of Independent Business (representing small business of all types) and the Canadian Manufacturers Association (representing manufacturers of all types) and the Business Council on National Issues (representing all types of large firms).

The population of relevant trade associations was developed in the following manner. Three sources were used in combination to identify associations that would potentially meet the criteria. The first source was the Directory of Trade and Professional Associations in Alberta (1985), published by the Alberta Department of Public Works. Since this source was somewhat dated, it was supplemented by entries under the heading "Associations" within the Edmonton, Calgary, Red Deer, and Lethbridge telephone Yellow Pages, which appear, by their names, to be trade-related. The final source was the Annual Directory of the Canadian Society of Association Executives (CSAE, 1988).

The initial list of potential associations consisted of 85 associations. In order to establish

if each of these could be labelled a 'trade association' (as opposed to a professional association, research institute or government organization), and met the three criteria for inclusion in the study, an initial telephone call to each was attempted. Of these 85 associations, 24 no longer had a listed telephone number, or the listed number was out of order. Of the remaining 61 associations, 36 met all three criteria. Of the 25 organizations that were excluded, twelve had no full-time office, four indicated that they were not involved in relations with government, and nine could not be classified as trade associations. This classification as 'not a trade association' was unproblematic. Some examples of organizations that were deemed to be other than trade associations included the Canadian Well Logging Society, a technical association whose primary activity is the production of technical publications; the Alberta Forestry Association, which provides (pro-industry) information and educational programs; and the Petroleum Recovery Institute, which conducts research and performs some educational activities.

Table 6.1 presents a list of the population of associations. A request was made to each of these associations to participate in the study. Twenty-nine of the thirty-six (80%) agreed to participate. Table 6.2 presents a list of those associations of that were excluded and the reason for their exclusion.

Given the high rate of participation, there is little reason to expect the possibility of a significant problem of sampling bias. The seven groups that declined to participate were not concentrated in a particular industry. While two non-participating associations -- the Tourism Industry Association of Alberta and the Alberta Hotel Association -- were from the tourism industry, the sample did include two others from the tourism industry (the Alberta Motel Association and the Alberta Restaurant and Foodservices Association). Furthermore, the non-participants ranged in size and presumed importance, from the Alberta Motion Pictures Industries Association to the Alberta Hotel Association. It could be argued that

Head offices of national associations:

- Canadian Association of Oilwell Drilling Contractors
- Canadian Craft and Hobby Association
- Canadian Petroleum Association
- Coal Association of Canada
- Independent Petroleum Association of Canada
- Petroleum Services Association of Canada
- Propane Gas Association of Canada

Regional offices of national associations:

- Canadian Bankers Association
- Canadian Council of Grocery Distributors
- Canadian Federation of Independent Grocers
- Insurance Bureau of Canada
- Retail Merchants Association of Canada

Provincial and regional associations:

- Alberta Book Publishers Association
- Alberta Chamber of Resources
- Alberta Construction Association
- Alberta Forest Products Association
- Alberta Gravel Truckers Association
- Alberta Home Builders Association
- Alberta Readymix Concrete Association
- Alberta Restaurant and Foodservices Association
- Alberta Roadbuilders and Heavy Construction Association
- Alberta Trucking Association
- Alberta Weekly Newspapers Association
- Automotive Service and Repair Association
- Farm Equipment Dealers of Alberta and B.C.
- Landscape Alberta Nursery Trades
- Manufactured Housing Association of Alberta and Saskatchewan
- Motel Association of Alberta
- Motor Dealers Association of Alberta

Table 6.1 Sample of trade associations included in the study.

Alberta Hotel Association (declined interview, "too busy")
Alberta Motion Pictures Industries Association (excluded after numerous messages left unreturned)
Canadian Association of Geophysical Contractors (declined interview, "too busy")
Canadian Portland Cement Association (declined interview, "confidential")
Insurance Brokers Association of Alberta (excluded, executive director in hospital)
Mechanical Contractors Association of Alberta (declined interview, "too busy")
Tourism Industry Association of Alberta (declined interview, "too busy")

Table 6.2 Associations excluded from the study (and the reason for their exclusion).

those associations that declined to participate may feel that they have more to hide than other associations, suggesting that their actions to influence public policy may be regarded as less legitimate than those of the others. An alternative possibility is that participating associations may tend to take have more of a public relations focus than non-participating organizations, as they may regard participation in a research project as a public relations activity.

There is little evidence, then, that sampling problems yielded a restriction in terms of size or industry. The final sample is quite representative in this way. However, the possibility remains that less public relations-oriented associations and/or less legitimate association may be under represented in the sample. This will serve only to restrict the variability of the tactics that are used. It should not bias the findings involving the relationship between variables.

Selection of Policy Issues

Informants from each association were asked to choose three policy influence attempts. They were asked to choose situations in which their association had attempted to influence the outcome of government policy making. Any level of government was acceptable. However, it was indicated to them that issues that they personally had been involved in were preferred, and issues that had been resolved were preferred to those that were still on the agenda. The former stipulation ensured that their information would be first hand and thus more likely to be accurate. The latter stipulation ensured that an understanding of the complete process was obtainable.

There was, however, variation in the number of attempts that were brought forth by the informants. Of the twenty-nine associations, twenty-one brought up three influence attempts, seven mentioned only two, and one (the Executive Director of the Alberta Book Publishers Association) had insufficient experience in his position to discuss any influence attempts. The result was a total of seventy-seven influence attempts. However, ten of these were excluded from the quantitative analysis for a number of reasons. For example, two of the issues brought up by the informant from the Alberta Gravel Truckers Association were excluded because no attempt had yet been made by the group to alter these policies. Issues were excluded if the association had only recently begun to attempt to alter a policy, such as the Alberta Restaurant and Foodservices Association's attempt to remove restrictions on sales of alcohol on Sundays. In some cases, such as the Alberta Forest Product Association's postponement of the implementation of the 'free-to-grow' legislation, insufficient information was obtained from the interview to accurately complete the Influence Attempt Coding Form (to be described shortly). Details of the remaining issues and the reason for their exclusion are presented in Appendix B.

Since the choice of issues was left to the discretion of the informants, the extent of representativeness of the issues is unclear. A social desirability bias might exist. This may

have occurred in two ways. First, it is possible that the association officials tended to choose issues in which their position was consistent with the public good. The result would be a restriction on the extent of variation on the goal divergence variable. Such a restriction on variation on this independent variable might make it more difficult to establish a statistical relationship between this variable and the dependent variable of strategy.

Second, informants might have tended to choose influence attempts which yielded a positive outcome for the association. If some strategies are more successful than others, then this could yield a sample which over-represents successful strategies and under-represents unsuccessful strategies. These potential problems with sampling bias must be taken into account during the analysis and discussion of results.

PROCEDURES

Trade Association Interviews

The first step in gathering data from the trade associations was an initial telephone contact. In most cases, the researcher spoke with the senior manager in the association and asked a number of questions in order to determine if the association met the criteria for inclusion in the study. In some cases, other staff members provided this information. If the criteria were met, a request was made for an interview with the senior manager. In all cases but one, the interview was conducted with this senior person. The exception was the Canadian Association of Oilwell Drilling Contractors, whose Executive Director was out of town during the interview period. In that case the interview was conducted with his Executive Assistant whose position required extensive involvement in government relations.

The interviews consisted of a number of phases. They began with some general questions about the association. (See Part A of the interview schedule presented in Appendix

C.) Respondents were then asked to complete a short questionnaire consisting of general questions about the association (see Appendix D).

In the next portion of the interview, informants were asked to identify and discuss, if possible, three policy influence attempts, one at a time. Instructions for their choice of issues was presented in the discussion of sampling.

Informants were asked first to describe the policy issue, then to chronologically describe what actions were taken by individuals within their association to try to influence the policy outcome. This general description was followed by numerous further questions. Part B of the interview schedule presented in Appendix C served as a guide; however, many other questions were asked as deemed necessary for clarification or as seemed appropriate or of interest.

Informants were then asked to fill out a second questionnaire which dealt with aspects of the specific issues that were discussed (see Appendix E). The interview was concluded with a brief discussion by the researcher about the research, and an indication that participants would be provided with a summary of the findings.

In general, the interview process can be described as semi-structured. While the interview schedule served as a guide, frequent prompting was required in order to obtain necessary information. Interviews ranged from just under one hour to almost three hours. Two-hour interviews were typical. All interviews were tape recorded with the permission of the interviewees and transcribed by the researcher. After the transcription, the researcher completed the Influence Attempt Coding Form (presented in Appendix F), thus condensing qualitative data into numerical data. Qualitative analysis consisted of highlighting and classifying statements that related to concepts utilized in the hypotheses. As well, other concepts 'emerged' (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) as relevant to the research questions and were also noted. Further information about analysis is presented in the Analysis section later in

this chapter.

Selection of Government Informants

In addition to interviews with industry association managers, interviews were also conducted with fourteen civil servants in the Alberta government. (See Appendix A for the departments and agencies represented.) These interviews were conducted for two reasons. First, an attempt was made to provide a government perspective on a sample of the issues that were raised by the trade association managers in order to evaluate the validity of the responses made by the trade association respondents. Further discussion of the validity issue will be presented in the measurement section. Second, government personnel provided a government perspective on the research questions more generally. That is, open-ended interviews allowed for the government informants to suggest factors that had not been included in the hypotheses derived from theory and previous research.

Government informants were identified after analysis of the industry association data was undertaken. First, a subsample of 21 of the 67 policy influence attempts in the sample was made. This subsample consisted of all of those influence attempts in which the industry association was classified as utilizing a 'participative' strategy, and in which the policy dealt with Alberta provincial legislation. This included ten of the twelve participative influence attempts.

A further eleven influence attempts were randomly chosen from the those categorized as advocacy strategies and which involved attempting to influence the government of Alberta. Time constraints restricted the number of influence attempts that received this further investigation. Furthermore, resource constraints restricted the validity check to those government officials operating in Alberta. The twenty-one influence attempts that were chosen as part of the subsample are indicated in Appendix B with a @ symbol, and

henceforth will be referred to as the 'validity subsample'.

The next step in choosing the government informants consisted of writing a letter to the Deputy Minister of the relevant government departments (or senior manager in the case of Crown Corporations) explaining the nature and purpose of the research, and requesting the name of the individual within the department who was most involved in any discussions with the relevant industry association regarding the specific policy issue. An interview was then requested with this individual.

In all cases, a suitable interviewee was located and an interview with that individual was granted, yielding a response rate of 100%. In a number of cases, more than one influence attempt was discussed with one informant. Fourteen interviews were conducted, with data collected for a sample of twenty-one influence attempts.

Government Interviews

In the first portion of the meetings, the interviewees were asked to complete one questionnaire (see Appendix I) for each influence attempt about which he or she was deemed by the Deputy Minister to have been involved. The questions were rephrased but comparable in meaning to a number of those issue-specific questions answered by the trade association respondents. During the completion of this questionnaire, some general discussions about the specific influence attempt and the relevant trade association usually occurred.

Subsequently, informants were engaged in a general discussion aimed at determining their views about the circumstances under which industry associations would be most likely to be included in policy making. In cases in which the department of government is also involved in a regulatory role, the informants were also asked their views about the cases in which industry delegated regulation would be appropriate. Some final questions related to their views about the specific advocacy tactics of associations undertaking publicity campaigns

and acting jointly with other groups. The interview schedule is presented in Appendix J.

All interviews were taped with the permission of the informants and then transcribed by the researcher. These interviews lasted approximately one hour.

REANALYSIS OF CLASSIFICATION SCHEME

The pressure group literature was examined to develop the classification scheme of trade association strategies that was presented in Chapter Four. However, this classification scheme was only tentative. Before providing further detail about measurement, the applicability of this classification scheme to the data will be discussed.

Participative versus Advocacy Strategies

To reiterate from earlier chapters, 'participative strategies' refer to those instances in which trade association officials are actively involved in helping to formulate government legislation; on the other hand, advocacy strategies include situations in which trade association officials are clearly outside of the policy-making process, yet attempting to influence the final outcome of policy-making. Table 6.3 presents the frequencies with which each has been classified by the researcher.

Dependent Variable	N	(%)
Participative strategy	12	(18%)
Advocacy strategy	55	(82%)
Total	67	(100%)

Table 6.3 Frequencies of each category of dependent variable.

The findings of the present research suggest that a distinction between participation and advocacy is meaningful, but classification has some potential to be problematic. A brief discussion of each issue and the actions taken by the association are presented in Appendix B. It may be useful to discuss a few examples from the study to clarify how the distinction has been made.

A fairly clear example of a participative approach was that taken by the Alberta Restaurant and Foodservice Association (ARFA) to deal with training and labour shortage problems in the restaurant industry. The Alberta Department of Tourism put together a group of individuals to analyze the problem and develop a solution. That group included representatives of ARFA. The recommendation that was made by this group and adopted by government was the creation of the Alberta Tourism Education Council, which would set standards for training and coordinate educational programs for the industry.

This example has been classified as participative because ARFA representatives were formally included in a group assigned the task of developing a solution to a perceived problem. While the final decision to accept a policy recommendation lies in government's hands, the fact that the association's participation in the policy group was requested is the important factor.

More problematic for classification are the cases in which the association formulated policy (even going as far as drafting legislation) and presented it to government without any mandate from government to do so. For one example, the Alberta Chamber of Resources rewrote legislation related to the use of groundwater in the oil industry and presented this to the Water Resources Branch of the Alberta Department of Environment. However, of the five cases of this occurring, in only one was the policy accepted by government. These cases have been categorized as advocacy strategies because the association essentially wrote the proposal and then advocated that it be adopted; they cannot be regarded as 'participating' in policy-formation.

A number of cases that have been labelled participative are those in which the industry, via the representative association, is involved in a form of self-regulation (or 'delegated regulation' as commonly labelled by the Alberta government officials) akin to that common for professional associations. These cases have been labelled participative since the industry is formally granted the authority to develop at least some of the rules (often formerly made by government directly) with which industry members will be required to comply.

For example, the Executive Directors of both the Motor Dealers Association of Alberta and the Automotive Service and Repair Association discussed their involvement in the creation of the Automotive Regulatory Board in Alberta. Since Alberta was one of the few provinces without legislation regulating the retail automotive industry, the Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs decided that an Automotive Regulatory Board would be set up to establish and monitor requirements for firms in the industry.

Delegated regulation is conceptually distinguishable from those cases in which the association officials are working jointly with government, as in the example of the formation of the Alberta Tourism Education Council described above. However, the two processes are similar in that the association is actively involved in developing the rules. This suggests that a

revised classification scheme including two sub-types of participative strategies might better reflect the empirical findings. The first might be labelled 'collaborative' (in which government and industry work jointly to develop policies) while the second might be labelled as 'delegated regulation'. This distinction may be useful not only because the two approaches differ conceptually, but also because each may result from different antecedent circumstances.

While a subclassification of the participative approach appears useful, it will not be feasible in the present study as the numbers in each subcategory are very small. However, future research should directly examine this issue.

Advocacy Tactics

The three advocacy tactics discussed in Chapter Four are 'direct contact', 'third party endorsement' and 'the public route'. In discussing these advocacy tactics we will concern ourselves with a) whether the three tactics are inclusive, and b) whether the three tactics are found empirically and/or are in need of redefinition.

It was found that the vast majority of tactics could be classified within the scheme presented in Chapter Four. Only two influence attempts posed a difficulty; both were actions of the Canadian Crafts and Hobby Association (CCHA). In order to eliminate a proposed tax on model kits, the CCHA sent out a directive to their members to write to their Members of Parliament expressing their dissatisfaction with the proposed tax. While the action was instigated and coordinated by the association, the government contact was made by the members representing themselves, as opposed to the association representing the industry. Therefore, it is inappropriate to label this as a direct contact tactic.

In an attempt to eliminate an import duty on education craft and hobby videos, the CCHA encouraged each of its distributors to apply for a remissions order, arguing that these tapes were 'educational' rather than for entertainment purposes. After reviewing over four

hundred applications for remissions, the customs and excise department made a change in regulation exempting these tapes from the import duty. In both of the cases, actions were taken by individual firms rather than their representatives in the industry association.

These actions were categorized as 'grass roots lobbying'. Since only two advocacy tactics posed difficulty for classification, the analysis was conducted on the remaining influence attempts. Since the vast majority of advocacy tactics were classifiable, it can be concluded that the proposed classification scheme is useful.

Direct contact. The findings of the research suggest that the advocacy tactic of direct contact provides no conceptual problems. The typical, highly prevalent influence strategy is for the trade association officials to talk to (by telephone or in person) and/or write letters or submissions to politicians and/or bureaucrats.

Third party endorsement. Earlier, third party endorsement was defined as appealing to a third party to obtain support for the group's policy preferences. The interviews suggest that a more useful manner in which to consider this type of action is as 'joint action'. Frequently government policy issues affect more than one industry and thus numerous industry associations attempt to influence the nature of the policy. Therefore a focal association may actively seek the support of another affected association (previously definable as third party endorsement), or it may be subject to a request to act as a third party, or it may have been a mutual decision for multiple associations to work together. In each of these three cases, the association is working with another group, yet the term 'third party endorsement' connotes that the focal group actively sought support of that other group. Furthermore, frequently numerous groups work together, but the third party endorsement label fails to capture that possibility.

As a result of the empirical work, then, it is suggested that the category of actions previously labelled as 'third party endorsement' be broadened and relabelled as 'joint action'. This term will be defined as a situation in which the association acts jointly with another group to pressure the government to act in their favour. As will be discussed in Chapter Eight, this change in the definition of the category of actions may necessitate a rethinking of the conditions under which it would be adopted.

Having relabelled the second advocacy tactic, some definitional problems remain. In analyzing the influence attempts it is not always clear whether action was taken jointly with another group or alone. It became apparent in the interviews that many of the trade association executives are acquainted with others. This contact is facilitated by memberships in the Canadian Society of Association Executives, local chapters of which meet on a monthly basis. This society includes all types of voluntary associations including industry associations, and other potential 'third parties', such as the Alberta Motor Association, and the Alberta Safety Association.

As a result of communication across associations, an informal network is available and frequently association officials discuss their concerns and actions with others. The Executive Director of the Petroleum Services Association of Canada, for example, said that his group has an informal pact with other oil industry associations to exchange the position papers that they present to government so that each group is kept aware of the activities of the others. For the purposes of the study, informal communication between two groups who are both attempting to influence a policy towards a similar end will not be classified as joint action. Rather, each will be said to be undertaking direct contact.

On the other hand, the Alberta Roadbuilders Association's action of coordinating submissions to government with the Alberta Construction Association and the Edmonton Construction Association to ensure consistence across submissions will be classified as joint

action. In this case, the associations have jointly taken the strategy of standardizing their submissions; this goes somewhat beyond mere communication.

Other examples of joint action are less problematic: cases in which multiple organizations put forth joint submissions, meet jointly with government, or jointly sponsor advertising campaigns.

The public route. 'The public route' was earlier defined as an attempt to change public attitudes in order to facilitate government policy-making in the focal industry's favour. Press releases and advocacy advertising campaigns were presented as likely tactics to fit into this category. There may be some problem in determining whether gaining media publicity is an attempt to influence government via public attitudes, or merely maintaining positive media relations. A common activity of trade association officials is to respond to media requests for information and interviews regarding newsworthy events. However, complying with these requests does not usually appear to be an attempt to influence the government by changing public attitudes. The Executive Director of the Independent Petroleum Association of Canada stated that his group frequently substantially tones down their criticisms of government when questioned by the press. Their strategy is to fill their role as representing the industry to the public while conducting their government influence attempts behind closed doors.

Media publicity about an association's views on a policy will only be categorized as a public route tactic if the interviewee indicated, upon questioning, that their intention was to influence public attitudes on the issue.

The frequencies with which each of the three advocacy tactics were used, as classified by the researcher, are presented in Table 6.4.

Number (%age) using direct action	Number (%age) using joint action	Number (%age) using the public route
54 (98%)	19 (35%)	10 (18%)

Table 6.4 Frequency of advocacy tactics (n = 55).

Now that some concepts have been relabelled and others clarified, we will turn to a discussion of measurement.

MEASUREMENT

The data collection process yielded both qualitative and quantitative data. The qualitative data is in the form of interview transcripts. Two types of quantitative data were produced: interviewee responses to questionnaires A and B, and the researcher coding of aspects of the transcripts (see Appendix F for the coding form). Analysis of the participative/advocacy research question and the advocacy tactics research question consisted of both quantitative and qualitative analysis. The question of long-term strategies to influence government utilized qualitative data alone. Concept measurement and analysis pertaining to each of the three questions will follow.

Concepts Applicable to the First Research Question

Precise operationalizations for the concepts of strategy, information dependence, implementation dependence, economic dependence, association density, autonomy, goal divergence, and issue specificity, are presented in Appendix G. These conceptual definitions were developed prior to data collection. Each of these will be briefly discussed.

Strategy. The strategy used by an association to influence public policy was classified either as participative or advocacy. This classification was done by the researcher as part of the analysis of the interview transcripts (and recorded on the Influence Attempt Coding Form presented in Appendix F). This classification was performed based on the definitions of advocacy and participation presented in Chapter Four and elaborated earlier in this chapter. To reiterate; an influence attempt was classified as participative if the informant's description indicated that the association's representative(s) could be regarded as working with the government in developing policy, or if the government delegated authority for regulation to the association. In most cases, the classification was non-problematic, as was discussed earlier in the chapter.

A second measure of strategy was obtained from the trade association informants. The issue-specific questionnaire contained a question asking them to describe their involvement in this issue as either "a participant in the policy-making process" or "as outside of the policy-making process, but attempting to influence the content of the final result".

This second measure of strategy was not utilized in the analysis, as some responses were judged to be invalid. In thirty-three percent of the influence attempts, the two measures were in disagreement. Since the sample of participative strategies is very small, this extent of error in classification could cloud any potentially significant results. Some informants made comments suggesting that they were a participant in each policy issue, failing to make the distinction between participation and advocacy as defined for the present study. Others remarked that an association can never participate in policy-making, since the government always has the authority to enact legislation. In other words, this item on the questionnaire appears to have failed to distinguish between advocacy and participation as defined for the purposes of this study.

Information dependence. As suggested in Chapter Five, the extent to which government is dependent on a trade association for information is a function of many factors, including industry concentration, the extent to which the trade association has provided the government with information in the past, the amount of research relevant to policy-making conducted by the government and industry respectively, the extent of expertise relevant to the policy issue conducted by government and industry respectively and the research and expertise requirements of the particular policy issue. Therefore, the operationalization of information dependence is a summary score consisting of these various factors as reported in the questionnaires completed by the trade association informants. Again, Appendix G presents the precise questionnaire items that comprise this measure.

Clearly, there is potential for inaccuracy of response. It is plausible that respondents would over-estimate industry's expertise and research and under-estimate the expertise and research activities of government. There is some evidence of response bias in Question 7 of the first questionnaire (See Appendix D) regarding the extent of technical information and expertise that the association has provided to government in the past. Over half of the respondents gave a five, the highest rating possible, while none gave the lowest possible rating; only 1 (4%) gave a response less than the mid-way point of 3. Therefore, the validity of the responses to this question are somewhat suspect.

For example, the Canadian Craft and Hobby Association respondent gave a rating of five although it was made clear in the interview that this association is very young, and as yet has had very little contact with the government. Similarly, a rating of five was made by the respondent from the Motel Association of Alberta, another group which appears to be relatively inactive in dealing with the government. The Independent Petroleum Association of Canada and the Insurance Bureau of Canada, both of which deal extensively in information exchange with government, made the same rating. The lack of variation captured in the

responses to this item does not appear to reflect the extent of variation which appears, as a result of the qualitative data, to truly exist. Furthermore, the correlation between association respondent and government respondent ratings for this item in the validity subsample was an unimpressive .104.

There is less evidence of a social desirability bias in the other items which comprise the information dependence measure. These items are issue-specific, and all yield significant variation in responses. There appears to be a willingness to admit a lack of industry information or expertise on specific issues, while less willingness to report such deficiencies overall. Thus, while there is still the potential for a bias in ratings of industry information, there is still sufficient variations in responses to find a relationship between these other items and strategy if it exists. Since the item which appears to be invalid comprises only one-ninth of the information dependence measure, it can be argued that the composite measure, while imperfect, has significant validity. Furthermore, support for the measure's validity is a moderate correlation of +.512 between the sum of items associated with information dependence common to both trade association and government questionnaires in the validity subsample.

Implementation dependence. Two measures were obtained for implementation dependence. The first was a composite measure of three items on the questionnaire completed by the trade association representative. These items dealt with how active the association had been in the implementation of the policy, how difficult it would have been for the government to implement the policy without the association's cooperation, and the extent to which respondents believed the government relied on the association to implement the policy. (See Appendix G for the exact questionnaire items).

The second measure was an item coded by the researcher according to her judgment

of the extent to which the specific policy required implementation that could potentially be conducted by the trade association. This measure was included after a number of interviews had been conducted in which respondents appeared to misunderstand the intended meaning of 'implementation'. Even after attempted clarification by the interviewer, a number of respondents interpreted implementation as the act of getting a particular policy idea into law. Some indicated that they were highly active in implementation because they had conversations with politicians to facilitate gaining political support for the policy.

Some examples will clarify how the researcher classification was made. Influence attempts received the maximum score of 5 on this variable if the policy required a major effort on the part of the association to implement the policy. For example, the first issue discussed by the Executive Director of the Manufactured Housing Association (MHA) was amendments made to an existing Alberta Mortgage and Housing Corporation (AMHC) lending insurance program for the purchasers of manufactured homes. In this case MHA was extensively involved in selling this program to its members. They worked with AMHC to develop a new logo, and a new ad campaign. A press conference was held in Red Deer at MHA's office. The MHA promoted the new program heavily to its membership. The Executive Director of the MHA discussed the involvement of his association in implementing the program:

> We agreed as part of the responsibility to get this thing off the ground is to do a number of things to assist [AMHC]. One was to ensure that we would keep people updated on an ongoing basis in our newsletters, secondly that we would have them make presentations to our groups, both at annual meetings and we have another information session that we call zone meetings, and we will go and say to Lethbridge and call in the members from that local area and put together a little zone meeting for that area and update people as to what's going on, to hear people's concerns and so on. And at times like that we'll have people from AMHC come in and be present to assist in informing everyone. And as well, we haven't got this off the ground yet, but we have the process in place that we'll make awards as an industry for the companies that have done the largest volume under the AMHC program, or have shown the greatest increase under the AMHC

> program. And then we put together a sales training program ... . And then we went as support and helped them in the presentation, so that AMHC and ourselves made a presentation on the new improved program, how to use it, how to get the most mileage out of it, and that was done in Lethbridge, Calgary, Red Deer, etc.

Since insufficient use of the program was placing AMHC in a risky position as insurers, success of the program required a larger base of insurees. Therefore, from the AMHC's perspective, marketing the program was integral to its success. The extent of MHA's involvement in the marketing of this program, therefore, yielded a maximum score of 5 for implementation dependence.

Another score of five was given to the Alberta Restaurant and Foodservice Association's (ARFA) attempt to resolve a number of problems in the tourism industry. As discussed above, ARFA, along with various other tourism associations, attempted to convince the Alberta Department of Tourism of the need for some improvements in education and training within the industry. The discussions yielded the creation of the Alberta Tourism Education Council, which coordinates educational programs offered by various institutions, and sets standards for these programs to educate tourism personnel. The Council consists of representatives from each of the tourism associations, as well as from the government and various educational institutions. Implementation of the policy, then, consists of the operation of the Alberta Tourism Education Council, which is funded by the provincial government, but which operates extensively through volunteer efforts of the industry associations' membership. Implementation dependence was rated as high due to the necessity of industry involvement in the implementation of the policy.

At the other extreme of the rating scale, scores of one were given in cases in which no implementation was required. For example, the Motel Association of Alberta attempted to convince the Alberta government to remove a 7% motel room tax. They were unsuccessful, but had they been successful, no action would have been required to implement

such a policy. Similarly, the Manufactured Housing Association attempted to eliminate an increase in the road tax for transporters of mobile homes. The mere elimination of a cost to trade association members has no potential implementation activity for the trade association.

In summary, this implementation dependence measure attempted to quantify the extent to which the association could potentially have been involved in implementing the policy. Therefore, the scores were based primarily on the nature of the issue. Tax issues typically received low scores as implementation is nonproblematic. Major regulatory programs, however, provide greater opportunity for the association to become involved in implementation, and such these issues received higher scores.

The correlation between the two measures of implementation dependence is +.406. The latter measure of implementation dependence will be used in the analysis. It is perceived to be more valid for two reasons. First, as described above, a number of respondents appeared to misinterpret the three questionnaire items. Second, it can be argued that the researcher has the benefit of viewing a large number of policy issues, and can make a comparative judgement about the potential contribution of the trade association to the implementation of the policy. This potential for a comparative judgement is unavailable to the trade association respondents.

Economic dependence. A government's dependence on an industry was regarded to be a function of the amount of employment generated by the industry, and the ability of the industry to relocate. Industry mobility was regarded as important, because a highly mobile industry would be less dependent on the government for favourable legislation, as it could relocate if legal conditions became unfavourable. In other words, a highly mobile industry would have more power vis-a-vis government than an industry tied to the province, all else held equal. Therefore, the measure of economic dependence was a composite measure

including the number of individuals employed within the industry, the mobility of the industry, and a perceptual measure of the contribution of the industry to the province's economy. All items were obtained from trade association respondents. Exact items are presented in Appendix G.

Both the quantitative and qualitative data reveal some validity concerns regarding the economic dependence measure. First, the correlation between the general perceptual measure of the economic significance of the industry made by the trade association respondents and those made by the government officials in the validity subsample was somewhat low (+.369). Even less impressive is the correlation of +.211 between the sum of the items related to the number of employees in the industry and industry mobility on the one hand and the general perceptual measure of industry economic contribution made by association respondents. An even smaller correlation (+.169) was found between the government general perception of industry economic contribution and the sum of the industry mobility and industry employment variables.

The qualitative interview data reveal some other potential problems with the measures of economic dependence that have been used. One problem is that in industries which contract out much of their work, the employment provided by the firms within the association's domain does not fully represent the job creation provided by the industry. As one informant indicated:

> Our activities, the investments that we make employ thousands of people beyond our own companies. There's the drilling companies. A lot of the work is done via contract. We seldom, in fact we don't ever just refer to head office employment [when talking to government], and those are the actual employees that we represent.

Another informant suggested that the number of jobs provided is less important for determining the economic contribution of an industry than other factors:

> The retail trade does not set the economy. It's set by other industries like

> energy, farming, manufacturing or whatever. The thing that the retail trade does do is provide probably the most jobs of the industries. But it depends on the economy how many jobs.

In at least one case, the jobs provided by the firms in the association's domain is not meaningful because the association is based on the product as opposed to the industry. The firms that are members of the Propane Gas Association of Canada are large oil companies. Thus they employ a large number of people. However, the economic contribution resulting from propane itself is far less significant than that resulting from the oil and gas aspects of the business.

The previous discussion suggests that the study's measure of economic dependence may be far from ideal. The validity concerns will be taken into account when the quantitative analysis is presented. As well be discussed in more detail, future research may be required to further explore the concept of economic dependence, as well as its measurement.

Density. Association density was defined as the percentage of firms within an association's domain that are members of the association. Information about the number of members of the association, and the number of firms in the association's domain were obtained from trade association respondents. No attempt was made to evaluate the validity of the association representatives' responses, since this was viewed as the most reliable, and likely the only source of such information.

Autonomy. The autonomy measure was a composite of two items from the trade association questionnaire. The first item was the percentage of the association's budget that came from membership dues. As was discussed in Chapter Five (and following Coleman, 1985), it was assumed that associations that obtained a larger proportion of their funding from membership dues would be less autonomous from its members than one obtaining large proportion of its funding from other sources. The second item was a hypothetical scenario,

requiring respondents to judge whether their decisions are guided by the preferences of the trade association officials, or by their members.

The two items comprising the measure of association autonomy are attempting to measure the same construct. Therefore, it is possible to evaluate the measure by examining the inter-item correlation. In this case, the two items do not correlate ($r = +.062$) suggesting that the two items are not successfully measuring the same construct. It is possible that the source of association resources does not influence the extent to which association managers act in an autonomous fashion. Alternatively, the scenario presented to the respondents in the questionnaire may be unable to capture the degree of association autonomy. Unfortunately, no question about association autonomy was included in the validity subsample. In summary, the composite measure of autonomy poses difficulty. It is possible that either of the autonomy items is a valid measure of autonomy, or that neither is valid. It is difficult to establish given the available information. Any conclusions that are made based on this measure must be made tentatively.

Goal divergence. The extent to which the goals of the association diverged from the public interest was measured using two items. The first was an item on the association questionnaire regarding the extent of divergence between the policy preferences of the government and those of the association. An assumption was made that the government at least perceives itself as acting in the public interest; therefore, if the association's goals diverged from those of the government, then the association would not be regarded as acting in the public interest.

The second item was a researcher coding regarding the number and extent to which other groups were involved in attempting to influence the policy outcome. The assumption for the latter point was that if the government was facing pressures from other opposing

groups, they would be in a position to moderate between factions, and thus would have goals at least somewhat counter to those of the association. The inter-item correlation was +.253. This modest, but positive correlation is somewhat reassuring. Since it is possible for a policy to be contrary to the public interest, but to lack specific organized interests actively opposing it, a perfect correlation between these measures would not be expected.

Issue specificity. The extent to which the issue was specific to the industry represented by the association was also measured using two items. The first item was a rating by the association representatives regarding the extent to which the issue was relevant to other industries. The second item was a researcher rating of the extent to which the issue impacted groups other than industry, such as consumers, employees, or the general public. These two items attempt to tap different aspects of issue specificity; thus, inter-item correlation is not a relevant measure of validity.

Table 6.5 presents descriptive statistics of the independent variables applicable to this research question. This table suggests that there is significant empirical variation within each variable.

Variables	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	S.D.
Dependence				
Information Dependence	19.0	39.0	29.299	5.090
Implementation Dependence	1.0	5.0	1.776	1.335
Economic Dependence	4.0	11.0	7.466	2.136
Legitimacy				
Association Density	0.087	1.0	0.536	0.316
Autonomy	1.0	4.5	2.537	1.204
Goal Divergence	1.5	5.0	3.567	0.956
Issue Specificity	1.0	5.0	3.351	0.921

Table 6.5 Descriptive statistics for independent variables.

Concepts Applicable to the Second Research Question

The second research question deals with the conditions under which the three advocacy tactics -- direct contact, joint action (formerly labelled third party endorsement) and the public route -- are undertaken. It was hypothesized that the more costly the proposed legislation, the greater the likelihood that the association would undertake multiple advocacy tactics simultaneously. The three advocacy tactics were defined in Chapter Four, and further discussion about how these classifications were made was presented earlier in this chapter. Operationalization of two other relevant variables -- 'cost of legislation' and 'use of multiple tactics' -- is presented in Appendix G. Each is discussed below.

Cost of legislation. One item on the Influence Attempt Coding Form (Item 13, Appendix F) was used to measure this variable. Based on the discussion of the policy issue with the trade association informant, an assessment was made by the researcher about the seriousness of the issue for the association's membership.

It could be argued that such a rating might have been made by the trade informants themselves, rather than by the researcher. However, the chosen measure is likely to be more valid. Informants may have a tendency to rate the issue relative to other issues they have dealt with; therefore, one of their most serious issues might receive the maximum rating. However, it is possible that the most serious issues of one association might be considered minor to another association. By having one coder make the ratings across all associations based on the broader view of many issues and many associations, ratings across associations will be more comparable.

Use of multiple tactics. This dichotomous variable was also measured by one item on the Influence Attempt Coding Form (Item 12, Appendix F) completed by the researcher. The influence attempt was deemed to have involved the use of multiple tactics if two or more

advocacy tactics were undertaken simultaneously at any point during the influence process; otherwise, the influence attempt was coded as not utilizing multiple tactics.

ANALYSIS

As previously discussed, both qualitative and quantitative data was obtained and analyzed. The first and second research questions -- those dealing with when trade associations participate in policy-formation and when particular advocacy tactics are used -- includes both quantitative and qualitative data analysis. The third research question -- that regarding how industry associations manage their relationships with government over the long term -- is more exploratory, and therefore qualitative analysis alone has been undertaken. Analysis for each of the three questions will be discussed in more detail below.

The First Research Question

Both quantitative and qualitative data analysis has been undertaken to address the question of when trade associations will participate in policy formation. Frequency distributions of advocacy and participative strategies have been calculated. Multivariate analysis was conducted to examine the effect of the independent variables on trade association influence strategy. Since the dependent variable is categorical in nature, logistical regression was the analytic technique of choice (Aldrich and Nelson, 1984). The set of independent variables was regressed on the dichotomous dependent variable of strategy.

The statistical analysis has been supplemented by qualitative analysis of the transcripts. The words of the both association and government informants is utilized to help explain and illuminate the quantitative findings. Furthermore, the qualitative data will be used to discover further relevant concepts that may be useful in explaining when trade associations are likely to

participate in policy formation.

The Second Research Question

In order to test Propositions 3, 4 and 5 regarding the relative frequency of direct contact, joint action and the public route, frequencies of each have been calculated. The qualitative data will be examined in order to evaluate the rationale for the relative frequency of these three tactics.

In order to test for the effect of the cost of a proposed policy on the likelihood of undertaking multiple tactics, the 'multiple tactics' variable was regressed on the variable 'cost of legislation', using logistical regression because of the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable.

The Third Research Question

The final research question deals with how industry associations manage their relationships with government over the long term. Analysis of this question is based on the categorization of association informant responses to the last interview question, "What if any specific actions have you taken to improve your ability to deal with government?".

Analysis of this question will involve summarizing and categorizing the responses to this interview question. It should be recalled that Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) discuss the importance of organization's attempts to 'manage their dependencies' in an attempt to improve their bargaining power vis-a-vis other organizations in their relational network. Therefore, one a priori category that will be utilized will be labelled 'managing dependencies'. Since the present research stresses the importance of another concept -- that of association legitimacy -- in impacting an association's relationship with government, a second a priori category will be labelled 'managing legitimacy'. Responses that can not be placed into either

of these a priori categories will be categorized post hoc.

In some cases, techniques of managing government relations were discussed by the informants during other portions of the interview. Such strategies may have been neglected to be included as a response to this last question, or these actions may not be undertaken intentionally for that purpose. Such actions will be not be included in the presentation of the frequency results, but will be included in the discussion of each of the categories.

SUMMARY

In summary, the present study includes elements of both qualitative and quantitative research methods. A relatively large sample size has been chosen to allow for patterns across a wide range of associations and issues to emerge. However, qualitative interview data has been gathered to aid in the refinement of concepts that have been used and to identify other relevant concepts. This blend of qualitative and quantitative research will hopefully result in the benefits of both approaches.

The next three chapters will present and discuss the results of the research. One chapter will be devoted to each of the three research questions.

CHAPTER SEVEN: PARTICIPATION VERSUS ADVOCACY

The primary goal of this chapter is to make conclusions about the factors that influence the likelihood that a trade association will participate in helping to formulate government policy. In the first section, descriptive statistics for the dependent variable will be presented. In the next section, the results of the logistic regression will be presented. The discussion section will discuss both the quantitative and qualitative findings associated with each factor which was hypothesized as influencing the likelihood of trade association participation in policy-formation. Furthermore, any factors that emerged from the interviews that have not previously been addressed will be discussed.

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

Descriptive statistics for the dependent variable, strategy, are presented in Table 7.1, which indicates that 55 (82%) of the influence attempts were categorized as advocacy strategies while the remaining 12 (18%) were categorized as participative strategies. Of the latter, nine (75%) were sub-classified as collaborative, and three (25%) were classified as examples of delegated regulation.

Dependent Variable	N (%)
Participative strategy	12 (18%)
Advocacy strategy	55 (82%)
Total	67 (100%)

Table 7.1 Frequencies of each category of dependent variable.

These results suggests that participative strategies are relatively uncommon, at least for associations operating in the province of Alberta. It is important to note, however, that there was no attempt to ensure that the issues that became the focus for analysis were representative of those actions taken by the focal trade associations. Interviewees were completely free to discuss the issues of their choice. Thus, it is not possible to estimate the proportion of all influence attempts that are in fact participative.

LOGISTIC REGRESSION RESULTS

The logistic regression equation of the independent variables measures is presented in Table 7.2. Because of the relatively small sample sizes, especially for the participative group, the results must be interpreted very conservatively.

Independent Variables	Beta	S. E.	T
Dependence Variables			
Information dependence	.133	.096	1.387*
Implementation dependence	1.514	.477	3.177***
Economic dependence	.287	.233	1.236
Legitimacy Variables			
Density	.246	1.562	.157
Autonomy	-.205	.509	-.403
Goal divergence	-1.352	.743	-1.820*
Issue specificity	1.247	.638	1.953**
Constant	-10.481	5.134	-2.041**

*p < .10; ** p < .05; ***p < .01; all tests one-tailed

Table 7.2. Effects of Independent Variables on the Likelihood of Utilizing a Participative Strategy

DISCUSSION

Information Dependence

The information dependence variable was marginally related to strategy ($p < .10$). The beta coefficient was positive, suggesting as hypothesized that the greater the information dependence, the greater the probability of participation.

The qualitative data provides support for a relationship between information dependence and participation. The ability to provide the government with information was frequently discussed by the industry association representatives as very important in facilitating a group's relationship with the government. As an example, one interviewee stated:

> What [government] are looking for is they want your knowledge and expertise. Those guys don't want to govern from a position of ignorance. They want to use us to educate them on what it's all about.

A quote from another industry association director more explicitly makes the link between information dependence and the government's willingness to work with trade associations:

> Government tends to want to work with industry associations; they're a good sounding board for them.

A wide range of types of information that are provided to the government emerged during the interviews. A number of interviewees suggested that the individuals within the government may have significant expertise in some areas, but frequently lack direct experience in business. For example:

> The Alberta government has a pretty good understanding of [the oil] business. But they do not operate companies and there is a whole different perspective that one has on issues and on problems and on opportunities when you are running a company than when you are running a government.

Another informant stated:

> Our problems with [the Department of] Occupational Health and Safety have been at the technical level. Because they have individuals there who try to tell you how you should be doing your business, you know the guy's familiar with

> the boiler's branch stuff and he's telling you how to run steel pipe out into the field and trying to make a comparison and it doesn't work. So we've had quite a few battles so to speak on a technical level, trying to get them to understand why we do things the way we do, and why they're not intrinsically hazardous.

Some of the larger associations provide research findings to the government. The Insurance Bureau of Canada, for example, has a head office staff of one hundred people, seventy of which operate their statistics division. "Reams and reams and reams" of these statistics are provided to the government. The President of the Canadian Petroleum Association indicated that when the organization conducts a public opinion survey, a copy of the findings are sent to the government. Other informants suggested that their lack of ability to provide this kind of information posed a problem:

> No, we'll not have a whole lot of new statistical information. One of the great failings, and its strictly a resource issue, is that we haven't been able to develop a statistical base at our end of the industry like I would have liked to have done, which I know is there to do.

Given the qualitative support for the importance of information dependence, the lack of a stronger, more conclusive statistical relationship between information dependence and strategy choice is surprising. However, potential problems with the measurement of this variable were discussed in Chapter Six. Because a weak correlation between a variable and its measure attenuates the observed degree of association between the measure and another variable (Costner, 1969), the marginally significant beta from the regression equation is consistent with a true relationship between information dependence and strategy.

Alternatively, the lack of a stronger statistical relationship between information dependence and strategy may be due to a true weak relationship between the two variables. The interviews suggest that associations are anxious to provide the government with information. Informants frequently argued that bad government policy is often developed because the government lacks information. It may be that if policy development requires

information and expertise held by industry, the government has little difficulty in obtaining this information through submissions, meetings and other occasions of information exchange without needing to include the association in policy-formation. If this argument is correct, the associations may willingly provide information because they perceive (likely correctly) that a policy made with information provided by their industry will be preferable to one made without that input.

Implementation Dependence

Implementation dependence was significantly related to strategy ($p < .001$), suggesting that, all else equal, the greater the extent of dependence of the government on the trade association for implementation of the policy, the greater the likelihood that the association will participate with the government in the formulation of the policy.

The causal sequence that was hypothesized a priori was that the government's dependence on the association's cooperation in implementation would encourage the government to include the association in policy formation.

Interestingly, however, the qualitative data suggests that the reverse causal sequence is also possible. The Manufactured Housing Association (MHA) worked with the Alberta Mortgage and Housing Corporation (AMHC) in revising a loan insurance program for its customers. The MHA was also involved in implementing the new policy, including working with the AMHC to design and promote the new program. The MHA also planned to be active in presenting awards to companies who showed the greatest increase in AMHC loans. In other words, the association was highly active in promoting the AMHC program, resulting in a high rating for implementation dependence. However, it could be hypothesized that in helping to shape the revised program, the MHA is more likely to come up with a program which will involve itself in implementation than one which was created without the

association's involvement.

Because the government is not necessarily certain whether industry cooperation is required for policy implementation before the policy is formulated, implementation dependence may not be a good predictor of association participation. In summary, while the statistical analysis provides significant support for a relationship between implementation dependence and participation, no firm conclusions can be made about the causal process.

The interview data suggest that the government may not take advantage of an association's potential aid in implementing a policy. This finding is similar to that observed above, i.e. that a government may not use the information available from the association. An example is the Saskatchewan government's change in its environmental policy to allow the sale of soft drinks in cans and plastic bottles. A depot system operated by rehabilitation centres for the handicapped was devised to deal with the empty bottles. One association made an offer to the government to aid in the implementation of the new policy:

> One of the things we committed to was to helping the rehab centres kick the program off in store, through our flyers and the use of some of the print media...Essentially I said [to the government], bring me your creative material, give me the message you want to say and I'll bring it back to the members and we'll help you get the message out. And it never happened...So the offer was there and they didn't take it up.

In summary, the statistical findings clearly support a relationship between the involvement of the association in the implementation of a specific policy and the likelihood that the association will participate in developing that policy. In other words, a mutually beneficial situation is created. The government includes the association in developing policy in exchange for the association's aid in its implementation. However, the conclusion was qualified by evidence that, at least in some cases, the government fails to take advantage of help that is available from the associations.

Economic dependence

The beta for the economic dependence variable was not quite significant at the $p < .10$ level, although the relationship was in the predicted direction, i.e. greater economic dependence was associated with a greater probability of participation. At least two potential explanations for this nonsignificant finding will be presented.

As discussed in Chapter Six, there are potential problems with the measurement of the economic dependence variable. It is possible, then, that the measure of economic dependence was not sufficiently valid to reveal a relationship with participation even if such a relationship does exist.

There is also another potential methodological problem. While the influence attempt has been utilized as the unit of analysis, for the economic dependence variable, the measure is not issue-specific as was the case with information dependence and implementation dependence. Therefore, each influence attempt for a specific association will receive the same rating. What the analysis is testing, as a result, is whether those associations representing industries with higher economic significance tend to utilize more participative strategies than others. The problem arises when the manner in which the issues were selected is considered. Since there was no attempt to gain a representative sample of types of strategies for any given association, it is impossible to conclude whether the proportion of participative strategies is representative of the true proportion of participative strategies undertaken by each of the associations.

Another potential explanation for the findings is provided in the statements of one of the government informants. An administrator from the Alberta Mortgage and Housing Corporation suggested that those industries that are significant economically may have more influence at the political level, but at the lower bureaucratic level, this is less important. It may be that politicians are more dependent on industries for their economic contribution, and

thus more willing to include them in policy-formation than less significant industries. However bureaucrats, without concerns about reelection, are not dependent on industries for their economic contribution, and therefore may not distinguish based on degree of economical significance. In other words, economic dependence may be a relevant concept, but it may be more relevant at the political, rather than the bureaucratic, level of policy-making.

To summarize, specific hypotheses about three types of dependencies which government may have on particular industries were developed and tested using quantitative and qualitative data. The strongest finding was a relationship between implementation dependence and policy participation. The marginally significant relationship between information dependence and participation, combined with significant qualitative support for such a relationship led to a tentative conclusion that the greater the dependence of the government on the association for information, the greater the likelihood that the association will participate in policy-formation. The non-significant relationship between economic dependence precludes a conclusion that economic dependence is related to participation. The qualitative data suggested a possible intervening variable -- the hierarchical level at which the policy is developed.

Other Aspects of Government Dependence

Before turning to a discussion of the legitimacy variables and their effects on policy participation, we will consider other aspects of government dependence that emerged from the qualitative data. Two other categories of dependencies have been discerned from the interviews, suggesting that the concept of government dependence needs to be more fully explored. These two categories of dependence have been labelled 'political dependence' and 'industry control dependence'.

Political dependence. 'Political dependence' will be defined as the extent to which the industry association provides political support to government officials. The term 'support' is defined loosely to include anything which facilitates individuals in the government meeting their own political goals. Some examples will help to clarify the types of political support that industry associations provide to the government officials.

Frequently the informants presented examples of actions undertaken to help politicians and/or senior bureaucrats improve their public image or avoid public embarrassment. For example:

> One example was with the Deputy Minister of Agriculture in British Columbia where I had met him for the first time and it was just coincidental that we had just been made aware that 60 Minutes was coming out with their program on alar on apples. I said you may want to prepare for this, or how does your department deal with this issue because you have such a large acreage of apples.
>
> I do everything I can not to put Elaine McCoy into the situation of having to answer an insurance question in the legislature.
>
> The other thing we try to do is let government win the medals. Let them take credit for it. They're paid to do that job...So you be the catalyst, you take them the seeds, you take them the water, you do a little shovelling, whatever they need to reach the conclusion. And then let them take the credit for it.
>
> One thing you don't want to do is criticize too much in the media. You never make them look foolish. You never remind them of something; at least we don't.

In other words, the trade association officials may facilitate maintaining or enhancing the public image of government officials.

The industry associations in the sample also provided political support by assuring the government that a policy is politically acceptable, or at least will not have any negative political repercussions. The Canadian Petroleum Association was highly active in influencing post-National Energy Program Conservative Party energy policy. They provided Pat Carney, then the opposition energy critic, with their preferred policy along with public opinion

research suggesting that such a policy would be politically acceptable.

In some cases the industry association undertakes activities that serve to enhance the resources, power or legitimacy of a particular government department. For example:

> We assist [the Department of] Transportation in talking to the public. We have video presentations to try and keep their budget as a good part of the provincial pie.

In other cases associations help government departments meet their policy goals. For example, an interviewee stated:

> I'm sure it helped that they got an industry like us that's a big user of newsprint coming to them and saying well our members want this newsprint and if you have a mill here, they'll support it; they'll purchase product from it.

Another industry association undertook an advertising campaign in support of free trade, despite the fact that such a policy would have little impact on their particular industry. The Executive Director explained why:

> They really appreciated the effort that we went to. Now does that give us any bigger clout in Ottawa? I don't know. We were meeting with John Crosbie a couple of months ago, my executive committee, discussing some issues on international trade and we just happened to mention that we spent twenty percent of our last year's budget in support of free trade and his eyes lit up and he said 'you've got my full attention now'.

Although admittedly less frequently, the government respondents also did, on occasion, refer to the support of the industry associations for particular policy goals:

> The comments that [industry groups] made were really useful in helping us gain support for the Personal Property Security Act.

Again, the interviews were not designed to seek out information about political support provided by the trade association representatives, so the fact that both trade association and government respondents brought them up, suggests that this may be an important aspect of government dependence that the study failed to take into account.

Industry control dependence. A second additional function performed by the industry association for the benefit of the government is to influence the actions of its members. Although no attempt was made specifically to elicit examples of how the associations influence members' behaviour, a wide range of examples emerged from the interviews, nonetheless. Some examples will provide a sense for the range of methods employed to associations to influence member behaviour, and also the types of member behaviours that may be subject to association influence.

The Regional Vice President of the Insurance Bureau of Canada discussed his role in working with the Director of Public Safety Services to handle a crisis which occurred as a result of extensive flooding in Slave Lake, Alberta, in 1988. Since insurance policies tend to cover sewer backup, but not flooding, the initial response of insurance companies to the flooding was that they would deny claims. However, there was some ambiguity about the portion of damage that was due to flooding versus sewer backup; therefore the individual from Public Safety Services requested the trade association representative to accompany him on a visit to Slave Lake immediately after the flooding occurred in order to deal with the crisis quickly. Together they evaluated the situation and decided that the insurance industry should be required to cover claims relating to the basement if there was evidence of sewer backup, while the provincial govt would cover the remainder with emergency relief funds. Without the ability of the Insurance Bureau to recommend to its members the portion of damages to be covered by the insurance industry, the government's task of resolving the issue quickly and compensating the victims would have been much more difficult.

In this case, there is a clear association between the ability of the association to influence the actions of the industry, and the involvement of the association in making a decision about how the costs of the flooding would be distributed between the insurance industry and the government. From the association's perspective, in return for requesting its

members to adhere to the decision, it is able to be involved in the formation of that decision.

A number of other examples arose in which the association was able to influence one or a few of its members who were contravening existing legislation at the request of the government. From the government's perspective, this mechanism of control is often less expensive than more coercive tactics such as prosecution. For example, the government occasionally informs the Canadian Federation of Independent Grocers (CFIG) of instances in which its members charge prices for milk below regulated levels. Similarly, individuals within the Saskatchewan Department of the Environment expressed their concern to the CFIG about members illegally selling soft drinks in aluminum cans. The CFIG was told that if they were able to prevent contravention of the law, the government would look at developing, with the CFIG's help, new legislation that would include legalization of aluminum cans. The industry association agreed to use its influence in exchange for a role in developing legislation more desirable to the industry as a whole.

These are examples of relatively ad hoc, or informal, mechanisms of social control. However, examples of highly institutionalized mechanisms of social control were also provided. The Motor Dealers Association of Alberta operates a program called 'Autocal', an automotive consumer action line, to deal with consumer complaints about association members. The informant from this association indicated that since this program started eight years ago, the Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs has been able to lay off employees. The Department now refers complaints to Autocal.

The Alberta Restaurant and Foodservices Association (ARFA) has been actively promoting the designated driver program developed by the Alberta Alcohol and Drug Abuse Commission (AADAC). The program encourages members to augment their responsibility for reducing the number of intoxicated drivers on the roads. In other words, the association is helping the police enforce existing legislation by encouraging members to participate in this

program.

While implementing the designated driver program gives ARFA and its members a role in facilitating the compliance of the general public, some associations facilitate their own members' compliance with regulations. Many industry organizations undertake educational programs of various types, sometimes including instruction in what industry standards are in place, and how to meet those standards.

In summary, the industry association provide an important service to government. Through various informal and formal mechanisms, they influence the behaviour of their members in order to promote government goal attainment.

Dependence: a summary

In summary, the analysis provides significant support for a relationship between government dependence on a trade association and the likelihood of that association's participation in policy formation. Specifically, implementation dependence was found to relate most strongly to strategy in the quantitative analysis. Information dependence was marginally statistically related to strategy. No relationship was found between economic dependence and strategy. At this point, no firm conclusions can be made about the role of economic dependence. Measurement problems may explain the lack of findings. The alternative interpretation of political level as an intervening variable was also discussed.

Furthermore, two additional types of dependencies of government on trade associations emerged from the qualitative data -- political dependence and social control dependence. Future research is required to more systematically investigate the importance of these two variables. The next four sections will present and discuss the findings related to the four hypothesized components of legitimacy.

Association Density

Density was defined earlier as the percentage of firms in an association's domain which hold memberships in the association. The logistical regression revealed no significant relationship between association density and strategy. In other words, the hypothesis that associations with higher density would be more likely to participate in policy-formation received no support in the statistical analysis. The qualitative analysis helps provide an understanding for this lack of support.

A number of informants suggested that trade association density, as it has been defined here, may be less important than the percentage of business done by the association's members. Since there is a tendency for the associations to over represent the larger firms in the industry, their membership tends to conduct a greater percentage of industry business than their actual membership would suggest. The association managers, when representing themselves to the government, can present the larger number (ie. the percentage of business) in the hopes of being regarded as more representative of the industry. Unfortunately, no measure was made of the percentage of business within an industry performed by association members, and so the hypothesis could not be tested using this alternative measure of association density.

The association informants varied in their views about the importance of association density in dealing with the government. One stated:

> Facts and figures ... are usually seen as powerful tools in convincing a decision-making body, wherever they might come from, that you are showing them a large portion of a particular industry, and that you are not just one little scratch some place that they can just brush off.

The opposing and more common view of trade association managers was that density is unimportant:

> When you go to government you don't use the figures of the percentage you represent. You represent the industry by acclamation because nobody else is

there to represent the industry.

> I can probably count the times on one hand the number of times that the government has asked how many members we've got... But they accept us as the representatives of the retailers. Because they know we're province-wide and they know that when we speak we represent everybody.

Being regarded as the sole representative of the industry was more consistently viewed by the association managers as important than was association density. The Alberta Trucking Association was worried when a group of their members formed a splinter group, the Motor Carriers Association of Alberta. A major goal, which was attained, was to bring the breakaway group back into the association so that the industry could present a united front in its discussions with the government. Now that one association represents the trucking industry in Alberta, the Executive Director suggests that density is unimportant:

> We've not had to [present figures about our membership], we used to during every presentation we made, . . . but the answer is that if we don't, who does represent our industry? We're pretty much recognized for that.

The government respondents more consistently felt that density was an important aspect of trade association legitimacy. The following quote is typical:

> We are never sure if the minority organization really represents the industry. We have to be very careful. Sometimes you wonder if they aren't a group of dissidents, a group that doesn't agree with everybody else. We certainly don't want to meet with them and do the things they want if its actually representing the minority view in that industry.

One government representative said that he was careful when having discussions with an association to find out whether the views presented first of all were representative of the association membership, and second if nonmembers had also been consulted.

It is possible for associations to enhance their representativeness without increasing their density. Representatives of both the Retail Merchants Association of Canada and the Canadian Craft and Hobby Association indicated that when conducting a survey to establish

the industry's views on a policy matter, they survey both association members and non-members. Both associations had fairly low association density, but could present the views of 'industry' more broadly when speaking to the government.

In summary, the interviews suggest that representativeness may be a more important component of association legitimacy than is density. Density may be one aspect of representativeness, but the existence of alternative groups within the association's domain, percentage of industry business conducted by association members and demographic similarity between association members and the industry may be other important aspects. The lack of statistical relationship between density and participation is disappointing. However, future research should utilize the concept of 'representativeness' rather than association density. Further discussion of this concept will be presented in the concluding chapter.

Association Autonomy

It was hypothesized that the government would prefer to work with associations that were autonomous from the membership so that they would be in a position to transcend the short term parochial interests of the membership. In other words, an association would be regarded as legitimate if it was sufficiently autonomous to take this broad perspective. However, the beta for association autonomy was not significant in the regression equation. An explanation for this lack of finding can be found in the qualitative data. Information gained from interviews with both trade association and government officials suggests that there is not a direct positive relationship between association autonomy and association legitimacy.

Often strong views were presented regarding whether the association management <u>should</u> act autonomously, although there was no uniformity of opinion. The Executive

Director of the Petroleum Services Association of Canada believed that his role was to act in an autonomous manner since many of his member firms were small and struggling to survive, their management was unable to concern itself with long-term issues. Another association executive argued that:

> Most of the members don't know [what we do]. Sometimes you have to make decisions on their behalf. If everything we did was on consent, we'd be spending 85% of our time trying to get consent. So what you have to do is poll, and depending on the issue, as I guess like if you're appropriately politicized, is you know exactly who to ask what question.

The more common view (and usually expressed more zealously) was that the association managers are the servants of the members. Their job is to carry out the membership's wishes. Being a democratic organization, however, was not linked to improving their relationship with the government. It was seen either as a value to be upheld for its own sake, or to enhance the legitimacy of the association in the eyes of members and potential members in order to ensure the continued existence of the organization.

There was a similar divergence among the views of government informants. The majority view was that the autonomy of association managers from the membership was illegitimate. Supporters of this position expressed a desire for confidence that the views expressed by association leaders were a consensus of their members' views.

The less common view was that association managers should be able to act without discussion with their membership. Autonomy of managers was sometimes preferred because it facilitated faster and easier communication between the government and the association, not for reasons related to legitimacy. The above case of the government-industry response to flood relief, for example, was possible only because the association could act independently of its members. In only one case did a government informant express a positive view of association autonomy for reasons other than convenience. He made the link between

autonomy and leadership. He felt that good association managers were industry leaders; they would be knowledgeable about the interests of the industry as a whole and able to take a leadership role in the industry without the constant seeking of permission from the members.

The findings suggest that the relationship between association autonomy and government willingness to include the association in policy formation is more complicated than hypothesized, and as discussed by Coleman (1985). High association autonomy may encourage an association to take a broad perspective, which may increase their legitimacy in the eyes of government. However, it may also create concerns about the extent to which the association truly represents its members. The slight negative (but far from statistically significant) beta for autonomy in the regression equation may arise because the benefits of autonomy are outweighed by their costs.

Goal Divergence

The negative, marginally significant beta ($p < .10$) for goal divergence suggests, as hypothesized, that the more divergent are the goals of the association from the goals of the government, the lower the likelihood that the association will participate in policy making.

The analysis was undertaken with the specific policy influence attempt as the unit of analysis. The logic of the hypothesis was that if the association's goal for the focal policy issue was consistent with the public good (hesitantly defined as consistent with the government's policy preferences), the association would be perceived as legitimate because it is not proposing policies counter to the public welfare.

However, there may be a stronger link between overall association concern for public issues and its legitimacy in the eyes of the government. Thus, the government's willingness to include an association in policy making may be related to goal divergence, but on a different

level of analysis. That is, an association that generally presents itself as concerned about issues of corporate social responsibility may be more likely to find a place at the policy table on any issue. Legitimacy may be a function of the association's willingness to demonstrate goals consistent with the public welfare over the longer term. This may explain the weak relationship between issue specific goal divergence and participation, despite significant evidence from the interviews about a broad concern for industry support of broader social concerns.

The transcripts suggest that the associations frequently attempt to at least be perceived as highly concerned about the public good. For example, the Canadian Council of Grocery Distributors was faced with choosing between supporting a policy of curbside recycling of empty bottles, or a deposit system. The Regional Director stated in the interview that he felt that the curbside recycling system was not good for Saskatchewan, since it is a highly rural province less suited to curbside recycling than would be a highly urbanized province. Presumably the no-deposit, curbside recycling would be more in his members' interests (since consumers would not be required to pay the deposit); however, he supported the alternative policy.

One association executive indicated that the group undertook significant activities in order to be perceived as having goals consistent with the public good:

> Five years ago the [association] set out to establish itself to be and to be seen to be the most environmentally sensitive and caring corporate citizen, our member companies, in the country.

The interviews with the government representatives suggest that they prefer to deal with associations which take into account the public good. A representative from the Department of Occupational Health and Safety expressed high regard for the petroleum industry because of their recent attempts to improve health and safety in the industry:

> It's demonstrating that industry in this area have a commitment to

> occupational health and safety because that's really what its all about. That they were prepared to follow through on that commitment and spend significant resources in producing the report and identifying what they wanted to get done. That's good from our perspective. So we can sit back and say, see, industry is doing something. They are pushing forward.

Other government informants expressed a concern that some associations presented too narrow a perspective and failed to take into account the public welfare. One expressed amazement at some of the requests made by some industry associations. He said:

> A lot of times I find that association submissions are not well-written. They often don't show any balance ... Often times an association comes with a very biased view. I think if associations came across more equitably it would improve things.

Such an approach does appear to harm an industry's legitimacy from the perspective of the government.

In summary, the study finds at least marginal support for the hypothesis that a trade association will have an increased probability of participating in policy-formation the greater the extent to which its goals are consistent with the goals of the public on the specific policy issue. However, the qualitative analysis suggests that the extent of goal divergence from the public good needs to be examined beyond the level of the specific issue. That is, the government may be more willing to include an association in the formation of any policy if that association has traditionally acted in a socially responsible manner, and concerned itself with the public good.

Issue Specificity

The issue specificity variable was significantly related to participation in the regression analysis ($p < .05$), suggesting, as predicted, that the more specific is the issue to the industry represented, the greater the likelihood that the trade association will participate in forming that policy. In other words, industry associations will be more likely to collaborate with the

government on issues which primarily impact industry members. Issues with broader industrial and/or social impact are less likely to be resolved through collaboration with the industry association.

These findings suggest that the government will be hesitant to include an industry in developing a policy that will impact on other interests. There is a weakness in the logic behind this hypothesis, however. An influence attempt could have been classified as participative without the focal association being the sole group collaborating with the government in forming that policy. Therefore, it is possible for the issue to be non-industry specific, but for the government to perceive an association as having a legitimate role in participating in forming the policy if other interested parties also participate.

For example, three associations -- the Canadian Association of Oilwell Drilling Contractors, the Alberta Homebuilders Association and the Alberta Construction Association -- all participated in developing the revisions to the Builders Lien Act. In this case the issue was not rated as highly specific (since it impacted on many construction-related industries) but the strategy used by all of these three groups was categorized as participative.

A similar argument can be made for the self-regulation participative approaches. Representatives of both the Motor Dealers Association of Alberta and the Automotive Service and Repair Association discussed the creation of the Automotive Regulatory Board. Regulation of the retail auto industry impacts the dealers, the servicers and consumers. All three of these groups are to be represented on the Automotive Regulatory Board.

While these cases appear to contradict the specifics of the hypothesis, they conform with the overall argument about the association between issue specificity and legitimacy. If the policy concerns a small group of industries, then it may be illegitimate to include only one of those groups in policy formulation, but it may be regarded as highly legitimate to include all of the relevant groups.

Despite the weakness of the original hypothesis in failing to take into account the possibility of the participation of multiple interested groups, a relationship was still found between issue specificity and participation. This is likely because not all groups that might be impacted by a policy are organized, and thus cannot easily be included in policy formation. Furthermore, some groups may be unable to work cooperatively with other groups. While the consumers association and the motor dealers association may, despite their differences, be able to come to a compromise position, the forest products association may have more difficulty working with some environmental groups. It seems reasonable to conclude that more highly specific issues will yield less controversy and less opportunity for diverging interests and thus be more conducive to participatory decision-making than broader issues impacting a wider range of interested parties.

Other Factors

The study was designed to facilitate the testing of specific hypotheses derived from existing literature and to provide the opportunity for the emergence of other potential explanations. The interviews with the government provided the opportunity for the latter. Informants were asked what factors influenced the likelihood that an association would be included in the formation of policy. After an initial response, they were then prompted further for aspects of the association that might be important and for aspects of the issue.

Only one factor was brought up that had not been considered in the study; that was the extent of consensus within the industry. An interesting example of within-industry divergence of views hampering industry participation was the creation of the National Safety Code to replace existing regulation of the trucking industry, as discussed by a representative of the Alberta Trucking Association and a representative of the Alberta Department of Transportation and Utilities.

Since trucking firms by their mobile nature tend to cross provincial boundaries, and since trucking is regulated at the provincial as well as the federal level, it is preferable to have a common safety code in all the provinces of the country. In order to facilitate the development of standard regulations, there was an attempt on the part of the Council of Ministers of Transportation to develop a National Safety Code which would be adopted by each province. They created a task force to develop recommendations for the safety code which included the Canadian Trucking Association (CTA). However, there was much disagreement between the various provincial trucking associations so that the consensus position of the CTA diverged from that of many of the provincial associations. While the task force made recommendations for a National Safety Code, many of the provincial associations lobbied for changes, leading to the adoption of different safety regulations across the country.

The Department of Transportation representative argued that if the trucking industry across Canada had been united, the trucking industry could have been regarded as having participated in the formation of the National Safety Code. However, since the recommendations developed by the task force were significantly altered prior to implementation, the provincial association must be regarded as playing an advocacy role.

Another government representative also suggested that diverging interests within the industry makes participation difficult:

> It is often difficult for the association to comment on an issue that impacts each of its member companies in a different way...The association's viewpoint is usually a compromise or a consensus viewpoint that will give us a general feel for the implications of the policy... as a result its not as conducive to sitting down and working on it together.

Within-industry consensus, then, was the only factor, other than those included in the study, that was indicated by the government informants as impacting their likelihood of including an association in policy-making.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

In this chapter an attempt has been made to evaluate a number of hypotheses regarding factors influencing the likelihood that an association will participate in policy-formation. A number of hypotheses were not supported by the quantitative analysis, and the qualitative analysis was drawn upon to find potential explanations for the lack of findings.

It is interesting to note, however, that there is a commonality between those factors that were found to be statistically related to participation. Implementation dependence, information dependence, issue specificity and goal divergence as measured in this study are all issue specific. These were also the factors that were found to relate at least marginally to participation. The unconfirmed hypotheses related to economic dependence, density, and autonomy. These are association-specific, and do not vary with issue.

These results suggest that the nature of the issue may be a better predictor of participation than the nature of the association. Previous research, however, has tended to focus on the latter. Numerous authors that were discussed in Chapter Four develop classification schemes of associations. Pross (1986: 120-121) has developed a typology of pressure groups in which 'group characteristics' are associated with 'levels of communication with government'. The latter aspect, of course, is closely related to extent of participation. The assumption of such a basis for typology is that the nature of the communication with government is constant across issues, but varies between groups.

Similarly, Grant (1984) has developed a classification scheme of pressure groups. Some are labelled 'insider groups', of which he distinguishes three sub-types. Others are labelled 'outsider groups' also consisting of three sub-types. Again, the assumption is that a group is always either 'inside' or 'outside' of the policy-making process.

Coleman (1985) distinguishes between 'policy-capable associations' and 'policy-weak

associations'. While these three authors diverge somewhat in the characteristics of associations that are regarded as important in influencing collaboration with the government in policy-making, they are similar in disregarding variation in policy capability across policy issues.

The results presented in this chapter suggest that any given group may be inside the policy-making process in some cases and outside in others. Therefore, the findings point to the necessity of redirecting the focus of future research towards an increasing concern with the identifying characteristics of the policy issue that facilitate association participation. The present study has successfully directed attention to at least some of these factors.

CHAPTER EIGHT: THE USE OF ADVOCACY TACTICS

In this chapter, the findings related to the second research question regarding the use of the three advocacy tactics -- direct action, joint action and the public route -- will be presented and discussed.

A HIERARCHY OF TACTICS

Fifty-five (82%) of the 67 influence attempts were classified as advocacy strategies. Appendix B includes the tactic(s) that were used in each of the sample of influence attempts. The frequencies of each of the three influence attempts is given in Table 8.1. That is, in 54 out of 55 influence attempts, direct contact was used *at some point* in the influence process. Similarly, in 19 of the 55 influence attempts, joint action was used *at some point* in the influence process, and in 10 cases, a public campaign was used at some point. In other words, more than one tactic was used in many cases. Sometimes tactics occurred simultaneously and other times sequentially. Again, Appendix B presents this information. Further details about sequencing and the use of multiple tactics will be presented in later sections. Propositions 3, 4 and 5 suggest that direct action would be the most popular advocacy tactic, followed by joint action, followed by the public route. The data presented in Table 8.1 support each of these three propositions. In Chapter Five, a rationale was provided for the propositions. Further data will be discussed in an attempt to evaluate the validity of this rationale for the findings.

Number (%age) using direct contact	Number (%age) using joint action	Number (%age) using public route
54 (98%	19 (35%)	10 (18%)

Table 8.1 Frequency of advocacy tactics (n = 55).

Direct Contact

In 54 of the 55 advocacy influence attempts, direct contact was made with politicians and/or bureaucrats at some point in the influence process. Clearly, direct contact is the most popular of the three advocacy tactics. The only case which did not involve some direct contact was utilized by the Canadian Craft and Hobby Association (CCHA) as was discussed in Chapter Six. In this case CCHA's Executive Director encouraged industry members to individually contact government departments. This grass roots lobbying was done without any direct contact between the association and the government.

Joint Action

Joint action was used less frequently than direct action. In one third of the sample of influence attempts, the focal association acted jointly with another group at some point in the process. Other groups with which the focal association worked included provincial governments (or departments within the provincial government), municipal governments, other business associations, individual firms, agricultural associations, and church groups.

In four (21%) of the nineteen cases in which joint action was utilized, it occurred with government only; in three cases (16%) action was taken in conjunction with government and industry and in nine cases (47%) action was undertaken jointly with industry only. Of the remaining three cases, one influence attempt was undertaken with an agricultural group only, one with church and industry, and one through involvement with the Canadian Alliance for Free Trade, a broad group of free trade advocates.

The nature of joint action can also be classified by the nature of the alliance that was developed. In one case, an existing formal group, the Advisory Council on the Transportation of Dangerous Goods, was enlisted to support the Propane Gas Association's attempt to establish

Good Samaritan Legislation as a policy priority of the federal government. In six of the remaining cases, an issue-specific group was established. For example, the Canadian Federation of Independent Grocers formed the 'quality of life group' including themselves, other retailers and church organizations. Actions were then taken in the name of the 'quality of life' group. In another case, numerous Alberta industry associations created the 'industry task force on workers compensation' which was a permanent group created to deal specifically with workers compensation on an ongoing basis. In the remaining cases, joint action could be described as an ad-hoc alliance with another association to deal with one specific issue, and without the establishment of a joint identity.

At the outset of the research, the preliminary conceptual framework and initial research hypotheses used the idea of 'third party endorsement' (since replaced by what we now term 'joint action'). It was believed that working with or through a third party was more adversarial in dealing with the government than direct contact because the former tactic consists of attempting to increase the power with which to face the government. However, as is clear from the earlier discussion of the concept of 'joint action', it does not have the adversarial connotation as does 'third party endorsement'. In fact, the interviews suggest that joint action may serve to enhance the legitimacy of industry in presenting their demands to government.

Legitimacy may be enhanced in two ways. First, by working jointly with other groups that would be affected by the policy, the representativeness of the lobby is enhanced. When the informant from the Insurance Bureau of Canada was asked why it was helpful to work jointly with the Insurance Brokers Association, he responded,

> I think because we're representing two sides of the industry. I'm not just looking at it purely from the insurance company's side and it's not just purely the marketing arm. It's two organizations that represent totally different facets that are working towards a common thing, and we feel that it might carry more weight.

It was common for interviewees to suggest that they do try to work with other affected industry associations if they have interests in common. Second, legitimacy can be enhanced by working jointly with a group which has greater legitimacy than itself. This strategy is alluded to in the following quote:

> We hooked up with what's called the quality of life group in Saskatchewan. And we got the churches involved and some of the department stores like Eatons and quite a collection of goody people (emphasis added).

Hesitancy to cooperate with other groups in influencing government policy may be expected to result from a desire to avoid compromising the organization's autonomy. The interviews did suggest that this was an issue in some cases. One association manager explained why he was unable to work with other interested parties on influencing the Workers' Compensation Board experience rating system:

> We had some informal discussions with the Canadian Federation of Independent Business, the East Edmonton Business Association, the South Edmonton Business Association, but it was informal. We had some discussions about an *en masse* release, an *en masse* press conference or an *en masse* submission to the minister, but it was difficult to get that many associations on the same wavelength. Everybody's got their own perspective of the problem, on any problem. And frankly egos come into play too because the associations all want to wave the flag and they want to take the credit for it. So while we may agree fundamentally, we may be jockeying for a slightly different perspective and its hard to bring the associations together.

The informant from the Alberta Construction Association (ACA) felt quite strongly about the importance of putting forth a united front in dealing with the government. In fact, the nature of the associational system in the construction industry facilitates this, as it is what Coleman (1986b) labels an 'organized system', or what the ACA manager labelled an 'integrated membership' system. In this system, individual firms are members of a local association (eg. the Edmonton Construction Association), which is in turn a member of the Alberta Construction Association, which is in turn a member of the Canadian Construction Association. In this system,

the Alberta Construction Association serves the aggregated interests of the various regions and trades within the construction industry in Alberta.

The system is not perfect, however, as there exists some competition with the roadbuilders' and homebuilders' associations. The ACA manager stated:

> One of the difficulties that we do have is with government and if you put yourself in a Cabinet Minister's shoes, and if you've got a bunch of people from the construction industry coming at you diametrically, one says its black and one says its white. What do you say? You say well I'm gonna say its any colour I want it to be. And so we constantly try to work to get a consensus among those groups.

This consensus is sometimes presented in the form of a joint brief. Alternatively, separate briefs are presented by separate associations, but with content previously standardized through consensus. The presentation of unanimity does involve compromise for the different groups and is not always possible to achieve.

The informant from the Canadian Association of Oilwell Drilling Contractors (CAODC) described the oil industry's attempt to influence the Workers' Compensation Act. The CAODC presented individual briefs while an industry group consisting of many oil industry associations presented joint briefs. The joint action was undertaken "to approach them as a group representing the majority of employment in Alberta". However, different industry associations within the oil industry have very different interests regarding the workers' compensation system. Ultimately a compromise was made within the industry group, yielding vague recommendations in cases of disagreement. Because the joint submissions did not reflect the precise views of member associations, each also presented separate briefs.

The informant from a relatively new and minor actor, suggested that support from other groups was often difficult to obtain:

> I couldn't see John Bulloch from CFIB wanting to look at us too strongly... We're not a big enough fish... We recognize that being small has its problems.

The results of the interviews suggest that joint action is generally regarded as a desirable tactic to influence government policy. It is often undertaken to enhance the legitimacy of the lobby, although in cases of a divergence of interests, the loss of autonomy over the content of the presentation to government reduces the likelihood that the groups will succeed in attaining a united front.

There is support in the findings for the argument presented in Chapter Five, that joint action would be a less desirable tactic than direct action due to the loss of autonomy that it would entail. Recall that resource dependence theory has as an important assumption that managers prefer to maintain autonomy in their relationships with other organizations (Aldrich, 1979). Prior to data collection, the major assumed benefit of joint action was an increase in the power of the lobby due to its larger size. This assumption fit well with the resource dependence perspective and its emphasis on interorganizational dependencies and power. However, the evidence that a joint action tactic enhances the lobby's *legitimacy* through increasing the representativeness of the lobby fits with the theoretical perspective of the present study. Since legitimacy is hypothesized as a variable which influences the nature of an association's involvement in policy making, it is not surprising that tactics which enhance legitimacy will be used beneficially by trade associations.

In summary, the use of a joint action tactic to influence government policy is relatively common. A cost of such a tactic is the loss of autonomy that is entailed. Sometimes such a cost serves as sufficient disincentive to utilize the tactic. The findings also suggest that the major benefit of joint action is an increase in the representativeness of the lobby, yielding an increase in the lobby's legitimacy. This benefit appears to frequently outweigh the cost.

Public Route

Attempting to influence government actions through influencing public attitudes, by

attracting the media for example, was the least frequent of the three hypothesized advocacy tactics. It was utilized at some point in ten influence attempts (18%). No association described more than one influence attempt utilizing the public route.

The relative infrequency of the public route is consistent with the hypothesis that it is the least popular of the three advocacy tactics. Two reasons for this hesitancy to utilize this strategy was suggested, including the expense involved, and the potential that it leads to a deterioration of relations with government. Regarding the first reason, in no cases was cost presented as a rationale for not taking a public route stand. This may be because it is possible to gain public exposure inexpensively through press releases, appearances on talk shows and responding to interview requests from news media.

There is support for the second reason for hesitancy in the use of the public route. The interview transcripts make it clear that the trade associations wish to avoid using the media to confront the government because of its adverse effects on future relations. As examples:

> You establish your credibility working cooperatively with government. The next issue you crap all over them in the paper. When it comes to issue number three, what are you going to do? Now we're going to be nice? Forget it. Most of the resolution of any issue is done behind closed doors, not in the public eye. The only one who wins when you debate issues in the newspaper is the newspaper.

> No, we tend not to [use the public route]. I think that when one looks at the process one has to say that irrespective of how this issue comes out, there are going to be other issues. In my view you only can get away with debating things in the press once.

> Today we tend to distinguish therapy and effect. There is always a constituency within associations that want you to be seen to be upset. They're upset about something the government has done, so they want their association to be seen to be upset as well. That's highly therapeutic. People express great outrage at government actions and government policies; they are highly critical and do so on television and in the press. Do these people ever change the policies? Infrequently, if ever.

> I know they [the government] weren't enamoured with the fact that we took the question to the media. They usually prefer to keep the discussion internally.

The government informants expressed less negative views towards the public route tactic than the above quotes would suggest. In fact, only one government informant gave a totally negative response to the question about this approach. A large majority of government respondents gave guarded approval to such a tactic. Many indicated that such an approach was completely legitimate as long as they were not presenting false information to the press, or divulging confidential information. Two government informants made comments to the effect that such an approach was 'fair game'.

The appearance of tolerance of the government informants is surprising given the attitudes of the association representatives towards the public route tactic. It is possible that the individuals who most resent a public route tactic are politicians, since they have the most to lose from criticism in the media; however, since the government sample did not consist of politicians, the 'government' sample may be biased regarding this issue.

The trade associations' reluctance to use the public route can be linked to the issue of political dependence discussed in the last chapter. Trade association support for government officials' political goals was one of the dependencies of government representatives on the trade associations. Quotes were presented that suggested that trade association representatives report conscious attempts to protect government officials from negative publicity. Avoiding the use of a public route strategy is thus consistent with trade associations' managing their dependencies.

The qualitative data provides another explanation of why trade associations may avoid the use of a public campaign. One informant suggested that a lack of public legitimacy hampered her association's use of a public route strategy:

> I think that the position we're in now, the public perceives [our industry members] negatively, and to use the public against government, we're going to have to change that first. They're not on our side right now. It doesn't make sense to try to use them.

Legitimacy appears as an important concept as well when the two cases in which

extensive media campaigns were undertaken are examined. The first was the Canadian Petroleum Association's campaign in response to the introduction of the National Energy Program, which has been the subject of previous academic discussions (Toner and Doern, 1986). The second was an attempt by the Alberta Forest Products Association to influence the Alberta Department of the Environment to allow the use of herbicides in Alberta forests.

The advocacy advertising campaign of the CPA was described in Chapter Five. However, the interview with the President provided additional insight. He argued that:

> through its own ineptitude the industry allowed the climate of public opinion to be created in which it was politically feasible for the federal government to make this massive intervention into the business of the industry.

The advertising campaign that was undertaken focused both on the specifics of energy policy, and upon enhancing the image of the oil industry. It was thought that it would only be possible to change the public's attitude about the National Energy Program if the oil industry was viewed with high legitimacy.

A similar pattern can be seen in an issue discussed by the former Executive Director of the Alberta Forest Products Association (AFPA). According to the informant, the use of herbicides has been approved by Agriculture Canada. However, their use is regulated provincially in Alberta by the Agricultural Chemical Act administered by the Department of the Environment. Use of herbicides in agricultural is ubiquitous, but use in 'green areas' (forests) of the province requires a certificate from the Minister of the Environment. Lobbying by environmental groups resulted in a promise by the Premier to disallow herbicide use in forests. Since then, no certificates have been made available to the forestry industry. In this case, the Forest Service is highly supportive of the forestry industry; furthermore, the politicians and the Department of the Environment are highly sympathetic. The obstacle to herbicide use lies in public attitudes.

A committee including the informant as Chairman, and representatives from the Department of the Environment and Forest Services was set up with the mandate to "come up with a good reason, and a good solid position to present for the use of herbicides and to come back with a public opinion reaction". The AFPA hired a consultant from the University of Alberta to conduct a public opinion survey. His report suggested that attitudes were favourable enough that with proper "education" the public would likely side with the forestry industry on herbicide use. Since then the AFPA has begun a fairly extensive public relations campaign stressing the forest industry's responsible forest management.

In this case the impediment to obtaining AFPA's preferred policy was not the attitudes of government bureaucracy or politicians, but that of the public. A public campaign to improve the legitimacy of the forest industry was thought to be a necessary antecedent to a change in policy regarding the use of herbicides on Alberta forests.

In summary the qualitative data finds no support for the argument that cost would serve as an inhibitor to the use of a public route tactic. However, support was found for the argument that the attempt to avoid becoming confrontational with government would inhibit the use of a public campaign. Furthermore, the findings suggest that the concept of legitimacy may be relevant to understanding when a public route tactic will be utilized. Tentatively, the data suggests that if an association has low legitimacy, they may avoid the use of this tactic. If they do resort to a public campaign, they will include attempts to improve their legitimacy as part of that campaign.

A SEQUENCING OF TACTICS

Propositions 3, 4 and 5 suggest a sequencing of tactics. That is, joint action will tend to occur only if direct action fails, and that the public route will only be used if the more

desirable tactics of direct contact and joint action fail. In fact, there were no cases in which the reverse sequencing of tactics occurred. That is, joint action never preceded direct action; nor did the public route ever precede direct action or joint action. However, the opposite was not found to be true. That is, joint action did not always sequentially follow direct action; they were often used simultaneously. Similarly, the public route did not always sequentially follow one or more of the hypothesized 'preceding' tactics; it was sometimes used simultaneously with them.

This finding, although contrary to the propositions, is not surprising given the discussion of the three tactics presented above. Since joint action appears to be a highly legitimate tactic, the benefits relative to the costs of such an approach are higher than suggested when the proposition was developed. Similarly, as the case study of the Alberta Forest Products Association suggests, a public campaign may serve the interests of the government as well as those of the industry, and so need not be avoided in order to preserve the relationship with the government.

MULTIPLE TACTICS

As was discussed in Chapter Six, the 'multiple tactics' variable is a dichotomous variable. An influence attempt was regarded as having involved the use of multiple advocacy tactics if two or more tactics were utilized simultaneously at any point in the influence process. The use of multiple tactics simultaneously occurred in eighteen instances. Table 8.2 presents the frequencies with which each combination of advocacy tactics was undertaken.

It was proposed that multiple tactics would tend to be more likely to be utilized under conditions of severe threat than under less threatening conditions. However, the regression of the 'multiple tactics' variable on the 'impact of legislation' variable yielded no relationship between the two variables.

Combination of tactics	Number	Percentage
Direct contact/public route	2	11
Direct contact/joint action	7	39
Direct contact/grass roots lobbying	2	11
Direct contact/consultant action	1	6
Direct contact/joint action/public route	3	17
Direct contact/joint action/public route and grass roots lobbying	1	6
Joint action/public route	2	11
Total	18	101

Table 8.2. Frequencies of multiple tactic use.

These findings, although failing to support the final proposition, are not surprising given the discussion earlier in the chapter about joint action and the public route. It was suggested earlier that joint action was often undertaken if other groups would be affected by the policy, and thereby had an interest in the policy. Therefore, it may be that the existence of other organized groups with similar interests would be a better predictor of the use of direct contact and joint action, than would the potential impact of the legislation.

Examination of the influence attempts utilizing direct contact and joint action supports this explanation. For example, the Motel Association of Alberta attempted to obtain a grant from the Alberta government to fund the creation of a grading system for accommodation in Alberta. They had discussions alone with government, but were also engaged in 'joint action' with the Alberta Hotel Association. Since the grading system impacted hotels and motels, it was natural for the two associations to work together.

In four cases, multiple tactics included direct contact, joint action and public route. These issues -- oil sands development, tax reform, the labour act and free trade -- are all highly public issues which have impact well beyond the industry whose representative raised them. Again, in these cases, the nature of the issue appears to be a better predictor of the use of

multiple tactics than does the impact of the legislation. Since the qualitative data analysis suggested that the use of joint action and the public route campaign are often not 'acts of desperation', the findings regarding this proposition are not surprising.

In conclusion, then, multiple tactics do not appear to be a result of highly threatening or costly legislation; rather, direct action appears to frequently be complemented by the other tactics if these other tactics are appropriate given the nature of the policy issue in question.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter an attempt has been made to make conclusions about how frequently, and under what conditions the three advocacy tactics -- direct action, joint action, and the public route will be utilized. The research supports propositions 3, 4 and 5, suggesting that direct action is the most popular tactic, followed by joint action, followed by a public campaign. However, the rationale that underpinned the propositions was not completely supported. There was some support for the idea that joint action required a loss of autonomy, which served to inhibit the use of this tactic. However, there was more evidence that associations would attempt to utilize joint action if the policy affected other groups in order to increase the 'representativeness', or legitimacy of the lobby.

There was significant qualitative support for the assumption that a public route campaign would tend to be resisted by association managers because of the belief that it could hamper their relationship with government. However, the concept of legitimacy appeared to be relevant to this issue as well. In cases of major public campaigns, a significant goal of the campaign was to enhance the legitimacy of the industry. Also, the possibility was raised that some associations would avoid the use of a public campaign because of their industry's lack of legitimacy. Lack of legitimacy may inhibit the use of a public campaign, or encourage the use

of a legitimacy-enhancing campaign in addition to the attempt at attitude change.

It is interesting to note that the concepts of dependence and legitimacy were not initially utilized in the development of the propositions related to the question of advocacy tactic use. Therefore, the research was not designed specifically to examine the impact of legitimacy or dependence. Despite this, these concepts have repeatedly been useful in explaining the findings. However, since specific hypotheses about the relationship between these variables and advocacy tactic use have not been tested, conclusions can only be tentative. The findings of the study do provide input for the development of hypotheses for future research. Some preliminary discussion of future research directions based on the findings related to this research question will be pre: nted in the concluding chapter.

CHAPTER NINE: MANAGING GOVERNMENT RELATIONS

The third question that the present study addressed was: "How do industry associations manage their relationships with government over time?" This was an exploratory question, and so specific hypotheses were not developed.

Interviews with trade association managers were concluded with the following question:

> "Have you taken any specific actions intended to improve your ability to deal with government?"

As discussed in Chapter Six, this question was posed to investigate the extent of and nature of proactive actions utilized by trade associations to increase their future success in dealing with government.

As discussed in Chapter Five, resource dependence theory takes a less deterministic perspective of organizations than other organizational theories, by suggesting how organizations attempt to 'managing their dependencies'. The present study has hypothesized that both dependence and legitimacy will influence the association's ability to become involved in policy-making. It follows, then, that a trade association could enhance future prospects for policy participation by both 'managing its dependencies' and 'managing its legitimacy'.

The responses to the final interview question were placed into four categories. The first two categories of 'managing dependence' and 'managing legitimacy' were determined *a priori*. Responses which could not be placed into either of these categories were classified into two post hoc categories ('facilitating communication or access' and 'general approach to dealing with government'). Table 9.1 presents the number of informants who indicated that their association had undertaken one or more actions that were categorized into each of these categories.

Response Category	#	%age
"Managing dependence"	12	41
"Managing legitimacy"	6	21
Facilitating communication/access	20	69
General approach to dealing with govt	10	29

Table 9.1 Number and percentage of respondents indicating the use of at least one action to improve relations with government in each category.

Informants varied in the number of actions indicated that had been taken to improve their relationship with government. They ranged from zero to eight actions, with two as the modal number of actions and a mean of 2.6. A summary of the responses to this question, by category, is presented in Appendix L.

The remainder of the discussion will include both informant responses to the concluding interview question presented above, and other actions that were mentioned by informants during other parts of the interview which relate to this issue.

MANAGING DEPENDENCE

Forty-one percent of industry association informants suggested that they had taken at least one action to improve their relations with government that could be regarded as an attempt to 'manage' the extent of government dependence. That is, the actions as described by the informants have been classified as attempts to increase the extent to which the government will perceive itself to be dependent on the association and/or its members for various benefits. This was the second most common category of response. Appendix L lists the actions placed in this category. These responses can be further categorized according to the kind of dependence, as follows.

The Provision of Information

A number of respondents indicated that they frequently provided the government with information. This information ranges from association newsletters to results of public opinion research. The Alberta Book Publishers Association is currently generating figures about the industry in order to provide that information to government. The Canadian Bankers Association occasionally puts on slide shows to inform the government about particular issues.

The informant from the Canadian Association of Oilwell Drilling Contractors (CAODC) indicated that they had recently hired two new individuals -- an engineer and an economist -- in order to increase the amount of expertise held by association staff. She also indicated that they regularly invite government officials to technical, legal and safety seminars that are put on for their members. Furthermore the CAODC board members have been encouraged to be more involved in discussions with government. Although not stated explicitly in the interview, such an action will supplement expertise and information of association staff with that information and expertise held only by industry members.

The Alberta Readymix Concrete Association is very young, and sees one of its top priorities as undertaking research about various issues in order to make its case to government. Two of the issues that were discussed in the interview were flatwork (i.e. driveways, curbs) standards and preserved wood foundation standards. The association is currently gathering information about failures in both resulting from what it views as lenient standards.

The opportunity to provide information is enhanced when association officials and government officials work closely together. The Alberta Trucking Association indicated that it invited two civil servants to sit on one of its committees. The Regional Vice President of the Canadian Federation of Independent Grocers, on the other hand, indicated that he often sits on government committees.

In summary, in response to the question about specific actions that the association has taken to improve its ability to deal with government, many discussed actions that related to providing

information, increasing the amount of information held by the association, or increasing the opportunity to provide information. This suggests that the respondents view their ability to provide information as significant and also that they can take conscious steps to increase their ability to do so.

The Provision of Political Support

It was indicated in Chapter Seven that industry associations often provide political support of various forms to the government. Those examples that were offered specifically in response to the final interview question included avoiding criticizing the government to the media, encouraging members to contribute to political campaigns and preventing government officials from making politically harmful mistakes.

Social Control of Industry

Numerous examples of the industry association undertaking actions to influence the behaviour of industry members were discussed in Chapter Seven. Two of the associations mentioned this type of action specifically in response to the final interview question.

The Canadian Council of Grocery Distributors frequently gets involved in helping provincial governments to promote local products. This requires particular promotional activities to be undertaken by the retail grocery stores. The association is also liaising between the Manitoba government and their member firms to help institute a pay equity program.

The informant from the Canadian Federation of Independent Grocers indicated that government relations were promoted by the association involvement in encouraging industry members to cooperate in the conversion to metric measurement and monitoring member compliance with milk price regulations.

Conclusion

The results suggest that certain aspects of government dependence are easier to manage than others. The trade association can increase its own expertise and the amount of information it holds, and thus hope to increase the government's dependence on them for information and expertise. Furthermore, the association managers perceive themselves as being in a position to provide political support of various kinds to government officials. However, the association has little opportunity to influence the economic dependence variable, as the employment levels and industry mobility are primarily a function of factors beyond the control of the industry association.

MANAGING LEGITIMACY

In Chapter Five it was suggested that trade associations could actively influence, at least over the long term, their ability to involve themselves in government policy-formation by increasing their legitimacy. Six informants provided responses that have been categorized as actions to manage the trade association's legitimacy (see Appendix L). In two interviews it was mentioned that the association was actively attempting to increase their membership. This, of course, serves to increase their association density and representativeness, as indicated by the following quote:

> The only way for the general contractors and the government to listen to us, and for us to be influential is to have a strong lobby. And when we only represent ten percent of the truckers, that's not a strong or effective lobby.

Staff of another association have consciously attempted to add outsiders to its board of directors to enhance its representativeness:

> We've just added what is supposedly our enemy, the operators, we've added two of their people onto our board of directors to say to government, 'well look, our operators are telling us this too. They're here with us'. Plus it gains some credibility with government when you do that.

Although the concept of representativeness was not included in our initial hypotheses, the

qualitative work presented in Chapter Seven suggested that representativeness is likely an important component of legitimacy.

In our conceptual framework, goal divergence was also linked to trade association legitimacy. Those associations that were perceived as having goals consistent with the public good were expected to be regarded as more legitimate than those whose goals were in conflict with the public good. Two informants responded that they attempted to improve their relationship with government by adopting goals (and more important, creating the perception that they have adopted goals) consistent with the public good. One association increased its focus on safety issues:

> I think there is an understanding now that our industry really is trying to get safety at the top of the issues.

Another informant suggested that his association's ability to deal with government had improved because:

> attitudinally the industry has matured, has taken a leadership role in a number of issues [safety, emergency response to spills]. I think as a result of that demonstrated leadership and maturity, the reaction of government is more positive than it used to be.

While only two informants discussed adopting goals consistent with the public interest specifically in response to a question, similar comments were made by other informants in other portions of the interviews. The informant who focused extensively on social responsibility issues was the representative of the Canadian Petroleum Association. He said:

> Five years ago, the CPA set out to establish itself to be and to be seen to be the most environmentally sensitive and caring corporate citizen, our member companies, in the country (emphasis added).

He spent a good portion of the interview discussing the CPA's environmental code of practice, which is the operating guidelines for member companies, and which, he states, is now a standard for all industries in Canada. He also discussed the members activities regarding such issues as pay equity for women, native employment in the oil industry, increasing access to oil industry

workplaces for the disabled, and support for sporting events and the arts. He also suggested that these actions improve the industry's image and thereby increase the likelihood that they will be included in policy-formation:

> I think we were [on the National Task Force for Environment and Economy] because we had a good reputation of being concerned and sensitive and constructive in our approach. That helps to have the reputation because it means that you get a place at the table where people are working at not only what is to be done but how it is to be done. With the 'whats' we can have little disputes; they reflect political priorities. With the 'hows' we can have much dispute.

While industry image appears to concern many of the associations, there is some difference of opinion on the manner in which that image is manipulated. One informant expressed some reservations about some of the types of strategies undertaken by the Canadian Petroleum Association to enhance the perception of their legitimacy. He said:

> Our industry is very environmentally aware. Its one of the things we're wrestling with now, because I have a problem. A lot of the associations, like the CPA, are bringing out codes of ethics, and environmental policies. Its the 'in' thing to do. The Prime Minister has stood up and said if you have a good code of ethics, or an environmental policy, then we know you're paying attention to it. We've been doing it for years, and we looked at one time of publishing our policy, what it was. Years ago, we said look guys, why put it in print. Every one of us knows what we should be doing morally. Do we have to write it down to tell you what you should be doing morally? Are you not responsible enough? So we've gone all these years without it, and now these other associations are doing it. We might be forced to do it just to jump on the bandwagon. But it bothers us, because its like having a big threat hanging over your head. We just don't think its right. Is it just a public relations ploy? We just don't know yet. So we have mixed emotions on that one. We've got some of our members saying, oh you've got to have a code of ethics, to let people know how good you are. We've got others saying yes, but if you look at our track record. Doesn't actions speak louder than words? We don't know whats right.

Other associations, too, are concerned about the image of their industry and have initiated other types of strategies to enhance it. The Propane Gas Association of Canada undertook a public attitudes survey, finding a negative public view of propane. In response they are undertaking a public image campaign aimed at consumers, the media and government to improve the industry's image. The Insurance Bureau of Canada stresses in their communications with government, their concern about the consumers' interests:

> And so what we're trying to do is present a different program that will provide for better protection for consumers. Because that's what appeals to politicians. (emphasis added)

In summary, the associations that were studied did undertake actions of various sorts to create the perception that they have goals that are consistent with the public interest in order to enhance the legitimacy of the association and the industry that it represents.

FACILITATING COMMUNICATION AND/OR ACCESS

The most frequent type of action to improve government relations supplied by the informants were those taken with the goal of improving the access of trade association officials to government officials and/or improving the quality of the communication between the association and government.

Some examples of actions falling into this category include inviting politicians and/or bureaucrats to social functions such as lunches, dinners, cocktail parties, and industry conventions. and government. A rather lengthy quote from one informant provides a sense for the extent of this contact, and the association's rationale for promoting it:

> One of the things we do do, and we promote this on a large scale, any of the political pundits, or the ministers with whom we deal, the senior bureaucrats, or anyone within the bureaucracy that have a very positive effect on our industries, we make sure that they're invited to all our major social functions. It may sound ridiculous, but we do this for a purpose. It gets them into an atmosphere where we're away from the mainstream. We generally go to Banff or Kananaskis where you've got a captive audience; they can't escape. It's an opportunity for the bureaucrats to meet the people who they know by name only. And it gives them a much better understanding of our industry. We allow them to sit in on all of our sessions; we have a little fun while we're at it. They get to understand our people much better. During these informal discussions, there's a great opportunity for an exchange of ideas. A lot of things sort of evolve from these social gatherings. We have golf tournaments and make sure we get all the people invited to these things. Its just good p.r. They get to know us and we get to know them. Its so much easier for a guy like [the Deputy Minister] to pick up the phone if he wants to talk to a contractor; its not just a name in a book.

While the Roadbuilders appear to have developed a strong relationship with government, others are just attempting to develop such a relationship. The Executive Director of the Alberta Restaurant and Foodservices Association (ARFA) has recently introduced what he refers to as the 'MLA buddy program'. Every government caucus MLA in the province has a 'buddy', an ARFA member who lives or operates a restaurant in his or her constituency, who requests meetings with the MLA to be held, usually, at his or her restaurant. ARFA provides the necessary background information to the buddy, who then communicates industry problems through reference to his or her own business. So while the Roadbuilders focus on establishing social ties with civil servants, the restaurant association encourages ties and communication links with the political level.

While facilitating access and communication through social contact, many associations indicated that they made attempts to more generally maintain contact with individuals in government through regular phone calls and meetings. The Regional Vice President of the Insurance Bureau of Canada indicated that he attempts to keep the communications lines open even when there are no specific issues to press:

> The best time to sell a customer more insurance is when he doesn't owe you any money. And you deal with the government in a similar manner. I meet with Elaine McCoy [former Minister of Consumer and Corporate Affairs] probably three to four times per year. I phone her up and say Elaine, we haven't chatted for a couple of months; I think its time we got together. When I walk into her office, I have a blank piece of paper.

The frequency of comments about association attempts to facilitate access to and communication with government suggests that this is perceived by the trade association managers as an important prerequisite for enhancing the interests of their industry. It might be concluded that managing legitimacy and managing dependence may be of lesser significance in affecting long-term ability to influence the outcome of government policy-making. However, an alternative

conclusion must at least be considered. Access to and communication with government officials is a necessary prerequisite to establishing an association's legitimacy in the eyes of those officials. If the government is unaware of the association's existence, its characteristics and its activities, it can hardly regard the association as a legitimate participant in policy-formation. Furthermore, the more opportunity that government personnel have to interact with members of an industry, the greater the understanding and positive affect government personnel are likely to feel towards the industry. Enhanced legitimacy may result.

The dependence of government on the industry association may also be enhanced by increased communication and access. If an industry has significant expertise and information which could prove useful in policy-making, government will only perceive itself as dependent on the association for that information if it is actually aware of its availability. In other words, a trade association may need to develop an ongoing communication with government in order to establish its legitimacy, and for the government to develop a perception of dependence on the association.

GENERAL APPROACH TO DEALING WITH GOVERNMENT

The final category of response to the question of specific actions that the association has taken to improve government relations concern the general approach used in discussions with the government. Almost one third of respondents mentioned at least one action that was placed into this category. Again, a more descriptive presentation of the responses are presented in Appendix L.

There appears to be little disagreement amongst respondents about the most appropriate style of interaction that should be used in dealing with government. Informants who gave responses in this category suggested that it was important to cooperate with government, to avoid

being adversarial, to empathize with the government's position, to praise the government when they undertook beneficial actions, and to be patient if changes are not immediately forthcoming. A representative statement is as follows:

> Today we tend to distinguish between therapy and effect. There is always a constituency within associations that want you to be seen to be upset. They're upset about something the government has done, so they want their assn to be seen to be upset as well. That's highly therapeutic. People express great outrage at government actions and government policies. They are highly critical and do so on television and in the press. Do these people ever change the policies? Infrequently, if ever. So it has little practical effect, but it makes the members feel so good to know their association is out there fighting for them. We try to think about practical effect as opposed to therapy. We try to think about ok, we don't much agree with this, but is there some way that it might be make more palatable to us and still achieve the government's objectives. Are there other alternatives. What can we suggest? And we always try and keep the level of rhetoric down. Because politicians generally speaking have very long memories, as all of us do when we're offended by someone, or if someone is critical of us, and I think that we have learned not to offend...

The proportion of respondents with comments that were placed in this category is significant. However, this category, too, can not be completely separated from the first and second categories of managing dependence and managing legitimacy. The association managers' attempts to utilize a cooperative approach in their communications with government will likely serve to increase the positive affect of government towards the association, and thereby enhance their legitimacy. Furthermore, government may trust information provided by association representatives more readily if these individuals have generally operated in a cooperative manner.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the responses to the final interview question suggest that industry association managers do feel that they can potentially improve their relationships with government in the hope of increasing their success in promoting their members' interests on future policy questions. Future research is necessary to establish if, in fact, these strategies are successful. The frequency

of actions classifiable as 'managing legitimacy' or 'managing dependence', combined with their conceptual relationship with the remaining two categories suggests that the theoretical emphasis of the present study on the concepts of dependence and legitimacy is valid.

CHAPTER TEN: CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY

This final chapter will attempt to summarize the findings of the present research, point out its weaknesses, discuss the relevance of the findings for theory, and provide some tentative directions for future research.

PARTICIPATION VERSUS ADVOCACY

The first goal of the research was to explain when trade associations will participate in the formation of government policies that will affect industry members. Both the qualitative and quantitative analyses provide significant support for the two hypothesized causal variables – government dependence on the trade association and trade association legitimacy. The findings of each will be discussed, and tentative ideas for future research will be proposed.

Government Dependence

Specifically, the aspects of government dependence that were found to relate positively to participation were information dependence and implementation dependence. Due to the marginally significant regression coefficient and significant qualitative support, it was tentatively concluded that the greater the extent to which the government is dependent on an association for information and expertise required to develop a policy, the greater the likelihood that the trade association will participate in the formation of that policy. It was also concluded that the greater the potential for the trade association to aid in the implementation of a policy, the greater the likelihood that the association will participate in the formulation of that policy.

The third type of dependence -- economic dependence -- was not found to relate to the likelihood of participation. In other words, there was no support for the hypothesis that economically powerful industries would be more likely to participate in policy-formation. It was

suggested that problems in the measurement of economic dependence may account for this lack of finding. However, the qualitative data suggest that the economic significance of an industry may increase an industry's power in relation to politicians but not in relation to bureaucrats. Most of the participative influence attempts involved collaboration between civil servants and trade association officials, and did not directly involve politicians.

Future research is necessary to address this unresolved issue. First, an attempt must be made to improve the measurement of economic dependence. The most obvious and relatively objective measure -- number of employees in the industry -- does not correlate with the general perceptual measures of economic contribution to the province as rated by either the trade association or government officials. The other measurement problems discussed earlier regarding the potential discrepancy between number of employees in the industry and the jobs provided as a result of the activities of the industry are problematic. It is difficult to obtain some objective measure of the contribution to the economy made by a particular industry. However, this problem could be alleviated by arguing that the government's perception of the economic contribution to the economy is the key aspect of government dependency. The industry can only be said to have power in relation to the government if the government perceives itself as dependent on the industry. This would suggest that government dependence should utilize a government perceptual measure rather than some objective measure. The present study includes only a government perceptual measure for the validity subsample. Future research may attempt to obtain such a government measure for each influence attempt.

Future research is required to address the question of whether the economic contribution of an industry is more relevant for a trade association dealing primarily with politicians regarding an issue than for one dealing primarily with bureaucrats. There is certainly anecdotal evidence from the business press suggesting that the influence of an industry on politicians is influenced by the extent of employment provided by the industry (eg. Watt, 1990).

It may be that politicians respond to the economic contribution of an industry while bureaucrats do not; in other words, the policy-making unit might be treated as a dichotomous variable in future research. Alternatively, it may be that an industry's economic contribution has a greater effect the higher in the hierarchy is the policy-making body. That is, the closer the policy-making unit is to the political level of the department, the greater may be the impact of economic dependence. This is plausible given that the more senior is a bureaucrat, the more his or her career chances may be impacted by changes in the political party in power. Furthermore, the closer is a bureaucrat to the Minister, the more likely that the Minister's dependence on a particular industry can be translated to the actions, views and priorities of the bureaucrat. Future research, then, should include both a dichotomous and a continuous variable regarding the level of the hierarchy of the policy-making unit. A test for an interaction between hierarchical level and economic dependence on participation should then be undertaken.

Two additional aspects of dependence emerged from the research -- political dependence and social control dependence. Both of these variables are non-issue specific. That is, a trade association could be rated for the extent to which the government is dependent on it for political support, or for the social control of its members generally. Since the qualitative research suggests that both of these variables are important, the logical next step is to attempt to conduct a more systematic evaluation of the relationship between these two variables and the likelihood of trade association participation in policy-formation. In order to test for such a relationship, measures for political dependence and social control dependence would be required. Furthermore, an assessment of the proportion of each associations' influence attempts that are participative would be needed.

Legitimacy

Of the legitimacy variables, issue specificity and goal divergence were found to relate at

least marginally to the likelihood of trade association participation in policy-formation. That is, a trade association was more likely to participate in the development of a policy when its goals were more similar to the goals of government than if there was a divergence of goals. Furthermore, trade associations were more likely to be included in the formation of policies that were specific to their industry than those policies that impacted on other groups as well. The other two legitimacy variables -- association density and autonomy -- did not predict trade association participation.

The qualitative research results suggests that future research should be directed towards an evaluation of the concept of representativeness, and its relationship to legitimacy and policy-formation. While it was argued that an association's density impacts on its legitimacy, interviews with both trade association and government officials suggests that the more encompassing concept of representativeness may be more critical. These interviews suggest that the extent to which a trade association can be said to be representative depends on a variety of factors. Association density is one of those factors. However, other factors include: the existence of other associations representing firms in the industry, the demographic similarity between member firms and non-member firms in the industry, and the extent to which non-member firms are consulted and their interests served by the association. A new measure is required which attempts to tap this broader and potentially more relevant concept of representativeness.

A weakness of the present research that was briefly discussed in Chapter Seven was the faulty logic behind the proposition relating issue specificity to participation. It was argued initially that the government would be more inclined to include an association in the formation of a policy that solely impacted their industry than one impacting multiple industries. However, since policy can be formulated with the participation of multiple non-government groups, the government may regard participation of all interested parties in policy-formation as highly legitimate. Future conceptual work, then, needs to combine the underpinning rationale for the issue specificity

proposition with the representativeness concept. For example, if a policy impacts on the members of four industry associations, and all four associations are included in policy-formation, the rating of representativeness should be higher than a contrasting case in which only one of the four associations is included.

The qualitative data suggests that the concept of association autonomy is relevant to association legitimacy; however the relationship is different than assumed. Association autonomy may increase the ability of the association to take a broad, long-term perspective; however, it also provides the government with concern about the extent to which the association represents its members. Future research should incorporate this concept into the concept of association representativeness.

The quantitative aspect of the present research focused on goal divergence at the level of analysis of the specific issue under influence. The qualitative results suggest that the legitimacy of an association is likely influenced by the degree to which the association more generally demonstrates a commitment to the goals of government. Future research should attempt to develop a measure for association commitment to the public good. It would be hypothesized, then, that 'socially proactive' associations would be regarded as highly legitimate, and therefore more likely to be included in policy-formation.

Summary

The qualitative and quantitative findings provide sufficient support for a conclusion that both government dependence on trade associations and the legitimacy of the associations influence the likelihood that their officials will be included in the formation of government policy. However, the study fails to completely address the question of which elements constitute government dependence and trade association legitimacy. The findings, however, have been useful in helping to develop these two concepts. It is expected that future research which expands

the concept of government dependence by the inclusion of political and social control dependence, and which alters the conceptualization of legitimacy to include the concept of representativeness and a global rating of goal divergence will be able to more successfully explain trade association public policy participation.

Delegated Regulation Versus Collaboration

In Chapter Four, a distinction was made between 'collaborative' and 'delegated regulation' participative strategies. In the former category trade association officials worked with government officials to develop policy. In the latter category, industry (or industries) were given the mandate to regulate themselves. The sample of participative strategies was too small to allow for a distinction between these two approaches for analysis. Therefore, the two groups were treated as a single 'participative' group. This constitutes a major weakness of the present study, however. As was mentioned earlier, it may be that these two approaches result from different antecedent circumstances, and so grouping them together may cloud true relationships between variables.

Future research should focus on the conditions under which industry self-regulation occurs. A library computer search for articles dealing with industry self-regulation yielded only a small number of articles (eg. Beck and Cherry, 1987; Best, 1987; Boddewyn, 1985; Dawson, et al, 1985; Koopman et al, 1986; Maitland, 1985; Murray, 1986; Richardson and Morris, 1988; Wyckham, 1987); few were Canadian. These articles suggest that concerns about anti-trust activities inhibits the delegation of regulation to industry:

> Industry or trade assocations appear to hold out little promise of being transformed into vehicles for industry self-regulation. The fear is too entrenched that industry self-regulation, however plausible its initial rationale, will eventually degenerate into industry protectionism (Maitland, 1985: 137).

Other authors argue that industry self-regulation is hampered by the concern about the inability

of the trade association to enforce the code on members and nonmembers (Richardson and Morris, 1988).

Industry self-regulation is clearly a major topic in its own right, and distinct from the research questions of the present study. The apparent increasing interest of the Alberta government in delegating regulation to industry, and the sparcity of academic literature related to this topic suggests that it warrants further academic attention. The concepts of legitimacy and dependence may be relevant; however, a more exhaustive search of relevant empirical and theoretical work is required before specific hypotheses can be developed.

ADVOCACY TACTICS

In Chapter Eight it was concluded that there was support for the propositions suggesting that direct action would be the most popular advocacy tactic, followed by joint action, followed by the public route. There was also support for the underpinning rationale that the loss of autonomy associated with joint action can inhibit the use of this tactic. Future research should be directed at more directly examining this rationale. A specific hypothesis might be tested:

> Hypothesis: The likelihood of a focal trade association engaging in joint action with another party is a function of the extent to which the interests of the association overlap with those of the other party.

If the collaborating parties are in agreement about the proposals that they are putting forward to government, then significant concessions from the parties is not required. The groups would then not perceive themselves as compromising their autonomy in the interests of developing consensus with that other party.

The concept of 'representativeness' may be also be useful in explaining when joint action

is used. That is, joint action may be undertaken in order to increase the extent to which the lobby is representative of the parties affected by the policy. This suggests a further hypothesis regarding the use of joint action:

> Hypothesis: Joint action will tend to be utilized when a specific policy impacts on other organized interests.

Regarding the public route tactic, the qualitative data clearly supported the argument that association officials will be inhibited from utilizing a public campaign for fear of damaging their relationship with government. However, the data also suggests other hypotheses regarding the use of a public campaign. Two specific hypothesis are as follows:

> Hypothesis: The public route is more likely to be utilized if the industry's legitimacy is high than if the industry's legitimacy is low.

> Hypothesis: If the public route is utilized by an industry with low legitimacy, the campaign will include an attempt to increase the industry's legitimacy.

MANAGING GOVERNMENT RELATIONS

An analysis of data relevant to the third research question regarding how trade association managers attempt to manage their relations with government over the long term yielded four categories of such activities. These included managing government dependence, managing legitimacy, facilitating communication/access and factors regarding the assocation's general approach to dealing with government.

It can be concluded that the trade assocition officials do perceive themselves as having the ability to influence their relationship with government. Attempting to increase the extent to which the government is dependent on the association and increasing the legitimacy of the association and/or the industry it represents appear to be common tactics to improve their probability of success in influencing future government policy.

Future research might fruitfully be directed at examining the success of such actions. It is likely that in-depth, case studies are needed to explore this issue, given that longitudinal data would be required. Future research might also consider the constraints faced by associations in attempting to manage their relationships with government.

CONTRIBUTIONS TO ORGANIZATIONAL THEORY

In Chapter Two, the dominant theoretical perspectives of Organizational Theory were criticized for their neglect of a consideration of how organizations can influence their environments. The present research supports the argument that organizations can and do influence an important component of their environments -- that of government regulation.

Furthermore, it confirms that not only are large firms or major industries able to influence their environments. In many cases of the sample, small firms, and relatively insignificant industries were able to participate in the development of public policy through their membership in the industry assocation. For example, although restaurants are typically small organizations operating in a highly competitive, low-margin industry, they are able to influence government policy about educational standards for industry personnel through the Alberta Restaurant and Foodservices Association's involvement in the decision to create and implement the Alberta Tourism Education Council. As another example, weekly newspapers, through their involvement in the Alberta Weekly Newspapers Association, were able to bring about a change in the Alberta Municipal Elections Act requiring municipal elections to be held on Mondays in order to facilitate their reporting of the results on their usual printing day of Tuesday or Wednesday.

The study's greatest contribution to the field of Organizational Theory is to resource dependence theory. The results affirm the usefulness of the resource dependence/exchange

perspective to the study of the role of interest groups in the development of public policy. Past research has utilized a resource dependence approach to examining government - industry relations. Salancik (1979), for example, examined the effect of interdependencies between defense contractors and government on the firms' commitment to affirmative action. Along similar lines, Pfeffer (1972a) related firms' dependence on the government for defence contracts with their willingness to pursue policies favoured by the government. Both studies focused on the compliance of dependent firms to the wishes of government. The present study is unique in its finding that interdependence between government and industry increases the industry's influence on government, by enabling the association officials to participate in policy-making.

However, the present study found some quantitative and much qualitative support for the importance of association/industry legitimacy in affecting the association's ability to participate in policy-formation. A major contribution of the study to resource dependence/exchange theory is its recognition of a potential relevance of the concept of legitimacy in interorganizational relations. There are two potential avenues that might be taken to develop this idea. The first is that legitimacy is relevant to any exchange, suggesting that the concept of dependence is insufficient to an understanding of how one social entity will be influenced by another. Second is the possibility that the concept of legitimacy is especially relevant to an exchange between entities when one of those entities is government. In other words, it may be that the present study is examining a unique case of interorganizational relations. Each of these ideas will be explored more fully.

In Chapter Five it was suggested that dependence was insufficient to explain the ability of one social actor to influence another. It was argued that if the recipient of an influence attempt perceived their compliance to be legitimate, then they may comply regardless of the balance of dependencies between the two social actors. It might be argued that the government, in its role of representing the public interest, may comply with requests of other social entities

if it perceives such compliance as legitimate. The government could be regarded as unique in its role of representing the public good, and so it may be argued that the concept of legitimacy is relevant only in exchanges between government and other social actors; exchanges between private parties would be affected by interdependencies only.

The opposing argument is that legitimacy may be relevant to other interrelationships as well. A hypothetical example will help in making such an argument. Consider a relationship between an independently wealthy woman and her wealthless husband in the nineteenth century. Assume that non-financial dependencies are balanced. A traditional exchange perspective relying solely on the concept of dependence would suggest that the woman would be more powerful than her husband, and thereby have more influence on his behaviour than he on hers. However, in the nineteenth century (and likely much later), a husband was regarded as legitimate in making demands on his wife, and she frequently regarded such influence as legitimate. In other words, dependence is insufficient in explaining the extent to which these two individuals can control each other. Societal expectations and values influence the willingness of the wife to comply with the wishes of her husband. It could be said, then, that the husband does not influence his wife as a result of his power, but is able to have significant control over her behaviour because of the perceived legitimacy of such control.

This hypothetical example suggests that, at least in some cases, legitimacy may be relevant to a complete understanding of the nature of influence between <u>private</u> social entities. This suggests that the present study is not a special case of interorganizational relations. Rather, legitimacy needs to be considered in <u>all</u> social exchanges. It may be that in some exchanges legitimacy is unimportant because there is no societal value that suggests that one party should allow another more influence. For example, legitimacy may not be relevant in a relationship between a firm and its supplier, since society has no expectations that one party in a commercial exchange should defer voluntarily to the other; rather the market economy is thought to function

most successfully when both parties bargain to the best of their abilities. In this case, the balance of dependencies alone should explain interorganizational influence.

In summary, the results of the present study suggest that dependence is insufficient to explain interorganizational relations. Future development of interorganizational theory needs to address the issue of legitimacy. Empirical work is required to focus on the types of exchanges in which legitimacy is relevant.

CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE FIELD OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

The findings of the present study provide a significant contribution to the field of Political Science. Specifically, the results of the first research question, regarding the conditions under which trade associations will participate in policy-formation, suggest a fruitful redirection of the pressure group literature. As was discussed in Chapter Seven, many of the variables that were found to relate to association participation in policy-making are related to the nature of the policy issue. However, much of the pressure group literature (eg. Coleman, 1985; Grant, 1984; Pross, 1985) emphasizes characteristics of the pressure group as determinants of participation in policy-formation. The findings of the present study, then, suggest that future pressure group literature should address the question of within which types of policy decisions will pressure groups tend to become participants.

The present study has some implications for another area within the field of Political Science which has not yet been discussed. The various theories of the state -- pluralism, elitism, structural Marxism, instrumental Marxism -- provide competing views regarding the relative influence of various societal groups on the activities of the state. Since these theories address different questions than those posed within the present study, further discussion will not be undertaken. Rather, it is sufficient to point out that the findings of the study may be of interest

to those academics involved in this debate.

CONCLUSION

The present study, admittedly, has numerous weaknesses. Some of the concepts of the study pose significant challenges for measurement. There is evidence that the study has failed to adequately measure at least some of the concepts that have been utilized. Furthermore, the study fails to adequately discuss the issue of the success of various trade association strategies to influence public policy. Finally, the relatively small sample size, and especially the small number of strategies that were categorized as 'participative', inhibits our ability to make firm conclusions from the quantitative findings.

However, despite the study's many weaknesses, it does make contributions both to the substantive area of trade association - government relations, and to organizational theory. It also has been successful in directing future research in the study of trade associations and public policy, and in resource dependence theory.

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APPENDIX A: Government Informants (presented by title)

1. Manager, Standards Development and Education, Employment Standards Branch, Alberta Department of Labour
2. Executive Director, Consulting Services, Alberta Mortgage and Housing Corporation
3. Senior Assistant Deputy Minister, Engineering and Operations, Alberta Department of Transportation and Utilities
4. Assistant Deputy Minister, Motor Transport Services, Alberta Department of Transportation and Utilities
5. Director, Industry Liaison Services, Alberta Department of Occupational Health and Safety
6. President and Chief Executive Officer, Workers' Compensation Board
7. Counsel, Legal Research and Analysis, Alberta Attorney General's Department
8. Assistant Director, Property Registration, Alberta Attorney General's Department
9. Director, Industry Services, Industry Standards Branch, Alberta Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs
10. Director, Housing Division, Research and Development Section, Alberta Department of Municipal Affairs
11. Director, Program Planning, Apprenticeship and Trade Certification, Alberta Department of Career Development and Employment
12. Executive Director, Alberta Professions and Occupations Bureau
13. Director, Destination Planning Branch, Planning Division, Alberta Department of Tourism
14. Assistant Deputy Minister, Projects and Supply Division, Alberta Department of Energy

APPENDIX B: Summary of Influence Attempts

The following is a summary of the policy issues that were discussed by the interviewees from the industry associations. A brief description of each issue is provided, along with a summary of the influence strategies that were utilized by the associations to influence the outcome of policymaking. Bracketed advocacy tactics separated by a semi-colon indicate a sequencing of tactics. Such tactics separated by 'and' indicate that these tactics were undertaken simultaneously. Policies that were excluded from the quantitative analysis are labelled with an asterisk (*), and an explanation for that exclusion is provided. Influence attempts that were also discussed with a government representative are labelled with the symbol @.

Alberta Chamber of Resources:

1. Revisions in Alberta provincial legislation relating to the use of groundwater in the oil industry.

Strategy: Advocacy (direct contact; joint action)

2. Federal government support for oil sands development in Alberta.

Strategy: Advocacy (direct contact and joint action and public route)

3. Federal government support for a Mining Development Agreement with the province of Alberta.

Strategy: Advocacy (direct contact and joint action)

Alberta Construction Association:

@1. Development of Alberta Worker's Compensation Board legislation that would allow for the formation of industry safety associations to be funded through arrangements with the Worker's Compensation Board.

Strategy: Advocacy (direct contact)

@2. Changes in Alberta's Apprenticeship Act.

Strategy: Advocacy (direct contact and joint action)

@3. New Builder's Lien Act in Alberta.

Strategy: Participative (collaborative)

Alberta Forest Products Association:

*1. Elimination of countervail duties by the U.S. on imports of Canadian lumber. This was excluded because it involves pressuring a foreign government.

2. An attempt to influence the Alberta Department of the Environment to allow the use of herbicides in Alberta forests.

Strategy: Advocacy (direct contact; joint action and public route)

*3. Postponement of the implementation of "free - to - grow" legislation. Excluded due to insufficient information.

Alberta Gravel Truckers Association:

@1. Change in regulation which makes kickbacks from gravel truckers to roadbuilders a criminal offense.

Strategy: Advocacy (direct contact and public route)

*2. The "50/50 rule" which ensures that half of the gravel truckers on a particular project are local truckers. Excluded because there was no attempt made to change this rule.

*3. The "three truck rule" which prevents a contractor from having more than three trucks on one particular job. Excluded because there was no attempt to change this rule.

Alberta Homebuilder's Association:

1. Excluding homes from the effects of federal tax reform.

Strategy: Advocacy (direct contact and joint action and public route and grass roots lobbying)

@2. New builder's lien act in Alberta.

Strategy: Participative (collaborative)

@3. Revision of drainage legislation in Alberta.

Strategy: Advocacy (direct contact; joint action)

Alberta Readymix Concrete Association:

@1. New builders lien act in Alberta.

Strategy: Advocacy (direct contact)

2. Increase in quality standards for concrete flatwork in Alberta.

Strategy: Advocacy (direct contact)

3. Increase in quality standards for preserved wood foundations in Alberta.

Strategy: Advocacy (direct contact)

Alberta Restaurant and Foodservices Association:

@1. Creation of the Alberta Tourism Education Council.

Strategy: Participative (collaborative)

2. Removal of the 7% surtax on alcohol purchased by commercial establishments.

Strategy: Advocacy (direct contact)

*3. Removal of legislation restricting the sale of alcohol on Sundays. Excluded because influence attempts are in the early stages.

Alberta Roadbuilders Association:

1. Change in Alberta Department of Transportation regulations replacing bonding as a requirement of tendering to possession of a letter of credit as a requirement of tendering.

Strategy: Advocacy (direct contact)

@2. Change in Alberta Department of Transportation regulations providing roadbuilders with interest on money held back by the department.

Strategy: Advocacy (direct contact)

3. New Labour Act.

Strategy: Advocacy (direct contact and joint action and public route)

Alberta Trucking Association:

@1. Deregulation of the trucking industry.

Strategy: Advocacy (direct contact)

@2. Provincial regulations regarding weights, sizes and measures for the trucking industry.

Strategy: Advocacy (direct contact)

@3. Changes to the Workers Compensation Act in Alberta.

Strategy: Advocacy (direct contact; joint action)

Alberta Weekly Newspaper Association:

1. Changes to the Alberta Municipal Elections Act requiring that municipal elections be held on Monday, as weekly newspapers typically are published on Tuesdays or Wednesdays.

Strategy: Advocacy (direct contact)

2. Exemption for reporters from portion of the Alberta Employment Standards Act regarding working hours and overtime conditions.

Strategy: Advocacy (direct contact)

3. Alberta government support for a newsprint mill in the province.

Strategy: Advocacy (direct contact)

Automotive Services and Repair Association:

@1. Changes in Workers Compensation Board experience rating system, which tended to lead to wide swings in rates for small businesses.

Strategy: Advocacy (direct contact; public route)

2. Development of regulations reducing the influence of insurance companies in directing the location and nature of auto repair claims.

Strategy: Advocacy (direct contact)

@3. Creation of regulations over the retail auto sales and repair industry in Alberta through development of an automotive regulatory board.

Strategy: Participative (self-regulation)

The Canadian Association of Oilwell Drilling Contractors (head office):

@1. Review of the Alberta Workers Compensation Board

Strategy: Advocacy (direct contact and joint action)

@2. New Builders Lien Act in Alberta

Strategy: Participative (collaborative)

3. Changes to federal taxation which would exempt certain employees working in the field from being taxed on travel and subsistence payments.

Strategy: Advocacy (direct contact and joint action)

The Canadian Bankers Association (regional office):

1. Approval for banks to purchase a seat on the Alberta Stock Exchange from the Alberta Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs.

Strategy: Advocacy (direct contact)

@2. Creation of an Alberta Property Security Act.

Strategy: Participative (collaborative)

*3. Change in legislation permitting banks to sell insurance. Excluded due to process being in the preliminary stages.

The Canadian Council of Grocery Distributors (western regional office):

1. Creation of bottle depots in Saskatchewan to be operated by rehabilitation centres.

Strategy: Participative (collaborative)

@2. Changes to the Alberta Pharmaceutical Act to allow grocery stores to sell more non-prescription drugs.

Strategy: Advocacy (direct contact)

The Canadian Craft and Hobby Association (head office):

1. The elimination of a tariff on imported educational craft and hobby videos.

Strategy: Advocacy (grass roots lobbying)

2. Elimination of a proposed value-added tax on model kits and crafts and hobby kits.

Strategy: Advocacy (grass roots lobbying; consultant action and direct contact)

The Canadian Federation of Independent Grocers (western regional office):

1. The goal was to have the Saskatchewan government introduce legislation prohibiting large stores from opening on Sunday (as opposed to the government's preference to have it referred to the municipalities to decide)

Strategy: Advocacy (direct contact; joint action; public route)

2. Creation of bottle depots in Saskatchewan to be operated by rehabilitation centres.

Strategy: Participative (collaborative)

3. Legislation to allow the sale of beer and wine in small grocery stores in British Columbia.

Strategy: Advocacy (direct contact; joint action; direct contact; joint action)

The Canadian Petroleum Association (head office):

*1. Post National Energy Policy (PC Government). This was excluded because time constraints precluded obtaining questionnaire responses.

*2. The future of Canadian environmental policy. Excluded because policy development is in the early stages.

The Coal Association of Canada (head office):

1. An increase in the 'Crow Rate', the cost of transportation of grain by rail.

Strategy: Advocacy (direct contact and joint action)

2. Free trade.

Strategy: Advocacy (direct contact and joint action and public route)

3. New British Columbia Coal Act.

Strategy: Advocacy (direct contact)

The Farm Equipment Dealers Association of Alberta and British Columbia:

1. Inclusion of dealers stocking inventory on a consignment basis as eligible for the general three percent inventory expense.

Strategy: Advocacy (direct contact and grass roots lobbying)

2. A change to the investment tax credit for farmers purchasing new equipment to the cash difference on a trade-in rather than the purchase price.

Strategy: Advocacy (direct contact)

3. Gaining an exemption from the proposed tax reform for farm equipment.
Strategy: Advocacy (direct contact)

Independent Petroleum Association of Canada (head office):

1. Elimination of the National Energy Program.

Strategy: Advocacy (direct contact; joint action and public route)

@2. Revisions to the Alberta Royalty Tax Credit.

Strategy: Participative (collaborative)

The Insurance Bureau of Canada (regional office):

1. Attempt to prevent the Alberta Motor Transport Board from implementing a 'passenger hazard' system, which would increase the liability available to passengers, but would reduce the amount available to other third parties for cabs, buses and rental cars.

Strategy: Advocacy (direct contact; joint action)

2. A change to the Alberta Insurance Act which allows insurance coverage of chiropractor charges without physician approval.

Strategy: Advocacy (direct contact)

Landscape Alberta Nursery Trades:

1. Change in legislation prohibiting sod farmers from using purple (tax-free) fuel.

Strategy: Advocacy (direct contact and grass roots lobbying)

*2. Changes to the Workers Compensation Act. Excluded due to insufficient information.

*3. Influence in the nature of government horticulture research. Excluded due to insufficient information.

Manufactured Housing Association of Alberta:

@1. Revisions to the Alberta Housing and Mortgage Corporation's lending program for buyers of manufactured housing.

Strategy: Participative (collaborative)

2. Elimination of the increase in road tax for transporters of mobile homes.

Strategy: Advocacy (direct contact)

3. Alberta government support for a pilot project for 'garden suites'.

Strategy: Advocacy (direct contact)

Motel Association of Alberta:

1. Obtaining a grant to implement a grading system for motels and hotels in Alberta.

Strategy: Advocacy (direct contact and joint action)

2. Elimination of a 5% Alberta room tax.

Strategy: Advocacy (direct contact)

Motor Dealers Association of Alberta:

1. Introduction of seat belt legislation in Alberta.

Strategy: Advocacy (direct contact and public route)

2. Inclusion of motor dealers in the Alberta Franchise Act.
Strategy: Advocacy (direct contact)

@3. Development of regulations for automotive industry (through the creation of the automotive regulatory board).

Strategy: Participative (self-regulation)

Petroleum Services Association of Canada (head office):

1. Increased government support for conventional oil.

Strategy: Advocacy (direct contact)

@2. Creation of industry safety regulations.

Strategy: Participative (self-regulation)

3. Obtaining Alberta government grants for the industry.

Strategy: Advocacy (direct contact)

Propane Gas Association of Canada:

1. Elimination of the road tax on auto propane in Manitoba.

Strategy: Advocacy (direct contact)

2. Enactment of good samaritan legislation to protect those who voluntarily deal with spills of propane transporters.

Strategy: Advocacy (direct contact and joint action)

3. Creation of the Canadian Auto Propane Council to direct and fund industry research.

Strategy: Advocacy (direct contact)

Retail Merchants Association of Canada (Alberta region):

@1. Changes to the Alberta employment standards code.

Strategy: Advocacy (direct contact)

*2. National sales tax. Excluded due to being the action of the head office.

@3. Changes to the workers compensation act of specific relevance to retail firms.

Strategy: Advocacy (direct contact)

APPENDIX C: Trade Association Interview Schedule

PART A. General Questions

Can you tell me when and why your association was created?

Can you tell me briefly about the type of firms that this association represents. [prompt for industry, size of firms, foreign vs. domestic ownership]

How many staff do you have here?

How long have you worked for this organization?

Can you tell me a bit about your career previous to your current position?

[Have informant fill out Part A of the questionnaire at this point]

PART B. I would like to discuss specific government policy issues that your association has been involved in. I would hope to discuss three such issues. I'll ask you to choose the issues, but What I'm looking for is a situation in which you have been made aware that there is a change in legislation or regulation being planned and you attempt to influence the outcome of that change, or a case in which your association attempts to change an existing legislation or regulation, or the case where you are working with government in developing legislation or regulation.

[Repeat the following for each issue]

Could you start by describing the issue for me, since I'm not an expert on your industry, and then talk about what you did to try to influence that policy. If you could try to tell the story chronologically, and then I'll interrupt frequently to ask questions, or to get more detail.

Where other groups involved in trying to influence this policy?
Who were they and what did they do?

Did you work with any other groups in trying to influence the policy?

Did you ever take out paid advertising or issue press releases?

Did your association have any involvement in the implementation of this policy?

What did {relevant govt department or agency} think of your group?

[Second questionnaire done after final policy issue is discussed]

PART C.

Do you feel that your association has improved its ability to deal with government?

Have you taken any specific actions intended to improve your ability to deal with government?

APPENDIX D: TRADE ASSOCIATION QUESTIONNAIRE A

Instructions: Please fill in the blank or circle the number associated with your chosen response.

1. How many member organizations do you have? _____

2. How many non-member organizations exist that would be eligible to be members of your association?

_____

3. Approximately what is your annual budget?

_____

4. Approximate what percentage of your annual budget is spent on government relations?

_____ %

5. Approximately what percentage of your budget comes from membership dues?

_____ %

6. Approximately how many individuals are employed by your member firms?

_____

6a. How many individuals are employed within the industry represented by your association?

_____

7. To what extent has your association been able to provide the government with technical information and/or expertise in the past?

1. not at all
2.
3. a moderate amount
4.
5. a significant amount

8. How mobile is your industry? That is, how feasible is it for the industry as a whole to relocate?

1. infeasible
2.
3. somewhat feasible
4.
5. highly feasible

9. How frequently have you heard of one of your members threatening to relocate to another province or country?

1. rarely, if ever
2.
3. occasionally
4.
5. frequently

10. How capital intensive is the industry?

1. low capital intensity
2.
3. moderate capital intensity
4.
5. high capital intensity

11. Relative to other industries in this province, how much of a contribution to the economy is made by your industry?

1. much less than average
2.
3. about average
4.
5. significantly more than average

12. Here is a hypothetical scenario. A proposed government policy is opposed by your members. However, association officials feel that it is in the long-term best interests of its members to go along with it. To what extent do you feel that your association would be able to act according to its own judgment rather than its members' judgment?

1. little ability to act autonomously
2.
3. moderate compromise/sometimes autonomous
4.
5. completely free to act autonomously

Appendix E. Trade Association Questionnaire B (reduced)

Part B. Please circle the appropriate number for each of the three policy issues.

	POLICY ISSUE 1	POLICY ISSUE 2	POLICY ISSUE 3
1. If you had to describe your involvement in each policy issue in one of the following ways, which would you choose?	1. as a participant in the policy-making process, OR 2. as outside of the policy-making process, but attempting to influence the content of the final result.	1. as a participant in the policy-making process, OR 2. as outside of the policy-making process, but attempting to influence the content of the final result.	1. as a participant in the policy-making process, OR 2. as outside of the policy-making process, but attempting to influence the content of the final result.
2. The following is a similar question, except using a five point scale. To what extent would you say that your association was a participant, that is, actively involved in forming each of the three policies?	1. little or no involvement 2. 3. moderately involved 4. 5. extensively involved	1. little or no involvement 2. 3. moderately involved 4. 5. extensively involved	1. little or no involvement 2. 3. moderately involved 4. 5. extensively involved
3. How much research is conducted by the relevant government department or agency that is applicable to each of the three policy issues?	1. little or none 2. 3. a moderate amount 4. 5. a large amount	1. little or none 2. 3. a moderate amount 4. 5. a large amount	1. little or none 2. 3. a moderate amount 4. 5. a large amount
4. How much expertise is held by employees of the relevant government department or agency that is relevant to each policy issue?	1. little or none 2. 3. a moderate amount 4. 5. a large amount	1. little or none 2. 3. a moderate amount 4. 5. a large amount	1. little or none 2. 3. a moderate amount 4. 5. a large amount
5. Did the government department or agency request information from your association about your industry's views on each of the policy issues?	1. no 2. not sure 3. yes	1. no 2. not sure 3. yes	1. no 2. not sure 3. yes

6. In your judgment, how much complex or technical information was required in order for the government to make sound policy decisions?	1. little or none 2. 3. a moderate amount 4. 5. a large amount	1. little or none 2. 3. a moderate amount 4. 5. a large amount	1. little or none 2. 3. a moderate amount 4. 5. a large amount
7. How much technic l expertise is held by your members that could have been or was useful for the government in developing each of th se policies?	1. little or none 2. 3. a moderate amount 4. 5. a large amount	1. little or none 2. 3. a moderate amount 4. 5. a large amount	1. little or none 2. 3. a moderate amount 4. 5. a large amount
8. How much research is conducted by your members or your association that could have been or was useful for the government in develo ing each of these policies?	1. little or none 2. 3. a moderate amount 4. 5. a large amount	1. little or none 2. 3. a moderate amount 4. 5. a large amount	1. little or none 2. 3. a moderate amount 4. 5. a large amount
9. To what extent d you think that the government believed itself to be dependent on your industry for information and/or expertise relevant to each of the three policy issues?	1. not at all 2. 3. a moderate amount 4. 5. highly dependent	1. not at all 2. 3. a moderate amount 4. 5. highly dependent	1. not at all 2. 3. a moderate amount 4. 5. highly dependent
10. How active has your association been in the implementation of each of these policies?	1. inactive 2. 3. somewhat active 4. 5. highly active	1. inactive 2. 3. somewhat active 4. 5. highly active	1. inactive 2. 3. somewhat active 4. 5. highly active

11. How difficult would it have been for the government to implement each of these policies without your cooperation?	1. very easy 2. 3. somewhat difficult 4. 5. extremely difficult	1. very easy 2. 3. somewhat difficult 4. 5. extremely difficult	1. very easy 2. 3. somewhat difficult 4. 5. extremely difficult
12. To what extent do you think the government relied or relies on you to implement each of these policies?	1. very little 2. 3. a moderate amount 4. 5. very much	1. very little 2. 3. a moderate amount 4. 5. very much	1. very little 2. 3. a moderate amount 4. 5. very much
13. How close was your association's stated policy preferences to those stated by the relevant government bodies?	1. very similar 2. 3. moderately at odds 4. 5. very divergent	1. very similar 2. 3. moderately at odds 4. 5. very divergent	1. very similar 2. 3. moderately at odds 4. 5. very divergent
14. Is or was each of these policies relevant to your industry only? or to other industries as well?	1. own industry only 2. 3. some other industries 4. 5. most or all industries	1. own industry only 2. 3. some other industries 4. 5. most or all industries	1. own industry only 2. 3. some other industries 4. 5. most or all industries
15. At the time, how did the relevant government departments or agencies regard your association?	1. very negatively 2. 3. in a neutral manner 4. 5. very positively	1. very negatively 2. 3. in a neutral manner 4. 5. very positively	1. very negatively 2. 3. in a neutral manner 4. 5. very positively

Thank you very much for your time and trouble.

APPENDIX F: INFLUENCE ATTEMPT CODING FORM (Questionnaire C)

TRADE ASSOCIATION: _____

Issue

1 2 3

1. Which statement best describes the association's involvement in this issue?

   1. as a participant in the policy-making process, OR

   2. as outside of the policy-making process, but attempting to influence the content of the final result.

[coding: 1 = participative; 0 = advocacy]

2. To what extent would you say that the association was a participant, that is, actively involved in forming policy?

   1. little or no involvement
   2.
   3. moderately involved
   4.
   5. extensively involved

3. To what extent did the specific policy require implementation?

   1. none
   2.
   3. a moderate amount
   4.
   5. a significant amount

6. To what extent were other outside interest groups making demands on the government which was counter to those proposed by the association? (consider both number of groups and extent of their activity)

   1. little or no outside involvement
   2.
   3. moderate involvement
   4.
   5. heavy involvement

7. Was this policy issue relevant to groups other than business (eg. consumers, employees, general public)?

1. little or no relevance to other groups
2.
3. a moderate amount of relevance to other groups
4.
5. of major relevance to other groups

8. Classification of the first type of advocacy tactic undertaken by the association

1. direct contact
2. joint action
3. public route
4. direct contact and joint action
5. direct contact and public route
6. joint action and public route
7. direct contact, joint action and public route
8. direct contact and grass roots lobbying
9. grass roots lobbying
10. consultant and direct contact

9. Classification of the second type of advocacy tactic undertaken by the association

1. direct contact
2. joint action
3. public route
4. direct contact and joint action
5. direct contact and public route
6. joint action and public route
7. direct contact, joint action and public route
8. direct contact and grass roots lobbying
9. grass roots lobbying
10. consultant and direct contact

10. Classification of the third type of advocacy tactic undertaken by the association

1. direct contact
2. joint action
3. public route
4. direct contact and joint action
5. direct contact and public route
6. joint action and public route
7. direct contact, joint action and public route
8. direct contact and grass roots lobbying
9. grass roots lobbying
10. consultant and direct contact

11. Classification of the fourth type of advocacy tactic undertaken by the association

1. direct contact
2. joint action
3. public route
4. direct contact and joint action
5. direct contact and public route
6. joint action and public route
7. direct contact, joint action and public route
8. direct contact and grass roots lobbying
9. grass roots lobbying
10. consultant and direct contact

NOTE: The sequencing of these tactics may not be clear-cut, as the timing of various tactics may overlap. The key to distinguishing between simultaneous tactics and a sequence of tactics is the intention of the actors. They will be considered as a sequence if the subsequent tactic was undertaken because the prior one failed, or was expected to fail. If one tactic was begun and another one attempted before the expectations of the results could be developed, then these tactics will be classified as multiple simultaneous tactics.

12. A score of 4, 5, 6, 7,8 or 10 on any of questions 8, 9, 10, or 11.

1. multiple tactics
2. no multiple tactics

13. Based on the interviewees comments, how serious a policy issue was it for the association's membership?

1. unimportant
2.
3. moderately important
4.
5. extremely important

APPENDIX G: OPERATIONALIZATION OF CONCEPTS

Note: [informant] indicates the following question was part of the two questionnaires completed by the informants.
- [researcher] indicates that the following question was answered by the researcher after conducting the interview
- [calculation] indicates that the score for the variable was based on a calculation as described

CONCEPT: strategy

DEFINITION: general approach adopted by a trade association to influence the nature of government policy.

OPERATIONALIZATION:

VAR 002 [researcher] Which statement best describes the association's involvement in this issue?

1. as a participant in the policy-making process, OR

2. as outside of the policy-making process, but attempting to influence the content of the final result.

[coding: 1 = participative; 0 = advocacy]

CONCEPT: information dependence

DEFINITION: Information dependence refers to the extent to which the government relies on the trade association and/or its members for information and/or expertise which is useful in formulating policy.

OPERATIONALIZATION:

VAR 010 [informant] How many non-member organizations exist that would be eligible to be members of your association?

VAR 011 [informant] How many member organizations do you have?

VAR 012 [calculation; measure of the total number of firms in the industry] Sum of VAR 010 and VAR 011

VAR 013 [calculation; cintile rank of number of firms in the industry] Scoring: VAR 012 responses will be grouped into five categories of equal size. Those associations falling within the category with the largest number of firms will receive a score of 5; those falling within the category with the smallest number of firms will receive a score of 1. Similarly, those in the moderate categories will receive a score of 2, 3 or 4.

VAR 014 [informant] How much research is conducted by government departments or agencies that relate to this policy issue? (reverse coded)

1. little or none
2.
3. a moderate amount
4.
5. a large amount

VAR 015 [informant] How much expertise is held by employees of government that is relevant to this policy issue? (reverse coded)

1. little or none
2.
3. a moderate amount
4.
5. a large amount

VAR 016 [informant] Did the government department or agency request information from your association about your industry's views on this issue?

1. no
2. not sure
3. yes

[score for this question: 1 = 1; 2 = 3; 3 = 5]

VAR 017 [informant] In your judgment, how much complex or technical information was required in order for the government to make a sound policy decision?

1. none
2.
3. a moderate amount
4.
5. a large amount

VAR 018 [informant] How much technical expertise is held by your members that could have been or was useful for the government department or agency in developing this policy?

1. none
2.
3. a moderate amount
4.
5. a large amount

VAR 019 [informant] How much research is conducted by your members or your association that could have been or was useful for the government department or agency in developing this policy?

1. none
2.
3. a moderate amount
4.
5. a large amount

VAR 020 [informant] To what extent has your association been able to assist the government on previous policy issues?

1. not at all
2.
3. a moderate amount
4.
5. a significant amount of help

VAR 021 [informant] To what extent do you think the government believes itself to be dependent on you for information?

1. not at all
2.
3. a moderate amount
4.
5. highly dependent

VAR 022 [calculation; measure of information dependence] Sum of VAR 013 to 021.

CONCEPT: implementation dependence

DEFINITION: Implementation dependence refers to the extent to which the government relies on the trade association to implement policy.

OPERATIONALIZATION:

VAR 030 [informant] How active has your association been in the implementation of this policy?

1. inactive
2.
3. somewhat active
4.
5. highly active

VAR 031 [informant] How difficult would it have been for the government to implement the policy without your cooperation?

1. very easy
2.
3. somewhat difficult
4.
5. extremely difficult

VAR 032 [informant] To what extent do you think the government relied or relies on you to implement the policy?

1. very little
2.
3. a moderate amount
4.
5. very much

VAR 033 [calculation; first measure of implementation dependence] Average of VAR 030, VAR 031 and VAR 032.

VAR 034 [researcher] To what extent did the specific policy require implementation that could potentially be conducted by the industry association?

1. none
2.
3. a moderate amount
4.
5. a significant amount

CONCEPT: Economic dependence.

DEFINITION: Economic dependence refers to the extent to which the government relies on the trade association and/or its members for such economic benefits as employment and tax revenues.

OPERATIONALIZATION:

VAR 040 [informant] How many individuals are employed within the industry represented by your association?

VAR 041 [calculation] Group data into five categories, with a score of 1 given to associations within the category with the least employees and a 5 given to associations within the category with the greatest number of employees.

VAR 042 [informant] How mobile is your industry? That is, how feasible is it for the industry as a whole to relocate?

1. infeasible
2.
3. somewhat feasible
4.
5. highly feasible

VAR 043 [informant] How frequently have you heard of one of your members threatening to relocate to another province or country?

1. rarely, if ever
2.
3. occasionally
4.
5. frequently

VAR 044 [informant] How capital intensive is the industry? (reverse coded)

1. low capital intensity
2.
3. moderate capital intensity
4.
5. high capital intensity

VAR 045 [calculation: measure of mobility] Average of VAR 042, 043 and 044.

VAR 046 [informant] Relative to other industries in this province, how much of a contribution to the economy is made by your industry?

1. much less than average
2.
3. about average
4.
5. significantly more than average

VAR 047 [calculation: measure of economic dependence] Average of VAR 041, VAR 045 and VAR 046.

CONCEPT: association density

DEFINITION: Association density refers to the proportion of firms within a particular association's domain that hold a membership in the association.

OPERATIONALIZATION:

VAR 050 [informant] How many member organizations do you have?

VAR 051 [informant] Approximately how many organizations exist that would be eligible to be members?

VAR 052 [calculation; measure of association density] VAR 050 / VAR 051

VAR 053 [calculation; rating of association density] Group data into five categories. Assign a score of 1 to those associations within the category with the lowest association density and assign a score of 5 to those within the category with the highest association density, with scores of 2, 3, and 4 for those falling within intermediate categories.

CONCEPT: Autonomy from Members

DEFINITION: Autonomy refers to the extent to which the association officials (i.e. staff and board of directors) is able to take actions without consultation with the remainder of the membership.

OPERATIONALIZATION

VAR 060 [informant] Approximately what percentage of your budget comes from membership dues?

VAR 061 [calculation: relative rating of percentage of budget from membership dues] Group data into five categories, assigning scores between 1 (high percentage) and 5 (low percentage).

VAR 062 [informant] Here is a hypothetical scenario. A proposed government policy is opposed by your members. However, association officials feel that it is in the long-term best interests of its members to go along with it. To what extent do you feel that your association would be able to act according to its own judgment rather than its members' judgment?

1. little ability to act autonomously
2.
3. moderate compromise/sometimes autonomous
4.
5. completely free to act autonomously

VAR 064 [calculation; measure of autonomy] Average of VAR 061 and VAR 062

CONCEPT: Goal divergence

DEFINITION: Goal divergence refers to the extent to which the goals of the industry association diverge from the goals of the relevant government department.

OPERATIONALIZATION:

VAR 070 [informant] How close was the policy preference of your association to that of the government?

1. very similar
2.
3. moderately at odds
4.
5. very divergent

VAR 071 [researcher] To what extent were other outside interest groups making demands on the government which was counter to those proposed by the association? (consider both number of groups and extent of their activity)

1. little or no outside involvement
2.
3. moderate involvement
4.
5. heavy involvement

VAR 072 [calculation; measure of divergence of goals from public interest] Average of VAR 070 and VAR 071

CONCEPT: specificity of Issue

DEFINITION: Specificity of issue refers to the extent to which the policy issue affects groups other than the focal association's members.

OPERATIONALIZATION:

VAR 080 [informant] Is this policy relevant to your industry only? or to other industries as well?

1. only relevant to own industry
2.
3. relevant to some other industries
4.
5. relevant to virtually all industry

VAR 081 [researcher] Was this policy issue relevant to groups other than business (eg. consumers, employees, general public)?

1. little or no relevance to other groups
2.
3. a moderate amount of relevance to other groups
4.
5. of major relevance to other groups

VAR 082 [calculation; measure of specificity of issue] Average of VAR 080 and VAR 081

CONCEPT: direct contact

DEFINITION: includes any combination of the following actions:

- phone calls to politicians and/or bureaucrats
- letters to politicians and/or bureaucrats
- meetings with politicians and/or bureaucrats
- submissions of briefs to politicians, bureaucrats, policy- formation committees, or commissions of inquiry

CONCEPT: joint action

DEFINITION: any successful attempt on the part of the association to gain the support of another organization, individual or group of individuals in presenting its case to government. "Support" by this third party entails efforts on their part (either jointly with the focal association, or separately) to influence the formation of the policy under consideration.

CONCEPT: public route

DEFINITION: any attempt to influence public opinion with the intention of increasing the probability that government policy will be more favourable than it would otherwise be. Such actions include:

- advocacy advertising campaigns
- statements made to the press
- attempts to influence editorial opinion

CONCEPT: grass roots lobbying

DEFINITION: Grass roots lobbying refers to the association's encouragement of individual members to initiate some action to influence the government.

CONCEPT: use of consultant

DEFINITION: The use of a consultant refers to hiring a consulting firm, law firm, accounting firm or some other individual or group to influence the government.

OPERATIONALIZATION OF ADVOCACY TACTICS:

VAR 200 [researcher] Classification of the first type of advocacy tactic undertaken by the association

1. direct contact
2. joint action
3. public route
4. direct contact and joint action
5. direct contact and public route
6. joint action and public route
7. direct contact, joint action and public route
8. direct contact and grass roots lobbying
9. grass roots lobbying
10. consultant and direct contact

VAR 201 [researcher] Classification of the second type of advocacy tactic undertaken by the association

1. direct contact
2. joint action
3. public route
4. direct contact and joint action
5. direct contact and public route
6. joint action and public route
7. direct contact, joint action and public route
8. direct contact and grass roots lobbying
9. grass roots lobbying
10. consultant and direct contact

VAR 202 [researcher] Classification of the third type of advocacy tactic undertaken by the association

1. direct contact
2. joint action
3. public route
4. direct contact and joint action
5. direct contact and public route
6. joint action and public route
7. direct contact, joint action and public route
8. direct contact and grass roots lobbying
9. grass roots lobbying
10. consultant and direct contact

VAR 203 [researcher] Classification of the fourth type of advocacy tactic undertaken by the association

1. direct contact
2. joint action
3. public route
4. direct contact and joint action
5. direct contact and public route
6. joint action and public route
7. direct contact, joint action and public route
8. direct contact and grass roots lobbying
9. grass roots lobbying
10. consultant and direct contact

VAR 204+ (classifying more tactics if necessary)

NOTE: The sequencing of these tactics may not be clear-cut, as the timing of various tactics may overlap. The key to distinguishing between simultaneous tactics and a sequence of tactics is the intention of the actors. They will be considered as a sequence if the subsequent tactic was undertaken because the prior one failed, or was expected to fail. If one tactic was begun and another one attempted before the expectations of the results could be developed, then these tactics will be classified as multiple simultaneous tactics.

CONCEPT: use of multiple tactics

DEFINITION: Multiple tactics will be deemed to occur when two or more advocacy tactics are undertaken simultaneously at some time during the influence process

OPERATIONALIZATION:

VAR 210 [researcher] A score of 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 or 10 on any of VAR 200 to VAR 204.

1. multiple tactics
2. no multiple tactics

CONCEPT: impact of legislation

DEFINITION: The impact of legislation refers to the extent to which the proposed legislation can be expected to impact on the association's member firms' profitability and/or autonomy.

OPERATIONALIZATION:

VAR 220 [researcher] Based on the interviewees comments, how serious a policy issue was it for the association's membership?

1. unimportant
2.
3. moderately important
4.
5. extremely important

APPENDIX H: List of Participative Issues

1. Petroleum Services Association of Canada -- setting safety standards
2. Alberta Restaurant and Foodservices Association -- creation of the Alberta Tourism Education Council
3. Motor Dealers Association of Alberta -- the Automotive Regulatory Board
4. Automotive Service and Repair Association -- the Automotive Regulatory Board
5. Alberta Construction Association -- Builders Lien Act
6. Alberta Home Builders Association -- Builders Lien Act
7. Canadian Association of Oilwell Drilling Contractors -- Builders Lien Act
8. Independent Petroleum Association of Canada -- revisions to the Alberta Royalty Tax Credit
9. Canadian Federation of Independent Grocers -- bottle returns
10. Canadian Council of Grocery Distributors -- bottle returns
11. Canadian Bankers Association -- Alberta Property Security Act
12. Manufactured Housing Association of Alberta -- revisions to the AMHC lending program

APPENDIX I: Government Questionnaire D

Trade association: _____

Specific issue: _____

For each question, please circle 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5.

Please note that your responses to this questionnaire will be treated in confidence. Only aggregations of responses will be presented in any written summary of the study's findings.

1. What is your perception about the economic significance of the industry represented by the trade association relative to other industries in Alberta?

1. much less than average
2.
3. about average
4.
5. significantly greater than average

2. To what extent has the trade association provided you with technical information and/or expertise in the past?

1. not at all
2.
3. a moderate amount
4.
5. a significant amount

3. In your judgment, how much complex or technical information was required in order for the government to make a sound policy decision?

1. little or none
2.
3. a moderate amount
4.
5. a large amount

4. How much research had been conducted by the Alberta government that was applicable to the policy issue?

1. little or none
2.
3. a moderate amount
4.
5. a large amount

5. How much expertise was held by government employees that was relevant to the policy issue?

1. little or none
2.
3. a moderate amount
4.
5. a large amount

6. In your judgment, how much technical expertise was held by the trade association's staff and/or members that could have been or was useful for the government in developing the policy?

1. little or none
2.
3. a moderate amount
4.
5. a large amount

7. In your judgment, how much research was conducted by the trade association's members or staff that could have been or was useful for the government in developing the policy?

1. little or none
2.
3. a moderate amount
4.
5. a large amount

8. To what extent did you feel the government was dependent on the association and/or the firms it represents for information and/or expertise relevant to the policy issue?

1. little or none
2.
3. a moderate amount
4.
5. a large amount

9. How difficult would it have been for the government to implement the policy without the cooperation of the trade association?

1. very easy
2.
3. somewhat difficult
4.
5. extremely difficult

10. How close was the industry's policy preferences to those initially held by government.

1. very similar
2.
3. moderately at odds
4.
5. very divergent

11. At the time of your discussions relating to this issue, how did you regard the trade association?

1. very negatively
2.
3. in a neutral manner
4.
5. very positively

Thank you very much for your time and trouble.

APPENDIX J: Government Interview Schedule

A. Conditions for industry participation in policy-making:

I am interested in understanding the conditions under which trade associations become closely involved in government policy-making. That is, I would like to identify the factors that increase the likelihood that representatives of trade associations will be appointed to committees, or more informally included in the development of government legislation and regulation.

1. What do you see as the most important factors influencing the likelihood of your department closely involving one or more trade associations in the policy process?

(After general question, prompt for type of issue, and characteristics of the industry association)

B. Industry self-regulation

1. I am also interested in the issue of self-regulation, or delegated regulation. Do you have any views about when industry can be expected to regulate themselves? [to be asked of those government informants with some regulatory function]

(Prompt for type of issue and characteristics of the association)

C. Advocacy Tactics

I am also interested in specific tactics undertaken by trade associations to influence government policy.

1. How do you feel about trade associations utilizing the press to help make their preferences known to government? Do you think it helps their case or hinders it?

2. If a specific policy concerns a number of industries, would you prefer to hear from different industry associations separately, or would you prefer that they come to some sort of consensus and then present that consensus to you?

3. Do you have any likes or dislikes regarding any other type of action undertaken by trade associations?

APPENDIX L: Actions to Improve Government Relations

Association:	Action:
1. Managing dependence	
ABPA	generating up-to-date figures on the industry
ACA	avoid criticizing government in the media
ARCA	doing research on issues
ATA	prevent government from making political mistakes putting government people on association committees
CAODC	hiring increased expertise inviting government to technical, legal and safety seminars getting board of directors more involved
CBA	slide shows presented to government
CPA	providing information
CCGD	cooperating on various projects
CFIG	encouraging members to contribute to political campaigns cooperating on various projects sitting on government committees
IBC	keeping government informed; sending them unsolicited information
IPAC	avoiding criticizing government in the media
LANT	sending information
2. Managing Legitimacy	
AGTA	membership drive
ATA	adding outsiders to the board
CAODC	taking the safety issue more seriously

CCHA	increasing membership
CPA	hiring people with high legitimacy
PGAC	taking a leadership role in issues

3. Actions to facilitate communication and/or access

ACA	annual dinner meeting generally keeping in touch contact between members and local politicians
ACR	phone calls newsletters magazines dinners for ministers
AFPA	communicating inviting ministers to social functions
AGTA	communicating
AHBA	regular meetings with government
ARBA	social functions (including golf tournaments) personal ties (executive director with deputy minister of transportation)
ARFA	MLA buddy program
ARCA	inviting government officials to conventions
ATA	gaining experience
CAODC	personability of managing director hiring people with contacts in government caucus dinners
CAC	routine meetings with government lunches, dinners, conferences
CBA	spending increased time on government relations
FEDABC	familiarizing director with government officials
IBC	dinners with politicians

LANT	developing relationship through calls and lunches inviting government officials to functions, conventions
MAA	annual dinner
MDAA	annual meeting with civil servants inviting MLAs for dinner and drinks at Glenora Club giving civil servants planters (of automobile) with plant
MHAA	inviting government officials to conventions maintaining contact through involvement in the housing advisory council sending congratulations and information on association to individuals in new positions
PGAC	cocktail parties
PSAC	gaining experience

4. General Approach in Direct Contact with Government

AGTA	empathizing with government's position
ARFA	being patient
CAC	avoiding taking an adversarial approach
CPA	maintaining an amiable relationship
IPAC	emphasizing effect, not therapy
LANT	cooperating with government
MAA	cooperating with government
MDAA	cooperating with government
MHAA	avoiding hollering and screaming
PGAC	praising government when they do things right